Then Vice President Richard Nixon traveled to the Soviet Union in 1959, leading up to President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s second attempt at détente with the Soviet Union. On this trip Nixon met with Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev. Together they traveled to an American Exhibition, where “the kitchen debate” took place. During this debate Khrushchev, who felt threatened by the presentation of the standard of living of the American middle class, became increasingly hostile towards Nixon. Responding to Khrushchev’s boasting that Soviet workers were superior and the Soviet Union would soon surpass the US Nixon said, “But these men, Soviet and American, work together well for peace…This is the way it should be.”[1] Because Nixon lost the 1960 election to John F. Kennedy he was not immediately able to follow up his rhetoric at the kitchen debate with his own foreign policy of détente. During his political hiatus, Nixon used this opportunity to build upon his already impressive foreign policy credentials. From 1963 to 1968 Nixon made highly publicized trips to Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, meeting important leaders and political officials, familiarizing himself with the pressing foreign policy issues of the day.[2]
In 1968 Richard Nixon ran as the “law and order” candidate, but his interest was in international issues rather than domestic issues.[3] Historian David Greenberg claims that Nixon wanted to be remembered as a “peacemaker who ended the Vietnam War and relaxed cold war tensions, especially through his China initiative and the improved relations with the Soviet Union known as détente.”[4] These lofty goals of achieving peace in Vietnam and better relations with both China and Russia not only show which issues Nixon believed were most pressing for the country but also his confidence in his ability to conduct foreign relations. Each individual foreign policy goal had its own set of pressures. Examining the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy superficially, it would appear that rapprochement with China, peace in Vietnam, and détente with the Soviet Union were equally important. Furthermore, on the surface it is not clear which pressure influenced his decision making most: domestic opinion, economic constraints, Congressional pressures, or a relative decline in US military power when compared to the Soviet Union. But upon closer inspection it would appear that Nixon was most concerned with the relative decline of US military power as characterized by the Soviet Union achieving nuclear parity with the US. As a result, Nixon’s main foreign policy priority was to pursue détente with the Soviet Union in order to achieve an arms limitation treaty.
This paper will first give an historiographic overview of the relevant secondary sources on Nixon’s foreign policy while also discussing the use of primary sources. It will then proceed to define key terms to orient the discussion that follows. To place Nixon’s motivations and decision making in context, a brief section on the power-cycle theory of foreign policy will follow. The final section will address how Nixon approached defensive and offensive strategic weapons before exploring the Moscow Summit and the SALT I Treaty.
Historiography
When discussing Nixon’s foreign policy, two main schools of thought exist on what influenced his foreign policy most: domestic or international considerations. Even within these different schools of thought disagreement persists among historians over which events, pressures, or limitations are important and actually had the greatest influence. Political scientists Richard Stevenson and Robert Litwak agree that Vietnam had a significant impact on how Nixon conducted his foreign policy. Stevenson argues that the US began to shift resources to the buildup of conventional forces to wage the Vietnam War, allowing the Soviet Union to close the missile gap by investing in strategic weapons.[5] Additionally the United States’ position in the Middle East diminished allowing the Soviet Union to fill the vacuum, specifically in Algeria, Egypt, and Syria.[6] Litwak, on the other hand, believes that the Nixon Doctrine, as a way to cope with the new limitations of American power, was a direct result of the Vietnam War, which was the first time in the twentieth century that American military power was unable to successfully exert political influence abroad.[7] Litwak also believes that the Vietnam War caused a shift from a bipolar world to a multipolar world, giving the United States more latitude to conduct foreign policy.[8] By contrast, Stevenson argues that despite the rise of other powers economically or politically, like China, Japan, and West Germany, it was still a bipolar world strategically divided between the US and Soviet Union.[9] Historian Longin Pastusiak presents a more general decline of American power; economic and military decline compared to the Soviet Union, as well as political and economic advancement by allies in Western Europe and Japan.[10] Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis argues that Nixon was motivated by balance of power considerations, particularly in promoting parity in strategic weapons to ease tensions between the Soviet Union and United States.[11]
Stevenson also makes a general argument about détente, claiming that it is a cumulative enterprise.[12] Therefore, when Nixon pursued détente—what Stevenson calls “Moscow Détente”—he owed its success to the three periods of détente which came before, the “spirit of Geneva,” the “spirit of Camp David,” and “Post-Missile Crisis Detente.” Moscow Détente, however, differed from the earlier periods of détente because it lasted significantly longer—almost four years as opposed to fifteen months, at most—and more substantial progress was achieved. [13] Stevenson attributes the success achieved during Moscow Détente to it not being based on ‘atmospherics’ like the previous three periods had been.[14]
Similarly, those historians who believe that domestic issues most significantly influenced Nixon’s foreign policy disagree on what placed the greatest pressure on him. American political historian John Robert Greene argues that domestic politics constrained Nixon’s ability to effectively conduct foreign policy; for the first time in 120 years the Democrats controlled both the House and the Senate and introduced bills, like the Vietnam disengagement bill, which made it difficult for the Republican Nixon to make progress in peace negotiations.[15] International historian Jeremi Suri and historian William Bundy claim that domestic pressure was what actually constrained Nixon’s politics. Suri argues that Nixon was forced to respond to direct social action, like the civil rights movement, women’s liberation movement, and anti-war protest.[16] Alternatively, Bundy argues that the public pressure had a more indirect impact by placing pressure on senators and representatives to affect foreign policy by cutting funds for the nuclear program, for example. [17]
This paper will build from Stevenson’s argument that the world remained bipolar. And, although the paper will agree that the Vietnam War caused the United States to fall behind in strategic weapons it will argue that the Soviet Union achieving parity was the main reason for Nixon to pursue détente. Gaddis’s argument that Nixon’s foreign policy was motivated by balance of power considerations, which Nixon believed could be achieved through arms limitation treaties, will be used as well. Greene’s and Bundy’s arguments that Congress placed constraints on Nixon’s foreign policy will be pursued in-so-far as it limited the defense budget and the United States’ strategic weapons, further motivating Nixon to pursue arms limitation negotiations to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving strategic superiority.
Primary sources include memoirs from both Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger (Nixon’s National Security Advisor), National Security Decision Memoranda, and contemporary articles from the New York Times. Reflections from Nixon and Kissinger, along with the National Security Decision Memoranda, will reveal what they, as policy makers, believed were the most important issues facing national security at the time. Conversely, newspaper articles will show how the public responded to the Nixon administration’s foreign policy and highlight issues that the public believed was most important. Public sentiment itself can be a powerful limit to power, but it can also be reflected in Congress, which can place further constraints on policy making power of the administration.
Defining Détente
Important to understanding Nixon’s foreign policy is to have a clear conception of the terms used when discussing arms limitation talks and détente. Generally speaking, Nixon’s foreign policy could be characterized by détente—usually defined as the relaxation of tensions between two nations, in this case the US and Soviet Union.[18] Stevenson provides two ways to think about détente, as a process and as a condition. Détente as a condition of relations between two nations should be understood as residing in the middle of a spectrum of tensions from high to low—war, cold war, détente, entente, and alliance. This definition of détente includes not only tensions eased from cold war to détente, but also escalated from entente to détente, conflicting with the traditional definition of detente.[19] To understand détente as a process it is implied that the easing of tensions between two already friendly nations could be considered détente, though this seems counter intuitive.[20] Stevenson provides a more careful definition of détente to capture more accurately the changes in the dynamics of the relationship between two nations when détente is occurring. Stevenson’s definition is as follows: “the process of easing of tension between states whose interests are so radically divergent that reconciliation is inherently limited.”[21] So the conditional aspect of increased tensions between two states must already exist for the process of easing that tension to result in détente.
Three periods of détente had occurred before Nixon could pursue his own in 1969. The first of these periods known as the “spirit of Geneva,” emerged as tensions between the Soviet Union and United State appeared to be escalating to a potentially dangerous level. By 1955 both President Eisenhower and Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, having secured their position of leadership and wishing to avoid a nuclear confrontation, initiated the first summit between major powers since the Second World War. [22] Though the spirit of Geneva lasted only about a year it did reestablish communication between the USSR and US for the first time since World War II, and it confirmed a mutual desire to avoid nuclear war.[23] The following period of détente, the “spirit of Camp David,” between the same two leaders marked the first time a Soviet leader had visited the US, but it achieved nothing noteworthy and only lasted a few months in 1959.[24] The spirit of Camp David détente was more heavily based on atmospherics and “personal diplomacy”—Eisenhower and Khrushchev essentially willed détente to occur—so when the U-2 incident occurred, an American spy plane was shot down over Soviet airspace, the period of détente did not have a strong foundation and came to an end.[25]The third period, “Post-Missile Crisis Détente,” between Khrushchev and President John F. Kennedy, was a reaction to how close to war the United States and Soviet Union came as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis. This period of detente lasted from 1963 to 1964, though it had no clear end and an attitude of peaceful coexistence persisted, and more importantly resulted in the establishment of a Hotline between the US and USSR and the signing of the Test-Ban Treaty and Non-Proliferation Treaty.[26] From these periods of détente a dialog was established which Nixon would utilize and it was shown that concrete results could be the product of détente, particularly in limiting and regulating strategic weapons.
Détente was not Nixon’s only foreign policy objective and to achieve his various goals he also used linkage. Kissinger believed that two kinds of linkage existed. The first was when two separate negotiation objectives are linked intentionally so as to use one as leverage to achieve the other.[27] An example of the Nixon administration linking two separate objectives in negotiations was using rapprochement with China as leverage in arms limitation discussions with the Soviet Union. The second kind of linkage was a product of the nature of the Cold War. Because the world was interconnected through economic and alliance systems the actions of one state, especially a major power, in one region would reverberate and have effects on other areas.[28] The administration also used linkage in this sense to couple progress in arms and trade agreements with the Soviet Union to bring stability to the Middle East and peace in Vietnam. More generally, when the Nixon administration was conducting foreign policy it was seeking to connect political issues with strategic issues, to achieve a lasting period of détente.[29] To truly ease tensions between the Soviet Union and the US, it was not sufficient to resolve only strategic issues when there were underlying political issues that were a more fundamental source of tension between the two nations. Easing these national security concerns as a result of strategic issues was a necessary prerequisite for the resolution of political issues to be advanced.
If linkage was a prioritization of diplomatic issues, the Nixon Doctrine was a prioritization of military obligations. The Nixon Doctrine was an “asymmetrical response” of playing to the United States military strengths to compensate for shortcomings and depending on allies to meet the needs that the US was unable to.[30] Not only had it become clear in 1968 that the US would not be able to achieve victory in Vietnam due to the erosion of popular support as a result of the Tet Offensive, but it obviously did not have the military capabilities to unilaterally ensure its interests were protected abroad.[31] Instead the US would channel its influence through regional strategic defense systems to shift the burden of containment away from the United States and to regional powers.[32] The Nixon administration hoped that détente with the Soviet Union would create stability in the periphery so that the shift of responsibilities to regional allies would transition smoothly.[33]
The Vietnam War also impacted on economy of the US and as a result federal spending—importantly the funding of the development of nuclear weapons. The Vietnam War spurred inflation and deflated the US dollar, pressuring Congress to cut the defense budget.[34] Until Nixon’s presidency, the US had enjoyed nuclear supremacy—having significantly more nuclear weapons than one’s opponent. Nuclear sufficiency—the number of nuclear weapons needed to decimate another nation—had already been achieved by both the United States and Soviet Union. Now, with the increased production of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union and the new budgetary constraints for the US Defense Department, the Nixon administration struggled to accept nuclear parity—having roughly the same nuclear capabilities—with the Soviet Union and the implications this would have on foreign policy.
On the other side of the diplomatic table, the Soviet Union had been advocating for peaceful coexistence with the United States since Khrushchev first formalized it in 1956.[35] By the 1970s, under the regime of Leonid Brezhnev in the Soviet Union, the meaning of peaceful coexistence had shifted. For the Soviet Union, peaceful coexistence meant that war was not the inevitable result of competition between two countries with opposing social structures.[36] In the US liberals not only accepted the legitimacy of the idea of peaceful coexistence but believed it was necessary because the arms race was too costly and unwinnable. Conservatives, on the other hand, had a deep-seated distrust of the Soviet Union and subscribed to “peace through strength.”[37]
Diplomatic Theory behind Détente
Some political scientists claim that early in the Cold War containment policy became closely tied with negotiating from a position of strength.[38] Stevenson broadens this claim to apply to all countries, but tempers it in another way by arguing that the “perception of strength” need only require a “minimum degree of confidence in national security.”[39] Stevenson’s definition does not seem to clash with intuition quite like the original claim made by political scientists. Strength can be measured in many different ways—economic, political, and by conventional and strategic military means—but when entering into arms control negotiations it would seem that both nations could not approach from a position of strength in military power. Though both nations could approach negotiations feeling relatively confident with the position of their national security. The irony of approaching negotiations from a position of strength is that at the beginning of the Cold War the US was in this position, but policy makers postponed negotiations waiting to attain this position of strength, allowing the Soviet Union the time it needed to increase its own strength.[40] Stevenson’s definition does seem to be a necessary preexisting condition for negotiations to begin, but it does not explain what would push a nation to pursue negotiations.
One such push factor could be that if one nation realizes that its power was in relative decline, then it may pursue negotiations to prevent itself from falling behind its competitors. The power cycle theory alludes to this type of motivation in diplomatic relations. Political scientists Brock Tessman and Steve Chan theorize that a power in decline could benefit from a preventive war while a rising power would be inclined to postpone a coming war as long as possible.[41] Preventive war was not an option for the Nixon administration as the Soviet Union had already attained nuclear sufficiency. The introduction of nuclear weapons had made war between the United States and Soviet Union a deadly endeavor for either side. If war was not an option for defending one’s supremacy, then it would seem that diplomacy ought to be used to the same end.
Nixon and Kissinger had another goal they were pursuing that pushed them to enter negotiations with the Soviet Union: balance of power. Kissinger believed that establishing a balance of power between the Soviet Union and United States was necessary for peace.[42] Another proponent of the power cycle theory, political scientist Young-Kwan Yoon, posits that global stability is achieved through a balance of power, and although stability usually implies peace, balance of power has not been sufficient to prevent major wars. [43]
At the time of détente, The United States had a minimal sense of national security, as Stevenson argues is required to pursue negotiations. US power also appeared to be in relative decline, giving Nixon and Kissinger reason to believe that it was in the United States’ best interest to pursue détente to prevent further decline of American power. And finally, Nixon and Kissinger’s belief that the balance of power would ensure peace and order suggests that a position of strength was not a prerequisite for negotiations nor was it an objective of negotiations.
Other Policy Considerations
Though Nixon entered office hoping to achieve détente with the Soviet Union there were other issue which required his attention as well. In 1968, only months before Nixon was elected president, the North Vietnamese launched a major offensive, the Tet Offensive. Though the US military touted the Tet Offensive as a military victory, claiming that the South Vietnamese performed admirably, it was a political victory for the North Vietnamese.[44] The images of North Vietnamese troops in the courtyard of the US embassy, the center of American power in South Vietnam, became symbolic of the deteriorating situation for the US in Vietnam. Lunched in an election year, the North Vietnamese offensive cast into doubt the Johnson administration’s reports that the US was winning the war and victory was close at hand.[45] That same year a US Army Company, under the command of Lieutenant William Calley, committed atrocities in the South Vietnamese village of Mỹ Lai, raping and murdering the civilians who lived there. When the Mỹ Lai Massacre was revealed to the American public in 1969, Americans began to question the morality of the Vietnam War as well.[46] In early 1969 Nixon began a bombing campaign of Cambodia code named “Menu” to take out the Ho Chi Minh trail running through Laos and Cambodia and North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia, from which the North Vietnamese army raided South Vietnam.[47] In 1970 Nixon expanded the war into Cambodia to eliminate the North Vietnamese sanctuaries, and in 1971 further expanded it into Laos to cut off the Ho Chi Minh Trail.[48] A second major offensive by the North Vietnamese army, began on March 30, 1972, named the Easter Offensive attacked on three fronts and initially made major gains.[49] By mid-September the South Vietnamese army retook most of the territory taken by the North Vietnamese.[50] All the while Nixon was implementing “Vietnamization,” transitioning the burden of military operations from the US military to the South Vietnamese military, allowing Nixon to gradually withdraw US troops.[51] The North Vietnamese coordinated their major offensives, the Tet and Easter Offensive, with American election years, forcing the war to be a political issue and blurring the lines between foreign and domestic policy.
Some scholars argue that the distinction between foreign and domestic policy is not a true distinction at all, and there is a complicated causal relationship between the two. In this sense, détente could be thought of as a direct response to the social disruption that occurred during the 1960s, and 1968 specifically, as a means of subduing these internal pressures.[52] Antiwar protests persisted through to Nixon’s presidency, and even escalated as US troops invaded Cambodia. Nixon hoped that his efforts towards peace with the Soviet Union and China would not only appease the demonstrators but could give him leverage in peace negotiations with North Vietnam. Antiwar protests pressured Nixon to move his Cambodia update to the beginning of June from the end of the month in 1970, and at the same time the Senate was moving to cut funds for operations in Cambodia.[53] Domestic pressures became such that, by the spring of 1970, Nixon was scrambling for a foreign policy success going into midterm elections in November.[54]
When Nixon entered office, the Democrats held majorities in both houses. This situation only worsened in the 1970 midterm election. Not only did the Democrats maintain their control of both houses of Congress, but the Republicans suffered a net loss of seven congressmen.[55] By the end of 1970 it was irrelevant that both houses of Congress were held by Democrats; Nixon’s heavy-handed approach to get the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) legislation passed and his nomination of the unqualified Clement F. Haynsworth to the Supreme Court alienated Republican and Democrats alike, to the point where there was effectively no relationship between Congress and the White House.[56] Although Nixon was barely able to get the ABM legislation passed, he was not able to get Haynsworth approved, with seventeen Republicans voting against the nomination.[57] The bipartisan disapproval of the Nixon Administration made it difficult for him to achieve his goals, especially in foreign policy. In addition to the resistance during the ABM debate, Congress repeatedly introduced bills that would cut the defense budget or end the United States military involvement in Vietnam. To prevent the president from involving the United States in another conflict like Vietnam Congress passed the War Powers Act in 1973 to rein in some of the authority granted to the executive to conduct war in the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed almost a decade earlier.[58] The state of the US economy also had an effect on congressional policies as well as foreign and domestic policy. The economic policies of previous administrations had created an environment which inherently limited Nixon’s policy options. Public and foreign policy of the 1960s accelerated the balance-of-payment problem which began in 1950. As the European and Japanese markets rebounded from the disruption of World War II, American imports increased while American capital flowed from domestic to foreign markets. [59] The guns and butter policies proposed by President Lyndon B. Johnson—his Great Society legislation and the Vietnam War—exacerbated the balance-of-payment problem and resulted in inflation.[60] The economic strain which resulted from the Vietnam War was sufficient to dissuade both hawks and doves alike to support a “major troop commitment or a large reserve call-up” when Johnson called for one in 1968.[61] This is the economic situation that Nixon inherited and it did not improve under his administration, by 1969 the economy was moving towards stagflation.[62] To add to Nixon’s economic woes the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) had threatened to use oil as a political and economic weapon. In response to this threat NATO allies did not allow American planes headed for Israel use their airspace or use American military supply depots in Europe.[63] As a result of the US aiding Israel in the Yom Kippur War in 1973 OPEC followed through with its threat and placed an embargo on all oil to be shipped to the US.[64] As a result of the oil embargo there were lines at gas stations, and it became a central point of public policy.[65] The oil embargo could have created more problems than just domestic strife; it could have had a more significant impact on the economy, and also affected national security in the form of an energy crisis.
Nuclear Power: American Decline and Soviet Ascendance
Throughout the 1960s the United States had experienced a relative decline in power, and several events during Nixon’s presidency revealed the limitations on US power. The first incident occurred in 1969 when an American EC-121 patrol plane was shot down by North Korean fighter planes, killing the entire crew of thirty-one. The American plane was on a routine patrol, during the day, outside of North Korean territorial waters; these patrols had been conducted for years without any complaint from North Korea.[66] Instead of retaliating, Nixon’s response was limited to requiring future patrols to have fighter escorts. In coming to this decision, Nixon had to consider the repercussions that retaliation against North Korean would have on relations with the Soviet Union and on the conduct of the Vietnam War.[67]
The second incident happened about a year later when a U-2 spy plane conducting surveillance of Cuba revealed the construction of new barracks, communications facilities, and SAM batteries at the Cienfuegos naval base. Additional intelligence revealed four Soviet ships in the area, the Ura-class submarine tender, two barges to handle the radioactive waste from a submarine’s nuclear reactor, and a nuclear submarine. This information suggested that the Soviets were violating the post-Cuban Missile Crisis “understanding” reached in 1962 and planned again to install offensive weapons in Cuba.[68] Kissinger was able, through his diplomatic channel with Anatoly Dobrynin, to get assurances that the Soviet Union was not placing offensive weapons in Cuba.[69] The specifics of this agreement were ambiguous, though. Was its intent to limit nuclear submarines carrying conventional weapons or diesel submarines carrying nuclear weapons? As a result of this ambiguity, both types of submarines continued to port at Cienfuegos, and so the agreement came to prohibit nuclear submarines armed with nuclear weapons.[70] Although the Soviet Union failed to establish a permanent base from which they could dock nuclear-powered submarines with nuclear weapons to counter American forward strategic missile bases in Europe their willingness to blatantly violate the 1962 agreement shows how much their confidence in their nuclear abilities had grown in under ten years.
Even the United States’ predominance over her allies seemed to be splintering. With the election of Willy Brandt—a Social Democrat—in Germany in 1969 Germany began to pursue its own policy of détente with the Soviet Union called Ostpolitik.[71] Both Nixon and Kissinger believed that this would weaken the NATO alliance and give the appearance that Nixon was not the leader of a cohesive anti-Soviet bloc in Europe. By leveraging this split the Soviets could be able to make advances which would threaten Western security.[72] French president Charles de Gaulle also pursued the interests of his own country during the 1960s. In 1964, France established direct diplomatic ties with China, subverting the bipolar Soviet-America partition of the globe.[73] Also during this period, France developed its own nuclear arsenal that would effectively be its own independent strike force.[74] This increasing independence of France from American hegemony culminated when, in 1966, de Gaulle relieved France of its military obligations to NATO, though he still retained France’s political position within the alliance.[75] The independent action of France made it appear that the United States was losing control over its allies.
As US power seemed to be declining, the Soviet Union seemed to be accruing power. When Alexander Dubček was elected the premier of Czechoslovakia, he began to call for “greater freedoms and more liberal internal practices.”[76] Despite making assurances that he would not make any external policy changes and would continue to be a full, active member of the Warsaw Pact, these changes were still a threat to Soviet predominance in Eastern Europe.[77] In 1968, Soviet leaders took steps to reassert their dominance in the region by sending Warsaw Pact troops to occupy Prague. The limited response of the US and its NATO allies to this action reassured the Kremlin of its security in its sphere of influence, furthermore, the Kremlin’s ability to protect socialism in the Eastern Bloc had been tacitly approved by the West. [78] The Soviet Union was looking to also expand its influence beyond Eastern Europe and was giving military aid to several Arab states, namely Egypt and Syria.[79]
Additionally, the strategic superiority that the United States had enjoyed for the entire postwar period was surrendered in 1967 by a self-imposed limitation of Minutemen and Titan intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and Polaris submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).[80] At the rate that the Soviet Union was producing missiles, the number of missiles capable of reaching the US by 1969 would match that of the United States’ total arsenal and, continuing at that pace through the 1970s, would come to exceed that of the US.[81] The Soviet Union also already had in place an ABM system while Nixon was trying to get legislation to approve an ABM system in the US pushed through Congress.[82] A functional ABM system could give the Soviet Union first strike capabilities without the fear of an effective retaliatory strike by the United States. Eliminating second-strike capabilities of the US would significantly shifting the balance and dynamics of power in Moscow’s favor. The successful test of a Soviet multiple independent targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) in the early 1970s showed that not only would the Soviet Union be able to match the United State quantitatively but qualitatively as well.[83] The Soviet Union, with Warsaw Pact troops, had a larger conventional force than the US and its NATO allies as well. If the Soviet Union were also to gain superiority in strategic weapons, especially with a functioning ABM system, then the security of Western Europe would be called into question and US national security would be at risk as well.
The Consolidation of Foreign Policy Power in the White House
Foreign policy was a primary concern for Nixon, and he wanted to have as much control over its development and implementation as possible. Part of the reason for his desire for control was his distrust of the State Department, which he developed during his tenure as vice president under President Eisenhower. Nixon believed that liberal bureaucrats in the State Department were serving their own self-interests instead of that of the country and the president.[84] His distrust of the State Department and his desire for foreign policy to be directed from the White House was made evident by his appointments. Henry Kissinger was appointed as National Security Advisor before Nixon selected a Secretary of State.[85] Nixon’s appointment to the position of Secretary of State, William P. Rogers, further reveals his motives. Rogers was appointed because of his inexperience in foreign affairs, although Nixon defended his choice by saying that Rogers would dutifully represent Nixon in both the State Department and when meeting with foreign officials.[86]
The restructuring of the National Security Council occurred very early in Nixon’s presidency, on January 20, 1969, and was one of the first directives from the Security Council, in National Security Decision Memorandum 2 (NSDM).[87] Kissinger also reorganized how the Security Council would conduct its business, dividing memos between National Security Study Memoranda—for issues that needed research—and NSDM—those issues which were reported to the president.[88] This restructuring would shift foreign policy decision making from the State Department to the White House.[89] As a result of this shift from the State Department to the National Security Council, Kissinger was able to gain a great deal of influence over foreign policy as he was adjacent to the President and met with him regularly.[90]
Nixon also wanted his foreign policy to be isolated from public influence. Nixon was a shrewd politician, and, although he knew that the two could not be totally separated, he did not want the public to dictate foreign policy. Early in his presidency Nixon wrote on a State Department report on Middle East policy that referred to domestic political considerations that the security interests of the nation, not domestic considerations, would affect his policy and that he did not want domestic considerations to be referenced in future reports.[91] He later wrote that leadership by consensus can work for domestic policy but not for foreign policy. In Nixon’s mind leadership by consensus selects the popular option, not the correct option, and selection of the correct option is entirely important in foreign policy, even if it was unpopular.[92] Nixon was also secretive in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. Several NSDMs concluded with reminders of the importance to avoid leaks and limit public comments, with emphasis added as arms limitation talks approached.[93] Nixon’s desire to control public comments and limit leaks suggests a concern that public knowledge of this policy could result in pressure that would unavoidably affect foreign policy. Although Nixon did not ultimately believe that foreign policy would affect the outcome of elections, he believed that the important issues, like “crime, busing, drugs, welfare, [and] inflation” had a more direct impact on the public and would be the issues to decide an election.[94] Leaks regarding the conduct of foreign policy and national security issues could further constrain Nixon’s ability to effectively conduct foreign policy and gain the trust of foreign leaders.
Congress has a constitutionally mandated role in foreign policy, namely the senatorial approval of treaties, but also the power to appropriate funds to the defense budget. Nixon knew that he would have to work with Congress if he was to achieve his foreign policy goals, but again he sought to limit their involvement. For Nixon the domestic battle for ABMs was a challenge to assert his “control over foreign policy and [dominance over] Congress.”[95] Kissinger recalled that the standard practice for briefing Congress on sensitive military operations involved only key members of Congress.[96] Despite Nixon’s desire, and efforts, to limit Congress’s involvement in foreign policy, it was still able to affect policy, frustrating Nixon. When Congress introduced ten separate resolutions to withdraw troops from Vietnam in 1969, Nixon complained that the behavior of Congress was preventing him from conducting “meaningful negotiations.”[97]
Strategic Arms Limitation and Balance of Power
To begin conducting foreign policy, the National Security Council first had to determine strategic needs of the United States. NSDM 16 laid out four criteria for strategic sufficiency. This strategic sufficiency was only in the event of a nuclear attack, but strategic sufficiency would also be necessary for successful arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. First, the United States would have to maintain a second-strike capability, which would deter any attacks on American strategic forces. Second, and related to the first, the United States would have to maintain forces to deter a Soviet first strike in a crisis. Third, the criteria for strategic sufficiency is to maintain parity with the Soviet Union to be able to match destructive capabilities. Lastly, the development of a defense network to minimize damage from “small attacks or accidental launches” was needed.[98] Of the four criteria for strategic sufficiency the first three had already been achieved, as suggested by the word “maintain.” The final criterion was different, though, and likely referred to the ABM program specifically. Missile defense was an area of the arms race where the US lagged behind the Soviet Union.
The Soviet advantage in ABMs concerned the Nixon administration. If one nation had a functional ABM system then it could successfully launch a first strike, targeting and eliminating the strategic capabilities of its opponent, greatly reducing the risk of a successful retaliatory strike. With the opponent’s strategic capabilities neutralized, the conventional forces could be employed without risk of further escalation. Nixon also claimed that if the United States were to enter arms negotiations without an ABM system as a bargaining chip he might be forced to give up something else in its place.[99]
The ABM program was not popular with the urban public and congress was looking to cut defense spending, making it a challenge to get the program approved.[100] Experts called into question the efficacy of an ABM system as well, and there were fears that it would exacerbate the arms race.[101] Despite the intense opposition to ABM legislation, it finally passed in 1969 with Vice President Spiro Agnew casting the deciding vote in the Senate.[102]
If it is true that a minimum sense of national security is necessary to enter into negotiations, and it is also true that Soviet superiority in ABMs could give them first strike capabilities, then it would seem that without an ABM system the US would not be able to enter negotiations with the Soviet Union. Although, according to Kissinger, the mere potential of an active US ABM system was worrisome to the Soviet Union because the United States’ technological advantage would quickly result in superiority for the US.[103] All Nixon needed was the threat of an active ABM system to enter negotiations and use as a bargaining chip.
The administration made limiting ABMs a priority in arms limitation talks. In the initial memorandum preparing different options for SALT, two of the four policy options were to set ABM levels at zero, or at the National Command Authority (NCA) level so that ABM sites were only stationed outside each nation’s capital.[104] Nixon and Kissinger wanted to link discussions on offensive and defensive weapons systems, but priority was given was to defensive systems. As one memoranda said, negotiations could “concentrate on defensive systems” for first few weeks of negotiations before offensive and defensive negotiations should be “considered equally.”[105] This emphasis by the administration on defensive weapons negotiations, and the ultimate goal of elimination of ABMs, suggests Nixon’s concern over the Soviet advantage. ABM systems did not only comprise of interceptor missiles and launchers, they also included “large phased-array radar” systems.[106] For the administration it seems that the only destabilizing element of the ABM system was the actual missile component. Nixon was willing to allow the Soviet Union to continue building its radar system—the Hen House—so long as it was not used in conjunction with an ABM system and the United States had the right to “equivalency.”[107] Equivalency could be understood in terms of parity, and suggests that Nixon believed that parity should be maintained in all aspects of strategic weapons, including radar systems to detect missile launches.
The Johnson administration’s answer to the Soviet ABM system was to overwhelm it with MIRVs, which would allow the US to launch more individual warheads without needing to increase the number of missiles.[108] In MIRVs specifically the US had superiority, but in ICBMs the Soviet Union had achieved parity. The test of the Soviet SS-9 missile in early 1971 meant that the gap in MIRV superiority enjoyed by the US could close as well. The SS-9 missile’s size would allow it to carry either the largest warhead in existence or several smaller warheads at the same time, though experts believed it would be about five years before the Soviet Union could master MIRV technology.[109]
As concerned as Nixon was about defensive weapons systems, limiting offensive weapons was also a high priority. The Soviet Union had reached parity with the United States, and if it continued to expand its missile production at the rate it was then it would soon surpass the US in missile capacity. Nixon believed that security and stability were not possible if one nuclear power felt insecure as the result of the other having strategic superiority.[110] To cap the number of total offensive weapons would be to eliminate a source of competition between the Soviet Union and United States. The hope of an arms limitation agreement was that through the elimination of the source of competition in the arms race by way of parity of strategic weapons both nations would have a relatively strong sense of national security. There would be a balance of power, and ultimately peace and stability.
Initially the administration sought a general freeze of ICBM launcher, SLBMs, and strategic heavy bombers.[111] But limiting the number of offensive missiles does not necessarily cap the destructive capabilities of missiles. So, in an effort to eliminate the arms race, it would shift efforts from missile production to missile size and payload capacity. The Soviet Union was already ahead of the US in respect to missile size with the SS-9 missile. Later in the SALT talk the administration’s focus shifted to address these issues. NSDM 158 advised that it should be agreed upon that “launchers for older, heavy ICBMs…cannot be converted to accept Modern Large Ballistic Missiles (MLBMs).”[112] This memorandum also suggested that a maximum depth and diameter of launchers, as well as the classification of heavy strategic ballistic missiles, should be defined and agreed upon.[113]
The Channel and SALT Negotiations
Nixon’s National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador to the US Anatoly Dobrynin conducted most of the interaction between the Soviet Union and the US through what would later be called ‘the Channel’.[114] According to Kissinger, these two men were given the authority to speak on behalf of their respective governments on major issues. When it seemed that progress could be made on an issue it was moved to official diplomatic channels, and if an issue reached an impasse there it would be brought back to the Channel.[115] The idea behind the Channel was not only to prevent deadlocks on the official level of diplomatic interaction but to act as a sounding board of sorts, to “unofficially” present ideas and gauge the other’s receptiveness to the idea. It was through this connection that détente, and more specifically limitation of strategic arms discussions, began when the Channel was established in 1969.
After the Channel was established, discussions on arms limitation began, switching between official channels—which also switched between Vienna and Helsinki—and the unofficial Kissinger-Dobrynin Channel. At times both the official and unofficial channels were open and conducting negotiations simultaneously, leading to confusion. The negotiation on arms limitations lasted until May 1972, when the SALT Treaty was adopted. The amount of time it took to come to an agreement on offensive and defensive strategic weapons suggest the complexity of the issues that were being discussed and how far each side had to come to reach a common understanding.
The Soviet Union too was looking to improve relations with the United States. A new weapons program would put further strain on an already stressed Soviet economy.[116] With a decreased military budget the Soviet government hoped to reinvest in its domestic economy.[117] In addition to an economic incentive to enter into arms limitation talks, the Soviet Union was experiencing a grain shortage at the beginning of the 1970s, due to crop failures and a generally ineffective agricultural system.[118] In this instance the needs of the Soviet Union and interests of the US aligned. The United States had a surplus of crops to be sold, and in 1971 Nixon authorized a grain sale to the USSR.[119] This gesture of good will showed that the two superpowers could come to a mutually beneficial agreement. Kissinger also suggested that the United States offering to limit their ABM program served to further persuade the Soviets to enter into SALT talks.[120]
The priorities of either super-power were not as convergent in the case of arms limitations. The Soviet Union sought to limit defensive strategic weapons whereas the United States’ goal was to limit offensive strategic weapons, although Nixon ultimately wanted to link offensive and defensive strategic weapons. In the first round of negotiations in Helsinki, the Soviet Union proposed a ban on ABMs and a moratorium on MIRV testing. Negotiations ran into a fundamental disagreement early on, because the Soviets wanted to define “strategic” as any weapon that could reach the other’s territory. This definition of strategic would include all of the United States’ aircraft based Western Europe and on aircraft carriers while excluding all of the Soviet missiles and bombers which could strike Western Europe.[121] For Nixon to accept this definition of strategic weapons would be to effectively abandon his European allies.
While trying to reach a common agreement with the Soviet Union, the Nixon administration also had to work with a hostile Congress. In 1969, in response to Congressional pressures, Nixon ordered the Sentinel ABM system’s deployment to be stopped.[122] Despite being a small percentage of the defense budget the ABM system was a visible program and as a result it was targeted as wasteful and diverting funds from domestic programs by the Senate.[123] Congressional attacks on the defense budget did not end with the ABM system; MIRVs, the B-1 bomber, new aircraft carriers and submarines, the F-14 and F-15 fighter jets, and the Cheyenne helicopters were under threat of having their funding cut as well.[124] Congressional efforts to cut the defense budget could have reaffirmed Nixon’s belief that an arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union was not only in the best interest of the country but necessary. Limiting the arms race would relieve the pressure to continue to expand the United States missile program, decreasing the amount of capital necessary to fund the program.
Congress’s involvement with the SALT discussions also created complications with the progression of negotiations. The Soviet Union had agreed to the American proposal on ABMs to be stationed only in each nation’s capital. The problem arose because the Nixon administration had already asked for the funds to build three ABM sites, but none of which could be located in the nation’s capital.[125] The ABM agreement continued to be a complicated issue for the Nixon administration. On January 17, 1971 the New York Times ran an article that argued that the American delegation should drop linking defensive weapons with offensive weapons. It went on to argue that coming to an offensive agreement was proving to be too difficult, and they should accept the ABM agreement as it then stood.[126] The author of the article believed that the US should get what it could when it could from the negotiations rather than risking it all for a more comprehensive agreement. Nixon thought that it would be foolish to give the Soviets what they wanted without getting anything in return because it would only be more difficult to get the USSR to return to negotiations and make concessions to the US at a later date.
External issues threatened to derail the SALT talks as well. The Vienna negotiations in 1970 were interrupted because of the crisis in Cambodia and Dobrynin was called back to Moscow.[127] Parts of the Ho Chi Minh Trail supply line of the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong ran through Cambodia and sanctuaries were established as a base of operations for raids into South Vietnam. The US had begun the “Menu” bombing campaign of Cambodia in 1969. In April 1970 intelligence showed that the North Vietnamese Army was pushing westward, threatening the sovereignty of the Cambodian government. In May Nixon ordered a joint US-South Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia to attack the North Vietnamese bases.[128] The news of the American incursion into Cambodia sparked a new round of antiwar protests; one of them at Kent State University in Ohio resulted in the death of four students on May 4.[129] Two years later Kissinger expressed concern that American bombing of Vietnam might again derail détente with the Soviet Union.[130] Kissinger showed a willingness to minimize the issue of Vietnam to focus on Soviet-American bilateral issues, abandoning linkage to save the summit.[131]
On May 20, 1971 Nixon announced that his administration was going to work with Moscow to come to an agreement on offensive and defensive weapons.[132] This effort culminated in the SALT agreement of 1972, which limited ABMs to two sites and imposed a five year freeze on land and sea based offensive strategic weapons to mid-1972 levels.[133] The SALT I agreement was quickly criticized as instituting a quantitative missile gap for five years that favored the Soviet Union.[134] Kissinger defended the parameters of the SALT I agreement arguing that the US lost very little, especially in comparison to what the Soviet Union lost. According to Kissinger the Soviet Union had been building 200 new launchers a year prior to the agreement and to meet the requirements of the agreement had to dismantle around 210 older ICBMs.[135] The US, on the other hand, had no new missile programs and Congress was unlikely to approve a new one. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to wait for the Trident submarine and missile which would begin production after the five-year freeze had expired. Furthermore, the agreement did not include US strategic bombers, land or sea based aircraft in Europe and the Pacific, or the nuclear weapons of England and France.[136] To Kissinger the SALT agreement actually gave the United States the breathing room to correct the imbalance in strategic weapons that came about during the 1960s.[137] Moreover, Nixon’s pursuit of détente resulted in real, tangible results. Of the SALT agreement Kissinger said, “[f]or the first time in history two major powers deliberately rested their security on each other’s vulnerability.”[138] The decision for the US and USSR to base their security in mutual vulnerability suggested an inherent trust between the two not to exploit this vulnerability for their own gains and an actual desire for peace.
Nixon’s effort towards détente produced more substantive agreements between the East and West and lasted longer than any previous period of détente.[139] Despite the achievements produced by this period of détente it was not enough to overcome the underlying tensions which were the cause of the Cold War. Nixon’s détente achieved the success it did and lasted as long as it did because it was not based on atmospherics. But it could be the case that the way in which Nixon and Kissinger conducted the arms limitation talks also detracted from their success. The secretive nature of détente did not build a broad or strong national consensus among liberals or conservatives in support of détente.[140] The perception that the SALT treaty came at the expense of American and Western security, and that the Soviet Union could not be trusted to faithfully uphold its part of an agreement or treaty, added to its unpopularity with the American public.[141] Conclusion
Nixon’s presidency was cut short as a result of the arrest of several members of CREEP (the Committee for the Re-Election of the President) for breaking into the Democratic National Headquarters in the Watergate Hotel to plant bugs, June 17, 1972.[142] As a result of the scandal impeachment hearings ensued, but before their completion Nixon resigned, leaving the White House on August 9, 1974.[143] When Gerald Ford took over the presidency for Nixon in 1974, one of his first tasks was to reorganize the White House staff and address domestic policy, but he ordered that Kissinger’s foreign policy remain intact.[144] Kissinger was at the pinnacle of his power, acting as both Secretary of State and National Security Advisor.[145] This allowed Kissinger to make policy propositions to the President as Secretary of State and control the flow of policy through the National Security Council as National Security Advisor.
The fall of Saigon, and South Vietnam, on April 23, 1975 reverberated through the US changing American perceptions of their country and its foreign policy.[146] The public reaction against Nixon’s foreign policy was so strong that by 1976 Kissinger’s influence within the White House had greatly diminished and Ford dropped détente from his vocabulary in the presidential election that year.[147]
The effects of the SALT Treaty did have a more lasting impact on American politics though. Shortly after SALT I was signed in 1972, negotiations on SALT II began and lasted until the agreement was signed in 1979. When President Jimmy Carter signed the SALT II Treaty, there was not a great deal of enthusiasm; a New York Times article said that the agreement would do little to end the arms race or address a more pressing security issue, the energy crisis.[148] Détente was viewed not only as an admission of American weakness but an acceptance, and even embrace, of that weakness by the American public.
In 1980 Ronald Reagan’s presidential campaign was a rejection of the acceptance of the limits of American power. Reagan has many memorable quotes during his time in public office, however, none can more succinctly summarize his approach to relations with the Soviet Union than “trust but verify,” a phrase that was in response to the perceived deception by the Soviet Union during détente and violation of the 1972 ABM treaty .[149] In 1981 Reagan announced his desire to begin Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) between the Soviet Union and the US in the place of the SALT treaties that he viewed as disappointing.[150] Reagan adapted another idea from the Nixon era of détente, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which was essentially a space based anti-ballistic missile system. Reagan claimed that the American development of SDI was not to bankrupt the Soviet Union, pressure them into negotiations, or act as a bargaining chip; however, it ultimately had these effects on the Soviet Union.[151]
The national security of the United States is among the greatest concerns of the president. Congressional and economic limitations may have been pressures for Nixon to pursue arms negotiations with the Soviet Union but only in so far as they limited the United States’ ability to produce strategic weapons at a rate which would allow them to maintain parity with the Soviet Union. The Vietnam War as well stretched American military capabilities and strained the economy, but similarly this was only significant in that it took funds from strategic weapons developments to invest in conventional military means in order to continue fighting in Vietnam. Rapprochement with China was an end in and of itself but also served to pressure the Soviet Union to enter arms negotiations. The greatest existential threat to American national security was the Soviet Union and the greatest weapon at their disposal was their nuclear arsenal. Soviet strategic superiority would threaten American national security and interests, specifically in Western Europe. To most effectively neutralize this national security threat would be to purse détente with the Soviet Union to achieve an arms limitation agreement.
On August 7, 1974, as Nixon was working on writing his resignation speech, he called Kissinger at 9 p.m. and asked him to come to the White House. Their conversation over the next hour reminisced about their struggles and their accomplishments over the past five and a half years; in reestablishing relations with the Chinese, easing tensions with the Soviet Union, ending the Vietnam War, and other foreign policy achievements. As they had joyously toasted to their invitation to China three years earlier, Nixon and Kissinger now toasted with remorse the closing of an era without finishing their drinks.[152] Nixon feared that all he had worked towards as president would be lost by his humiliation and resignation. He implored Kissinger, who had been sworn-in as Secretary of State on September 22, 1973, to stay on for the sake of continuity in US foreign policy.[153] Reiterating the point, Nixon briefed his successor, Gerald Ford, to capitalize on the foreign policy momentum that he had created and not allow Moscow or Peking to leverage the situation in their favor.[154] Through this personally trying period of Nixon’s life his concern was still on the national security concerns of the nation. At 9 a.m. on August 9 Nixon began his resignation speech when he came to what he said was the most difficult line he ever had to speak, “[t]herefore, I shall resign the presidency effective at noon tomorrow.”[155] The next day Nixon said his goodbyes to the White House staff and his cabinet before shaking Fords hand, wishing him luck, and leaving the White House.[156]
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