The Secondary and Tertiary Problem: Caucuses and Closed Primaries

American elections are incredibly disaggregated; each county has their own board of elections that is responsible for executing an election while adhering to the election rules established by each state. General elections are, for the most part, uniform in how they are administered. From state to state, there will be different requirements to register to vote and different rules regulating how, where, and when an individual can vote; but, generally speaking, the process to vote in Boise, Idaho is functionally the same as the process to vote in Baltimore, Maryland on that first Tuesday following the first Monday in November. The same cannot be said of our primary and caucus elections.

States and political parties have more control over how primary and caucus elections are conducted. To the point where the election process during the Iowa Caucus will be unfamiliar and perhaps foreign to someone used to a normal primary election. The extent to which individuals are able to participate varies widely from state to state as well; from open primaries that allow any registered voter—regardless of party affiliation, to participate—to closed primaries that only allow voters registered with the party to participate.

This disparity in the administration of primary elections has drawn the attention of good-governance groups who make the argument that closed primaries are locking some people out of the primary process, namely independent voters, and have the effect of electing more partisan representatives. My home state of Ohio currently has partially open primaries, meaning that voters can request either party's ballot on the day of the primary election. However, Republicans in the state are looking to change how Ohio conducts its primaries, in September 2023 Senator Michele Reynolds (R – Canal Winchester) sponsored a bill which would close Ohio primaries. So lets examine whether the openness of a state's primary does have any noticeable effects on its elected representatives.

Given that the election system and the openness of that system vary from state to state we are able to isolate each and look at whether they have an effect on the outcome of elections. First, we will look at the caucus and primary system to see how the different systems affect turnout—are voters being shut out of primaries and caucuses. Second, we will look at primary access and its affect on the partisan makeup of Congress—does the primary type affect the partisanship of elected representatives.

Before looking at the turnout results of primaries compared to caucuses, we should outline the differences between the two. Primary elections look more like general elections, with voters reporting to polling stations and casting a ballot in a voting booth. Vote-by-mail and early voting is also often available during primary elections, giving voters more opportunities to cast their ballots. Caucuses can be thought of as party meetings. These are held on a single evening at a single location in each county or voting precinct. Candidate surrogates will make the case for their candidate and party members will debate before the vote is held.

As may be clear, it is easier to vote in a primary election than it is in a caucus. Barriers to voting are inherently problematic in a representative democracy—after all, if not all voters are represented its not a democracy that is particularly representative. If we focus on this for a moment longer, the consequences of the barriers to participation in caucuses become more problematic. Being held on a single night means that voters that are not able to take time off work, find child care, or able to be relieved of any other obligations they may have are unable to participate. Furthermore, being held at only one location in each county or precinct means that those with limited mobility will have difficulty getting to the caucus location. The population of people that we are describing here is going to tend towards poor or working-class adults, people with disabilities, and the elderly that are being systematically excluded from caucus elections.

Looking at Presidential primaries and caucuses from 2008 to 2020, there is a large disparity between turnout of registered voters in states with primaries compared to states with caucuses. This includes election years when both parties have an open field without an incumbent candidate.

In some cases, like Iowa, the results of these elections hold an outsized influence as they are the first election to be held. For further discussion on this point see The Primary Problem.

Given that turnout in caucuses is extraordinarily low, averaging 5.6% in the last four primary and caucus cycles, it would seem that we should move on from this system entirely. It is not even a difficult case of arguing what new, alternative system we should use. We have another system in place in a majority of states that sees almost 7x the turnout in our primary election system.

That said, I do not think we should be satisfied with an average turnout of 35% in primary elections, or even the 42% average of 2008 and 2016 when both parties had an open field during the primary. The candidates in the general election should not be determined by less than half of registered voters in any given year.

Looking more closely at primary turnout specifically we are able to observe another distinct cleavage between the two primary types; open and closed primaries. As previously mentioned, there is a spectrum of primary access from open to all registered voter to closed to all but registered party members, depending on the state. One might intuit that there is a direct relationship between the openness of a primary and participation by voters. 

In Presidential primaries from 2008 to 2020 there is a consistent 4% greater turnout in those primaries that are open compared to those that are closed. Even so, turnout for open primaries remains too low at an average of 36% overall, or 44% for the 2008 and 2016 primary years.

To add another layer to why low voter turnout during primary and caucus elections is problematic; not only do obstacles to voting make it more difficult for marginalized communities to participate in the election, but more partisan voters are more likely to participate in primary and caucus elections. So not only are specific groups' views and perspectives not being considered during primary and caucus elections, but the more extreme views of the parties are weighted more heavily.

This leads nicely into our second topic; the partisan effect of open versus closed primaries. Similar to the effect on voter turnout, one may also intuit that the openness of a primary would correlate to how partisan elected representatives are. 

DW Nominate tracks how partisan Senators and Representatives are based on their voting record—with 0 being non partisan; negative values being left leaning and positive values right leaning. Using this metric we are able to group the Senators and Representatives from each party based on whether they are from a state with an open primary system or a closed primary system. Refer to the table below for the results for elected officials for the congressional sessions from 2011 through 2021.

 These results are a bit more muddled than the voter participation results in the Presidential primary and caucus elections, above. In the Senate it is fairly clear that open primaries result in less partisan politicians, particularly for Republican Senators. And for Congress as a whole, the results are as expected, with open primaries having a moderating effect on the elected representatives. However, in the House the results do not follow the expected trend, or the results of the Senate and Congress. This is likely because there are additional factors affecting House elections, namely partisan gerrymandering. Through gerrymandering, elected officials functionally negate any potential moderating effect of an open primary by drawing single party majority districts. 

In defending her bill to close Ohio primaries, State Senator Reynolds argues that a closed primary is needed to prevent voters from switching their party affiliation the day of the primary to manipulate the results of the election—voting against a candidate instead of for one. Proponents of the bill have not been able to provide evidence that this kind of election manipulation has occurred at a scale which affected the outcome of an election. In fact, the proponents of this bill have not been able to provide any evidence that this has occurred at all; proponents including Secretary of State, and head elections official, Frank LaRose.

Those opposing closing Ohio primaries, and opposing closed primaries more generally, argue that closed primaries suppress voter turnout by excluding independent voters and by excluding independent voters limit the moderating effect on the election resulting in more partisan representatives. I have attempted to validate the conclusion of those opponents to closed primaries herein, however, I would like to add a bit of nuance to the attributed cause of excluding independent voters.

While it is true that voters identifying as "Independent" has steadily increased throughout the new millennia, these independents are more partisan that independent voters of the past. That is according to Michigan State University political scientist Corwin Smidt who found in his paper, Polarization and the Decline of Americas Floating Voter, that between 2000 and 2004 voters who identified as independents voted more consistently for a single party than those who identified as strong partisans from 1972 to 1976. This suggests that if a state was to close its primary these voters could register with one of the major parties without concern that they may want to vote in another party's primary in the next cycle. It is also the case that the increase in voters identifying as Independent has been driven primarily by Gen X and Millennial voters. Younger voters tend to be less politically engaged and those who are less politically engaged are less likely to participate in primary elections. So low participation of independent voters may be more of a function of their cohort's political engagement.

I do not have an alternative theory for why closed primaries reduce voter turnout and produce more partisan representatives. It may be the case that states with closed primaries correlates closely to states with stricter voting laws more generally, having the knock-on effect of more partisan elections with lower turnout. The Election Law Journal's Cost of Voting Index throws that theory into doubt, however, with the "cost of voting" appearing to be fairly evenly distributed among open and closed primaries. It may be the case that by design closed primaries present barriers to entry, even for registered, partisan voters and it is this structure that is the problem. Whether this is the case or not it would seem there is little risk in abandoning closed primaries in favor of open primaries.

Data: 

Presidential Primary Turnout 

House Partisanship 

Senate Partisanship 

Forward to Reform: The Case for Overhauling the Mechanisms of Elections

In the 2020 Democratic Presidential primary Andrew Yang had a moment. He was a fresh face to the Democratic party with a background in business instead of politics, and he differentiated himself by strongly advocating for universal basic income. He eventually dropped out of the presidential primary and a year later he tried to capitalize on his political momentum by running for Mayor of New York. Again, he did not make it out of the primary. Fast forward another year and Yang is back in the headlines, this time announcing that he is launching a new third party, the Forward Party.

When explaining his reasoning for starting a third-party, Yang loves to throw around data; the percentage of Americans that identify as independents, and the number of Americans that want a third-party, and the number of Americans that want their elected leaders to compromise. The problem is, Yang’s understanding and analysis seems to begin and end here. He is right, to some extent, about the polling; and I will dig into that more a bit later. But a major third-party does not exist in America for of a lack of third-parties. There is no reason to believe that Yang’s Forward Party will fare any differently than any of the other 80+ third-parties in the country. The problem is structural and without addressing the structural issues a legitimate third-party will be dead on arrival. However, it is much easier to create a party to make it appear as though you are solving a problem than it is to actually reform a system. This is particularly true when to reform the system you need those with power in the system to change the system that they derive their power from.

The thing is, I do not disagree with Yang’s assessment, though I think either ignores or omits key information to fit his narrative, and where we diverge is in his proposed solution. So, lets start to break his argument down.

To start us off, lets look at some polling from Gallup on party identification. It is true that most Americans identify as independents, and that has been the case since 2009 according to Gallup’s polling. However, as I will examine more later, most Americans are casting their ballots for either of the two major parties.
 

While Americans that identify as independents is a plurality, this may be a bit misleading. First, I guess it needs to be stated, while there is an Independent Party that is not what this poll is identifying. This poll is identifying “independents”, as in those Americans that do not identify as either a Democrat or a Repbulican. In the 2020 election there were more than 80 named third-parties included on ballots across the country. Some, like the Libertarian and Green parties, will have more support than others, but spread that 41% across those 80+ parties and Democrats or Republicans are going to have the plurality.

Second, Michigan State University political scientist Corwin Smidt found in his paper, Polarization and the Decline of the American Floating Voter, that between 2000 and 2004 voters who identified as independents voted more consistently for a single party than those who identified as strong partisans from 1972 to 1976. This, Smidt argues, is due to parties that are more ideologically sorted now than they were fifty years ago, which means that voters could not use party identification as a heuristic when casting their ballots in the same way they can today. In turn, this has resulted in increased partisanship and voter calcification. That explains the voting behavior, but not the self-identification. That likely has to do with the general dissatisfaction with the two major parties and Congress, as we will examine later. 

So, despite the lack of a clear conclusion that can be drawn from Americans’ self-identification as independents, we did have two other data points to look at that might offer some clarity. If we again turn to Gallup polling, we will see that a clear majority of Americans favor the introduction of a major third-party.

Despite this expressed preference, Americans continue to elect Democrats and Republicans. As discussed above, this is due to increasing partisanship—which extends to independent voters as well—and voter calcification as voters become less likely to switch their votes between the parties, and negative partisanship as each side increasingly sees the other as an existential threat. This is not to say that the respondents to the poll lied, or the poll was fundamentally flawed. The dissatisfaction with the two parties is real and is reinforced by congressional approval ratings that remain in the 20% - 30% range, but something is preventing Americans from acting on their preference for a third-party alternative. Before we get into those factors lets look at the last data point as I think it is essential to understand the forces at work in our current system.

Lastly, turning again to Gallup, a majority of Americans believe that it is more important for leaders in Washington to compromise than it is to stick to their beliefs.
 

However, these results are immediately recontextualized if we take this analysis just one step further. Turning to Pew, they too find that a majority of Americans want elected officials who will compromise with the other party. The important difference in the the Pew survey is they followed the initial question by asking partisans if elected officials of their party should compromise with the opposition party. Support for compromise in this context fell precipitously.

Partisanship, particularly negative partisanship, is the likely culprit for this seeming hypocrisy. But I would argue that this desire for the opposition to compromise is the manifestation of a symptom—i.e. negative partisanship—not the underlying ailment. Negative partisanship is the result of a zero-sum system we have created where you either win an election or you lose an election. Those in the minority have found ways to frustrate the majority to prevent them from fully enacting their policy agenda; but for the most part if you win then you get to govern and if you lose, well, win the next one. And this is where the problem lies. Our election system incentivizes two parties because (1) you can win with only a plurality of the vote, (2) if you do not win an election, you do not have a part in governing, and (3) structures within our electoral and legislative systems incentivize the party in the minority to be nothing more than an opposition party.  

I think it is worth lingering on this last point for a while longer. We should assume that parties are rational actors within a system and the parties have two primary objectives within that system; to win elections and to wield power. When making their electoral case, parties can either make an affirmative case for themselves or a negative case for their opponents. Assuming majority control is realistically realizable for the minority party, they are going to behave in a way to maximize their electoral performance. The minority party understands that the majority party will get credit for legislative accomplishments, whether those accomplishments are bipartisan or not. However, the minority party understands the inverse is true too; the majority party will also get the blame for partisan gridlock. While a minority party may not be able to easily make an affirmative case for themselves, they are able to take away the majority party's ability to make their affirmative case. In the process, the minority party is making a negative case against the majority party—"what have they done to fix the problems of the nation when they held the majority?" 

This is the argument Frances Lee makes in her book, Insecure Majorities, though she takes it a step further. Lee compiled the share of the national two-party presidential votes, share of House seats, and share of Senate seats of each party in the chart below. It shows that the relatively small and short-lived majorities in the period since 1980 is relatively unique in the post-Civil War era. As stated above, the parties have two primary objectives. But as Lee illustrates in the chart below, there were extended periods where achieving the first objective of winning a governing majority was out of reach for the minority. That left wielding power as the only achievable objective, and the only way to exercise what little power the minority party did have was to compromise and work with the majority party. 

We are able to see the effect Lee is describing if we look at the number of Senate cloture votes from 1917, when the cloture rule was introduced, to 2020. A cloture vote is the three-fifths majority needed to end a filibuster, and so is used as a proxy for a filibuster since there is not data collected on when a filibuster is initiated. If we overlay the chart below, from Tim Ryan Williams at Vox, we can see that the number of cloture votes begins to rise roughly around the period of insecure majorities that Lee identified begins. 

There is a thread through these three data sets that Smidt and Lee can help us follow. As Smidt argues, in the second half of the twentieth century parties realigned themselves, sorting along ideological lines. This resulted in more polarized parties, and allowed voters that were likely always ideological partisans to more easily and consistently identify the candidate that they align with. Shortly after, the Democratic majority that had held throughout most of the century broke down, but instead of being replaced by a large and enduring Republican majority, the majorities were small and shifting. Lee posits that as long as majority control was attainable within an election cycle or two the party was incentivized not to compromised in order to win the next election. This created a feedback loop where increasing partisanship lead to decreasing compromise which fed frustration with the opposing party among voters, which led to increasing partisanship. While this loop continued to spiral, voters became increasingly disillusioned with Congress and the two major parties. So, voters increasingly identified as independents, and say they want compromise and a third-party option. 

To this point I have just stated that our system does not benefit third-parties, despite the polling that would suggest it otherwise should. We can look at the current composition of the Congress to see the practical, real-world results of our current political system. Currently there are three independent members in the US Senate; Angus King from Maine, Bernie Sanders from Vermont, and Kirsten Sinema from Arizona—only Senators King and Sanders were elected as independents, Sinema left the Democratic Party at the end of 2022. On the other side of the Capitol there are no independent members of the House of Representatives. Most recently, Justin Amash, Representative from Michigan, was elected as a Republican but left the party in 2020 to join the Libertarian party. He did not seek reelection. We should be seeing a trend here—though a very small sample size, which is indicative of the systemic advantage to the two parties in itself, half of the independent representatives to serve in Congress since 2016 were elected as members of one of the two major parties and not as independents.

We can look at the highest office in the nation as well. Since the Civil War the Presidency has been held by either a Democrat or a Republican. Even in 1912, when former President Theodor Roosevelt ran as a Progressive after not receiving the Republican nomination, the Democrat, Woodrow Wilson, won the Presidency. In that election, Roosevelt was only able to garner 28% of the vote. This is impressive considering that he received more votes than the incumbent Presidential candidate William Howard Taft. 

It is the case that Taft and Roosevelt split the Republican base, and had one not been in the race the other would have likely defeated Wilson. This highlights one of the arguments against third-party candidates, they are viewed as spoilers to one of the two major candidates—because it’s a zero-sum contest. Ross Perot in 1992 spoiled George H. W. Bush’s reelection; Ralph Nader spoiled Al Gore’s election in 2000; Jill Stein spoiled Hillary Clinton’s election in 2016; and Gary Johnson spoiled Donald Trump’s popular vote victory in 2016.

There is another way to look at Teddy’s Progressive presidential campaign though; whether it had an effect beyond his own election. The 62nd Congress (1911-1913), had one Progressive member of Congress. After the 1912 election the number of Progressives in Congress waxed to 10 members. This was the high-water mark for Progressives however, within three election cycles there would be none remaining. This is, again, an impressive legacy of a third-party candidacy for President, though it was short lived. But that is kind of the point here. Either the Progressive party was going to flair up and perform well in an election cycle or two before fading away again, or it would have grown and eventually supplanted one of the two major parties, likely the Republican party.

With Teddy’s third-party candidacy as a standard lets look again at those modern examples of spoilers. Ross Perot, running as an Independent in 1992, won 19% of the popular vote. Not quite Teddy’s 28%, but still a significant portion of the electorate, and well above any other third-party candidate since. Perot ran again in 1996, this time running as a candidate of the Reform Party. He was unable to build on his momentum from the 1992 election and only received 8% of the popular vote. In 2000, Ralph Nader, running as the Green Party candidate, received 3% of the popular vote. And in 2016 Gary Johnson, running as the Libertarian Party candidate, and Jill Stein, running as the Green Party candidate, received 3% and 1% of the popular vote, respectively. As one might be able to infer from the discussion of independents currently in Congress, none of these third-party candidacies were able to produce broader electoral gains for their parties.

What, then, is the solution here if not to try and create a major third-party? As I have argued throughout, because our system is zero-sum there is not room for a major third-party. That is not to say that the Democratic and Republican parties are interminable or immutable; throughout our history we have had parties rise and fall—the Federalists, the Democratic-Republicans, the Whigs—but one party was always supplanted by another. Furthermore, there has never truly been a period of multi-polar governance in this country; the Presidency has always been held by one of two major parties and though there have been more third parties in Congress at various points, they never wielded significant power and eventually faded away. See Figure 1 below for additional detail.

The solution is to remove the mechanisms that are currently in place in our electoral system that creates a zero-sum contest. Some argue that the Electoral College should be removed in favor the more direct popular vote; but this only addresses Presidential elections and still allows candidates to win with only a plurality, not a majority of the electorate. A more comprehensive set of solutions is needed to address all elections—whether that is the adoption of ranked choice voting or a proportional system. These alternate mechanisms for electing governing officials allows voters to cast ballots for third-party candidates with less worry that they will be “spoiling” the election for their preferred candidate of the major parties or throwing their vote away on a candidate that does not have a chance of winning. This would allow Americans to act on their expressed preference for a major third-party and for them to be able to vote in a way that aligns with their ideological identification—i.e. independent.

Further, if truly multi-polar governance was achieved elected officials would be able to compromise with members from parties outside of their own party without having to negotiate with someone that holds diametrically different views, as is the case in the current system. This would functionally make Pew’s survey cited above moot as elected officials could compromise to achieve policy goals without undermining their beliefs. However, if multi-polar governance was achieved further reforms would be needed to facilitate effective governance—thinking specifically about the filibuster in the Senate and the 60-vote threshold to functionally pass any legislation.

I recognize that this sort of reform is not likely to be enacted since reform would have to come from the very people benefiting from the current systems. This is the conversation we should be having though, not whether a new third-party with substantial resources is going to upset the status quo. It very well may be a disrupter in the political system, but if history is any indicator this new third party will either fade away in a few election cycles or take the place of one of the two major parties. Either way, in the long-term, equilibrium returns to a two-party system. 

The Primary Problem

The Presidential Primaries as we understand them are a relatively recent development in America’s electoral politics. Not that America's electoral system has been immutable; from changes to electing the President and Vice President on a single ticket to the direct election of Senators, America has been willing to change its processes for electing its governing officials. The modern Presidential Primary process we are familiar with today is a response to the riots at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago.

To understand the adoption of the modern system, we should set the stage leading up to the 1968 DNC. In 1968 Lyndon Johnson was President and had only four years early won reelection in a landslide victory. However, despite passing some legislation popular with the Democratic base, like the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, civil strife at home continued to grow. The Civil Rights movement continued its fight for equality and the Vietnam War continued to drag on, distracting from Johnson's domestic agenda—'The Great Society'. The absence of a clear motivation or objective for the Vietnam War—other than the increasingly broad policy of 'Containment'—along with the draft and apparent lack of any progress towards victory galvanized the public against the war,
particularly among young Americans. As a result, the anti-war movement became a focal point of the 1968 Democratic Presidential Primary.

Tapping into this zeitgeist, Eugene McCarthy, Democratic Senator from Minnesota—not to be confused with Joseph McCarthy, Republican Senator from Wisconsin, of 'Red Scare' and 'McCarthyism' fame two decades prior—ran a primary campaign against President Johnson on an anti-war platform. Meanwhile, President Johnson, an adept politician, read the tea leaves and announced that he would not seek reelection on March 31, 1968. Four weeks later, Johnson’s Vice President, Hubert Humphrey, declared his candidacy for the Democratic nomination for President.

Leading up to the Convention, held during the final week of August 1968, only 13 states and Washington DC held primary elections. Humphrey was not on the ballot in any of these primary elections, yet he won the Democratic nomination from delegates from the remaining 37 states controlled by party leaders. Outraged by the party leadership's flagrant power grab, anti-war protesters confronted police outside the convention hall, which devolved into a riot.

In response to the chaos of the 1968 DNC, the Democratic Party decided to hold primaries or caucuses in every state to decide their nominee for President. The Republican Party followed suit shortly after.

Though not nearly as dramatic as the events of the 1968 DNC, tumult during the 2020 primary has again pushed Democrats to rethink how they conduct their primaries. During the 2020 Iowa Caucus, the first contest between Presidential candidates, a failure of the electronic voting software delayed results, caused confusion, and ultimately led to conspiracy theories over stolen votes. The discussion whether to replace Iowa—and New Hampshire—as the first primary states predates the 2020 hiccup, however. Some have pointed out that both Iowa and New Hampshire are whiter and more rural than the country as a whole, and so, are unrepresentative of the country. This matters because the early states in the primary process winnow the field of candidates, effectively selecting the candidates later states will vote for. Voters in two states that are predominately white and rural are going to have different considerations than a more diverse and urban electorate.

President Joe Biden has weighed into the discussion, proposing South Carolina be the first primary state. President Biden owes his presidency to his primary victory in South Carolina. Heading into another primary in a year, the President likely wanted to discourage any potential challengers, and if one should arise he would want an early, decisive victory to quash any concerns over his electoral chances before they arose. If there was any doubt that President Biden’s suggestion of South Carolina was about politics and not representation, FiveThirtyEight looked at which states were most representative of the Democratic Party’s base. They found South Carolina ranked 46, behind Iowa (42) and New Hampshire (34).

While there are some objective measures over which state is most representative of the country to go first in the primaries—Illinois according to FiveThirtyEight—I think this begs the question, should any one state be first in the primaries? After all, voters in a Midwest state, even a representative one, will have considerations other than voters in the plains dealing with drought, or boarder states dealing with immigration, or coastal states dealing with rising sea levels.

Iowa and New Hampshire will make the case for themselves to continue to hold their positions as first in the nation. Some of these I find convincing; others, not so much. These states will argue that because they have held this position in the primaries for so long the residents of the state understand the importance of their selections and take this responsibility seriously. This, I’m not so convinced by, but we’ll look into voter motivation a bit later. The argument continues; because both Iowa and New Hampshire are relatively small, candidates are able to easily visit every major town and every county; meeting with voters across the state. This 'retail politics' is important for candidates to hone their message and actually "touch grass". I am a bit more persuaded by this argument; politicians should understand the interests and concerns of the people they are seeking to represent, however, the early campaign message is being tailored to an electorate that does not look like the nation. And lastly, the media markets in these states are relatively cheap. This gives newcomers who do not have a campaign war-chest or a robust fundraising network in place the ability to compete. I think this too, is a valid argument. We should not want a system that is biased towards a ruling class and only allows the wealthy to break onto the political scene. 

So, the question then becomes, can we achieve these benefits while also improving representation? To this point we’ve done a bit of stage setting, but let’s complete the picture with a quick look at what primaries look like today. I opted to look at the 2016 Presidential Primary calendar because (1) it was an open primary for both Democrats and Republicans, and (2) the 2020 Primary calendar was interrupted and jumbled by the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2016 the primaries began on Monday, February 1, with the Iowa Caucus and ended Tuesday, June 7. It spanned five months and there were 20 different election days. The primaries also began seven months before the party national conventions that are typically held in August—though candidates are declaring their candidacies earlier and earlier in the election cycle.

Of the 50 state elections held by both parties to determine their nominee, Democrats held 14 caucuses and Republicans held 13. If you live in a state that holds the more common primary and are unfamiliar with caucuses; these are party meetings typically held during the evening, in a public place where candidate surrogates make speeches before voters cast their ballot. This creates barriers of participation for people who cannot take time off work, find transportation to the caucus location, find someone to care for their children, or cannot attend an hours long meeting during the week for a myriad of other reasons. Many others have made the case against caucuses so I will not go into detail here. As the main thrust of my argument is for greater representation, caucuses that systemically preclude full representation—specifically participants of specific groups like parents, the sick or disabled, or poor—should be retired in favor of primaries.

Now to get back to our question; should any one state be the first primary state? Inspired by FiveThirtyEight, I did my own analysis of the demographics of states based on race, educational attainment, urban and rural divide, occupation, and employment status. Unlike FiveThirtyEight, I looked at the country as a whole and not the demographic breakdown for one or both of the parties. I also included a few more categories than the team a FiveThirtyEight. Based on the metrics I used, Oregon should be the first state to hold a primary—South Carolina is ranked 26, Iowa 38, and New Hampshire 43.

To those who do not live in Oregon, it might seem like an odd choice (to those in Oregon it might seem odd!); Oregon is whiter and slightly more educated than the nation as a whole. However, its rural-urban divide, occupation, and employment rate trend very closely to the national average. 

If ranking by race alone Illinois would be first; educational attainment – Georgia; rural-urban divide and occupation – Oregon; employment – New York. These other states may seem like more natural choices, they are states that are often in the political discussion in a way the Oregon is not.  

If we were to select one of these states to be first though, what other arguments would we have in defense of any individual state over the others? Cards on the table, I think an average of each of these metrics should be used, but I have no good argument for Oregon, alone, to be first. There may be reasons why a state should not be first; the state already holds an outsized influence over politics and media—think New York or California—or, as has been argued, the state is unrepresentative of the country. However, I am not able to defend weighing one state's political quirks more heavily by placing it first in the primaries, even if it is the most representative state in the country. Particularly because those quirky political preferences are weighed so heavily by our primary process. 

I said I would return to voter motivation, so lets take a look at that now. Every four years as part of the horse race coverage there will be stories about 'electability'. No one really knows what electability means. It is a lot of vibes, but one could assume it means something like broadly popular and able to win elections. A candidate is able to make a strong case for this by, well, winning primary elections. But the strange thing about the discussion around electability is that it is a bit circular in its reasoning. Discussions over candidate electability often lack the context of 'favorability' or 'strength of support' polling, which might actually do a better job of telling us who voters like and support—i.e. who is electable. Instead, electability seems to be asking respondents who they think has the most support and is the most well liked. In the early primary states there are few metrics for voters to inform this decision; there are fewer poll results and no primary results. So, the electability metrics that are released are take into consideration by voters, and because partisan primary voters want their party to win in the upcoming general election, they vote accordingly. And here is the circular reasoning; voters think a candidate is electable and so will vote for that candidate, who wins the election because they were electable (or more accurately, perceived to be electable). After the first few primary results come in, some candidates will perform well and appear electable while others will perform poorly and drop out. This is the winnowing effect of the early states that we previously discussed; but what's more, these early states have defined a narrative for the winning candidates going forward—namely, that they are electable.  

In 2016 Iowa voted first on February 1 and a week later New Hampshire voted on February 9, then about a week and a half later the next election was held on February 20. In the Republican field, Ted Cruz won the Iowa Caucus; Rand Paul, Mike Huckabee, and Rick Santorum dropped out. Donald Trump won the next primary in New Hampshire; Jim Gilmore, Chris Christie, and Carly Fiorina dropped out. Two elections and the field of Republican candidates was halved. On the Democratic side Hillary Clinton won the Iowa Caucus; Martin O'Malley withdrew after, leaving the race between Clinton and Bernie Sanders up to the Convention. 

Following New Hampshire there is a week and a half before the next set of primaries for the media to start to create narratives for election based on the results 1.38% of the country. Even if California were to be first in the nation, at 12% of the nation's population, would we think this fair? Perhaps, but I think there is a better way. It seems to me, the primary calendar should be, to some extent, condensed and regional primaries should be held.

 Above is my suggested regional groupings for primaries. Refer to Figure 1 in the linked support below for further detail of this breakdown. When trying to determine the regional groupings I had a couple objectives in mind; (1) I tried to keep the regions compact and (2) I tried to ensure the population across regions was relatively consistent. The latter is why some groupings might look a little odd, like Pennsylvanian's inclusion in the Appalachia grouping instead of New England or the Midwest. However, if I were to group PA with New York in New England, or with Ohio and Illinois in the Midwest the results of these regions would potentially weigh more heavily. It is the same reason Texas and Florida are separated. 

Maintaining compact regions is important for one of the reasons that Iowa and New Hampshire argue they should be first; it should be as easy as possible for candidates to traverse the regions to see as many voters as possible. That will be easier in some regions than others, the Central region is very large, but that is in the interest of this region having a comparable population to the others. By having regions, for the most part, continuous it allows candidates to set routes and continually stop and visit with voters in different regions in a way that would not make sense if Florida was grouped with Washington. Sure, a candidate could drive, stopping a long the way, but that would be wasting valuable time on states that have either already voted or will be voting in a later primary, at the expense of some states that will be voting in the next primary. 

One might argue that this is exacerbating the problem; we are swapping out the interests of the first few states for the interests of the first region. This is a fair concern, but as we did with individual states, we can identify which region is most representative of the nation to prioritize that group first. Furthermore, while there may be some regionalism at play, the individual politics of each state are unique leading to a greater diversity of representation. 

Pressing on this further, one might point out that this system would continue to favor larger states. Candidates would spend their time campaigning in the largest states in the region. To this I would point out that in several regions there is more than one highly populated state and this would not obviously be a sound strategy as it would effectively be forfeiting in the other states, which leads to my next point.

With each region having a similar population there is no obvious leader, meaning that winning the first region may not be as significant as winning the first state. This is because the results of the first primary become a bit more complicated. A candidate might come out of the first set of primaries with the most delegates, but they  may not win a majority of the states or votes. Or maybe a different candidate wins in each state. Or perhaps the candidate that wins a plurality of the states or votes does not win the most delegates. Any of these results preclude a clean narrative of a front runner. Sure, there will likely be candidates that drop out, but the mixed results allow more to stay in. It may not remove the 'electability' question, but it at least would allow more candidates to credibly make an argument for it, allowing for later primary regions to vote for their preferred candidates.

It is also worth considering how this will affect the campaign strategies of candidates. Not that there is no strategy currently involved in primary campaigns, but this would allow candidates deploy their resources differently. Under the current system candidates take a risk not campaigning heavily in Iowa and New Hampshire; the strategy paid off for President Biden, but not everyone is a former Vice President with deep connections in Congress (specifically to Representative Jim Clyburn from South Carolina). 

Consider the New England region; less well-funded candidates could choose to forego media buys in the expensive New York media market in favor of flooding New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine with ad buys. Sure, well funded campaigns with wealthy donors are going to be able to play in every market, but how is that different than how the campaigns are currently conducted? And if well funded campaigns do decide to go the route of expensive ad buys in the New York market hoping to win a knockout win with a big delegate haul, they will have fewer dollars for ad buys in other markets. This allows new comers to the national political stage to target their campaigns in hopes of breaking through other, smaller media markets and notching a couple wins to carry momentum into the next regional primary. 

To state the implications of this plainly; the adoption of regional primaries would include expensive media markets in nearly every region. However, because there are so many markets in play at the same time, it has the potential to dilute well-funded campaign's ability to flood all media markets making less well-funded campaign's media efforts in cheaper markets more potent. 

So, now that we are all convinced, we should have regional primaries, which region should go first? Based on my analysis, the order should be South Central first, followed by the Midwest, South East, New England, Central, Appalachia, and West Coast last. 

I think order matters a bit less if a regional primary calendar is adopted, for the same reasons given for adopting regional primaries in the first place. It has also been suggested that a rotating primary schedule should be adopted so that one region (or state) is not always first, which seems reasonable to me. 

Parties are largely in control of how primaries are conducted. Its true that Iowa and New Hampshire have state laws requiring that they are the first states to hold caucuses or primaries, but there are ways around this. I mention this because it means it is far easier to reform this specific part of our electoral system than it would be to reform general election processes; through Constitutional amendment or reform efforts in each of the 50 states. I would like to say that it is good that the Democratic party is again wrestling with the problems in their primary system, however, it seems clear that they have placed Democrat priorities over democratic principles. Primaries are where our electoral process begins; if that first step is unrepresentative then how can the elections that follow be representative?

The Rational for a Proportional System

At this point I have written more than once in favor of adopting a proportional electoral system over our current first-past-the-post (or winner-take-all) system, and even over a ranked choice electoral system. So, I thought it might be a good idea to quickly articulate why my preferences are what they are. To be clear, I do not disfavor a ranked choice system. In fact, I think it is necessary in certain cases when there is not anything to apportion—say in US Senate or Governor elections. And if I had the power to implement a new system of elections in this country with the snap of my fingers, but the only choice was between a ranked choice system and maintaining the status quo, I most definitely would choose the ranked choice system.

Although both a proportional and a ranked choice system are different means to achieve most of the same objectives—increasing ideological representation, increasing voter engagement, and breaking the two-party power structure—ranked choice retains some of the structural advantages for the two parties that exists in our current system. Namely, the two parties have a presence in every state to be competitive in most elections up and down the ballot. This includes donor lists, volunteers, a bench of candidates, relationships with pollsters and advertising agencies, party employees, and anything else needed to run a campaign. This will not necessarily be true of every other party as they may have difficulty even fielding a candidate in every race. The second benefit that the major parties have is name recognition. Voters may know the Libertarian and Green parties, but how many other third-parties can they name? In the 2020 election there were about 90 named third-parties included on ballots across the country. Even if voters recognize the party name, would they know the party's platform? So, even if their primary preference was for a third-party what would voters’ choose as their second choice? Likely the more recognizable candidate/party, which would probably be a Republican or Democrat.

Source: FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2020: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives, Federal Election Commission, Washington, D.C., October 2022

Now you might rightfully point out that most of the structural advantages I just outlined would still be present in a proportional system. However, the last point is where I think these two systems pull apart and a proportional system benefits third parties more. While I can take election results and distribute seats proportionally based on those results, it is more difficult to game-out ranked choice results (and to be fair, I made it easy on myself when apportioning seats by throwing all third-party votes into one bucket which overstates the actual results of any one third-party). This is difficult because while I could make some assumptions about who a voter’s second and third choice may be, voters are idiosyncratic and those assumptions may very well be wrong. Furthermore, when you change the election rules and incentives, voters will change their voting behavior accordingly. To take this one step further, if I were to retroactively apply a ranked choice system to all elections where a majority was not obtained, making assumptions along the way, the results likely would not drastically differ as the two major parties will have a substantial lead—in part because voters were not casting their ballots with a ranked choice system in mind.

With that said, I think we can intuitively work this out. Let’s set up a fairly simple example; there is a state with four districts. The state is roughly split between conservatives and liberals and districts are drawn fairly. After the election is held the vote tally is as follows: 

Under our current system two Republicans and two Democrats are elected to the House of Representatives.

But, as I said earlier, if you change the rules of the election, voters will change their behavior. Let's now assume this same state adopted a ranked choice electoral system. With no third party infrastructures in the first or third districts and no candidate pool to pull from, those two districts remain a race between the Republican and Democrat. So, looking at districts 2 and 4 only, the results of the election are:

After the first round no one has an out right majority, and the third-parties did better—15 points better. But they are still last, so when this goes to the next round and the Libertarian votes in District 2 are distributed to their second choice, the Republican, and the Green votes in District 4 are distributed to their second choice, the Democrat, the outcome of the election will be the same. This state will have two Democratic Representatives and two Republican representatives.

This is a simplistic model for illustrative purposes, but we can see how this has played out in reality. Maine adopted a ranked choice electoral system in 2018. Since then it has held two elections for the US Senate and six for US House (three election years for two House seats); electing an Independent and a Republican to the Senate, and two Democratic Representatives each year. In fact, only once in those eight elections has a ballot gone to the second round—on the first ballot for district 2 in 2018 no candidate had a majority and so an instant runoff was held between the Republican and Democratic candidates who had received the most votes. It should also be noted that Angus King is the Independent Senator who was elected in 2018. However, he was an incumbent who previously had identified as an Independent and was caucusing with the Democrats. As such, I do not think we can credit his electoral victory in 2018 to the ranked choice system. In 2022 Alaska joined Maine in adopting a ranked choice system. In that election Alaska sent a Democrat to the House of Representatives and a Republican to the Senate.

Let’s return one more time to our hypothetical state. This time the state has gotten rid of its districts in favor of one, multi-member district with seats distributed proportionately by party to the percentage of votes won. This time the results are as follows:

Based on these proportions, Democrats are awarded two seats and Republicans and Libertarians are awarded one each. Under the other two systems third-parties may have had support in all districts but may not have been able to field a candidate to run in every district. Further, a third-party may have broad support in a state, support enough to win a seat under a proportional system, but not enough in any one district to win a majority.

We should also take a minute to consider what the implications of this are for voters. Voters in Districts 1 and 3 that might support a third-party candidate are forced to either decide between voting for a candidate for one of the parties running or not to vote at all. These voters rightly feel under-represented because they are presented with a false dilemma. The only reason this is any dilemma at all is because our winner-take-all system forces us into the false choice between two ideologies; conservatism as represented by the Republican party and liberalism as represented by the Democratic party. The American electorate is much more diverse than this dichotomy.

The outcome between our second hypothetical and our last hypothetical illustrates how, I believe, a proportional system is more potent in enabling third-parties to gain representation within our government. I should point out, in fairness, that in Maine the third-party candidates did not gain enough votes (even when combined) to win a seat under a proportional system, suggesting an optimism in my final hypothetical. Though, to repeat my refrain, voter behavior may change to a sufficient degree for a third-party to win representation if Maine were to adopt a proportional system instead of a ranked choice system. 

When we are considering electoral systems we should not think of them as isolated systems in their individual silos. More voters turn out to vote in Presidential election years, but those additional voters are not only voting for the President, they also cast their vote in Senate and House elections, and on down the ballot. Turnout is generally higher. It stands to reason then, that if we were able to increase voter turnout for one branch of government due to increased representation resulting from a more responsive electoral system, then turnout overall would increase.

As I stated earlier, I believe a ranked choice system is better than our current system. Given time, I may be proven wrong by the electoral results from Maine and Alaska as parties, candidates, and voters adapt to the new system. I hope I am wrong. I hope we begin to see more diverse representation from these states, and as a result increased voter turnout.

It is for the very reason that individual elections affect one another that my ideal would be to adopt a proportional system for state general assemblies and the House of Representatives, and a ranked choice system for Governors and the US Senate. I believe these systems would reinforce one another.

Proportional systems would give third-parties a better shot at gaining representation within the government. By merely winning an election third-parties would gain a credibility with voters that they have struggled to gain in the past. Winning an election would also increase the profile of third-parties so the party and its platform are more familiar to voters and voters would actually be able to see how the party's ideas translate into practical governance. 

When it comes time to cast a ranked choice ballot voters are more familiar with third-parties, their candidates, and their platform. Voters also view certain third-parties as more credible after the party has won representation for itself in an election and voters can see how the party operates in the government. Perhaps, then, after the ballots are counted, third-parties have a larger share of votes in the first round and are not the first party eliminated from the ballots. Maybe third-parties are also voters second and third choices above Republicans and Democrats. And so, maybe third-parties win more ranked choice elections.

What I am describing is a virtuous cycle. As third-parties win more elections they become more credible and known. As those parties become more credible and known they win more elections. The more elections that third-parties win the more ideologies and perspectives are represented. As more ideologies and perspectives are represented within the government citizens begin to see themselves better represented in their government and observe more responsive elections. As this perception increases more citizens begin to participate and voter turnout increases. With increased voter turnout, support for third-parties increases, and so on.

But to kick off this cycle something is needed to breakthrough the two parties hold on power. I do not think a ranked choice system is strong enough to do this. Although I believe a proportional system would be able to do this, it has limited applications—you cannot apportion votes for a single Senate seat or Governorship. And while I think a proportional system would still have an effect on these elections, the effect would inherently be limited because the candidate with the plurality of votes would win the election, reinforcing the two party system. Both are needed if we truly want to change our system for the better. 

A Proportional Response: Creating an Ideologically Diverse and Representative Electoral System

The 2016 Presidential election may be the most discussed election in American history. From Democrats almost neurotic analysis of how Hillary Clinton—one of the most qualified Presidential Candidates in history—could have possibly lost to Donald Trump—a political new comer; to Russian interference, election security, and the Muller Investigation; to Trump’s insistence that he won the popular vote but for the “millions of people who voted illegally”, without any evidence to support this claim. However, Trump’s defensiveness over his popular vote deficit is revealing of a feature within our electoral system. Namely, that the Electoral College (EC) over weights the votes of less populated states making it possible for a candidate to lose the popular vote by 2.8 million votes but still win the EC, as Trump did in 2016.

 

To be clear, this is a feature, not a bug. When shaping our government the Founders purposefully created a system which would weigh towards states with lower populations. Fearing a tyranny of the majority, the Framers guaranteed all states a minimum of 3 electoral votes, in order to protect the interest of those less populated states from being dominated by more populated states. In today’s context this means that Wyoming, a state with the lowest population of voting aged adults in 2019 according to Census data, accounts for 0.17% of the total voting aged population in the US, but 0.56% of the total EC votes. Conversely, California, with the largest population of voting aged adults, accounts for 12% of the total voting aged adults in 2019 but only 10% of the EC votes. With a large and diverse country, this may be a good feature of an electoral system; however, the disconnect between the popular vote and the EC seems to have flipped the Founder’s concern of a tyrannous majority on its head, with an entrenched minority able to punch above its weight to dictate national politics.  

 

My intent is not to call into question the legitimacy of Trump’s election. Both Trump and Clinton were playing by the same set of rules and Trump won fairly under those rules. However, I think it is worth revisiting those rules which govern our elections, specifically the pluralistic system of allocating EC votes, by looking at the results and outcomes of our elections. Using election results from the Federal Elections Commission, in 2016 Hillary Clinton won 48% of the popular vote versus Donald Trump’s 46%, but due to our ‘winner take all’ electoral system, that translated into Trump winning 59% of states and 57% of the EC compared to Clinton’s 41% and 43%, respectively (see Figure D, below). This is not the only time in our history that we have seen a disconnect between the popular will of the people and the results of the EC. As shown in Figure A, below, in the five elections which took place this century, two have resulted in victors with a negative margin of victory; 20% of our elections this century have been decided by a minority of the population.

 

Figure A:

Year		Republican		Democrat	Other	Margin of Victory
2000	🗸	50,456,002		50,999,897	3,949,201	-543,895
2004	🗸	62,040,610		59,028,444	1,226,291	3,012,166
2008		59,948,323	🗸	69,498,516	1,866,981	9,550,193
2012		60,933,504	🗸	65,915,795	2,236,111	4,982,291
2016	🗸	62,984,828		65,853,514	7,830,934	-2,868,686

 

Intuitively, I think one would look at the results of the 2000 and 2016 elections and say the outcomes are undemocratic based on the results the popular vote. Conversely, one might understand the Framer’s intent when adopting the EC System, as outlined above, and would accurately point out that the system is working as intended. However, those same Framers warned against political parties, and certainly did not foresee power concentrating within two parties as it has today. Referring to Figure B, below, we see that even in years that the governing party does win a majority of the popular vote, it is only by a slight majority—3% at most.

 

Figure B:

Year	Republican	Democrat	Other	None
2000	47.87%	48.38%	3.75%	0.00%
2004	50.73%	48.27%	1.00%	0.00%
2008	45.65%	52.93%	1.42%	0.00%
2012	47.20%	51.06%	1.73%	0.00%
2016	46.09%	48.18%	5.71%	0.02%

 

In other systems of democracy this would push the ruling party toward building a coalition to effectively govern, but in a highly partisan, bipolar government that simply is not an option. One might not be all that surprised by the results in Figure B given the deep partisan divides in the country. Though, what is more striking about the data above is not the results for the two parties, but the ‘None’ column. In 2016, enough voters—28,863—voted for “None of these candidates” for this to register, ever so slightly, with 0.02% of the total popular vote. What’s more surprising, this voting option registered despite Nevada being the only state having this ballot option. In that state, “None of these candidates” garnered 3.9% of the popular vote. This is a fairly damning indictment of the state of the nation’s two parties from the voters of Nevada; it is an indictment from the voters who have the option to vote their displeasure with the current status quo. If we were to rerun the election results to include reported registered voters from the Census Bureau the picture looks much worse.

 

Figure C:

Year	Republican	Democrat	Other	None	DNV
2000	39%	39%	3%	0%	25%
2004	44%	42%	1%	0%	14%
2008	41%	48%	1%	0%	10%
2012	40%	43%	1%	0%	16%
2016	40%	42%	5%	0%	13%

 

The data in Figure C, above, was calculated using election results from the Federal Elections Commission and reported registered voters from the Census Bureau. Using this data we can see that on average over the last 5 elections 16% of registered voters did not cast their vote. This should register as a vote for “None of these candidates”, though this context is almost never provided when covering election results. In fact, it is not included in the topline numbers when looking at election results on the FEC website. This picture of American political participation would only get more grim if we were to run the same calculation for all voting aged citizens. It is worth also considering that these calculations were run in Presidential election years and for Presidential elections, which tend to have the highest voter turnout.

 

Political participation is an important issue to consider and efforts to enfranchise more voters should be taken seriously. Nevada’s concept of providing an option to unequivocally state dissatisfaction with the two parties rather than voters staying at home and being branded apathetic seems a simple measure to take. Making election day a national holiday so people do not have to take PTO to vote seems another intuitive fix. These, however, are by no means comprehensive and much more detailed policy proposals exist to engage those citizens who have historically not participated. These policies should be championed.

 

So, what we have seen so far is that our current electoral system is (1) not responsive to the plurality of the electorate in all cases and, (2) is not engaging citizens to be politically active.

 

First, to address the responsiveness of our system to the popular electorate, Figures B & C, above, show the election results as total votes and percentages. Figure D bring these together to highlight the disconnect.

 

Figure D:

	2000				2016
	Bush	Gore	Margin		Trump	Clinton	Margin
% of States	58.8%	41.2%	17.6%		58.8%	41.2%	17.6%
% of Electoral	50.4%	49.6%	0.7%		56.7%	43.3%	13.4%
% of Pop. Vote	47.9%	48.4%	-0.5%		46.1%	48.2%	-2.1%

 

In the 2000 election, the difference in the popular vote was 543,895 votes, or 0.5% of total votes cast, so when looking at the electoral results there does not appear to be a deep disconnect. But in 2016, when that deficit grew to 2,868,686, 2% of total votes, the issue became more clear. Looking into the results by state in 2000 six states were decided by 1% or less; Florida (25), Iowa (7), New Hampshire (4), New Mexico (5), Oregon (7), and Wisconsin (11). In all of these states, the winner also did not win a majority of votes cast, and that is 59 EC votes allocated entirely to a candidate who did not win a majority in these states. Similarly, in 2016 six states were decided by 1% or less; Florida (29), Michigan (16), Minnesota (10), New Hampshire (4), Pennsylvania (20), and Wisconsin (10). Again, in none of these cases did the winning candidate garner more than a plurality of votes cast. These are not inconsequential, small EC states in all cases. It should also be understood that this cuts both ways; Gore in 2000, and Clinton in 2016 both hauled in EC votes this way despite losing the EC. Appendices A & B should be referenced for the full results of the 2000 and 2016 elections.

 

To take a step back and not focus for a minute on the specifics of these two elections, let us instead look a hypothetical scenario. One could imagine a case in which a candidate wins a majority of the states, let’s say 32+, and so wins the EC in a landslide. In this scenario this candidate also wins the popular vote. The House and Senate are swept as well. One party controls the government. The candidate would inevitably enter office declaring a mandate from the people to fully enact their policies. But, in this scenario, this candidate only receives 48% of the popular vote; a plurality, not a majority. Why then does our electoral system recognize this as a mandate? A majority of Americans have not expressed their support for these policies and yet our electoral system warps and amplifies election results, multiplying, and in some cases flipping, popular vote margins.

 

A way in which to mitigate this distortion, while maintaining the EC would be for each state to apportion their EC votes based on the percentage of votes cast for a candidate. Admittedly, when working with specific elections, one can shift the allocation to achieve a specific, desired outcome. The allocation ranges I applied are as follows:

Electoral College Allocation Thresholds
Percent of Votes	90%	80%	70%	60%	50%	40%	30%	20%
Percent of Electors	100%	85%	75%	65%	55%	45%	35%	25%

 

We can argue with the specific allocation percentages, but when allocating EC votes we can pull the EC margin in line with the popular vote margin, as show in Figure E, below. Further documentation of the allocation is included within Appendices A & B as well.

 

Figure E:

	2000				2016
	Bush	Gore	Margin		Trump	Clinton	Margin
% of Electorate	49.0%	51.0%	-2.0%		49.0%	51.0%	-2.0%
% of Pop. Vote	47.9%	48.4%	-0.5%		46.1%	48.2%	-2.1%

 

By aligning EC results with the popular votes in this way we have also made our elections more responsive to voters, which means that individuals’ votes matter. Under this system Trump picks up 19 votes from Republicans in California and Clinton pulls in 17 Democrat votes from Texas. All of a sudden those voices in those states are heard. Therefore, a Republican voter in California may understand that casting their vote will not result in an outright victory for Republicans in a statewide election, but their vote may result their chosen candidate receiving a larger percentage of EC votes. If voters believe their vote will have more of an impact, then they will be more likely to turn out and support their candidate. By addressing the responsiveness of our electoral system to the proportion of votes received we are also addressing voter engagement.

 

It is also worth noting that when the US Constitution was originally adopted in 1789, Article II, Section 1, Clause 3 described the election process for the President and Vice President. Much like today, the candidate that receives the most electoral votes was elected President. However, the President and Vice President did not run on a single ticket, the Vice President was elected as the runner up candidate. This was amended 15 years later when the 12^th Amendment was adopted, changing our elections to elect both the President and Vice President on the same ticket as we do today. This is of note for a couple reasons. First, this is an example of proportionalism in the history of American elections. I am by no means suggesting we should revert to this specific system of a proportional elections; it could lead to the Presidential and Vice-Presidential offices held by opposing parties, and likely result in severe disfunction. It is for this reason that the 12^th Amendment was originally adopted. Second, there has been a willingness, in our history to alter our election processes. We should have the same willingness today to adopt solutions if we identify issues.

 

In addition to examples of historical alternatives, we have contemporary alternatives we could examine as well; namely the Congressional district method of allocating EC votes used Maine and Nebraska. Both Maine and Nebraska award 2 EC votes to the winner of the statewide popular vote. The remaining EC votes are awarded by district, with the winner of the plurality of the popular vote in a district winning that district’s EC vote. This could get us closer to solving the issues identified above, however, it would also create greater incentives for gerrymandering of districts to benefit a single party as they would reap the rewards in both Presidential elections and House of Representative elections. This brings us to our next subject.

 

To this point we have only examined Presidential election results, and there is reason to believe this change would only do so much to activate voters currently sitting on the sidelines. Based on past Presidential election results, supporters of third-party candidates may still see votes for their preferred candidate as throw-away or protest vote. Despite the increased odds that third-party candidates will win EC votes under the proportional system, it would still be very difficult for them to reach the 270 EC summit to win the election. However, there is an additional avenue we can engage with these voters. If we look at US House of Representative election results we see an issue similar to the EC results. In 2016 Republicans won 48% of the popular vote in House elections but 55% of seats. That same year, Democrats won 47% of the popular vote, but only 45% of seats. In 2018 this benefit flipped; Democrats won 53% of the popular vote and 54% of seats, Republicans won 44% of the popular vote and 46% of seats. It should be pointed out that third-party candidates won 4% of the popular vote in 2016 and 2% in 2018 though they won no seats in either election. In 2019 Representative Justin Amash left the Republican party to join the Libertarian party and is the lone Independent member of the House, but he was elected in 2018 as a member of the Republican party. To be clear, at the state level, both Republicans and Democrats benefit from districting which allows them to pick up more seats than the popular vote would suggest. See Appendices C.1 & D.1 for a state by state break down of these margins—it should be noted that these appendices only include states with more than one Representative. Gerrymandering is an obvious blight on our democratic system as its intent is to dilute certain votes to the point of irrelevance. One solution is to abolish Congressional districts.

 

Instead of a state being broken into a multiplicity of Congressional districts with one Representative for each district, voters would cast their ballot for a party and seats would be allocated based on the percentage of the popular vote won. Without Congressional districts, parties would be unable to divide voting blocs through gerrymandering in order to dilute those voters’ power. Admittedly, this would decrease regional representation, but it would increase political or ideological representation as voters would not be forced into a decision between two parties.

 

It is important to consider how much regional representation the current system provides though. Let us quickly take a look at the 116^th Congressional district map for my home state, Ohio. After the 2010 census, the Ohio State Legislature, held by Republicans, redrew the Congressional districts for the state which resulted in 9^th District absorbing part of the 10^th District of the 111^th Congress. This caused legacy 9^th District Representative, Democrat Marcy Kaptur, to run against legacy 10^th District Representative, Democrat Dennis Kucinich, in the 2012 election for the 112^th Session of the House of Representatives. Dennis Kucinich, who was a popular Democratic Representative, was redistricted out of the House of Representatives. Today, Ohio’s 9^th District stretches from Toledo in the west to the westside of Cleveland in the east—two of Ohio major metropolitan areas, separated by over 100 miles and almost a two-hour drive. This district spans five counties. Technically contiguous, but entirely convoluted. Ohio’s 11^th District does not quite pass the eye test either, extending from Cleveland down to Akron. These two cities, however, are at least in the same Combined Statistical Area as designated by the Census Bureau and separated by fewer than 50 miles and less than a 45-minute drive.

 

In the case of the 9^th District, are the constituents truly afforded regional representation? Sure, all have interests in policy which protects the Great Lakes as historically high-water levels in recent years have resulted in erosion of the shoreline and annual deadly algal blooms result in boil-water advisories for coastal communities. However, this district spans from rural agricultural communities, to exurban, to suburban, to urban communities—many of which are still heavily manufacturing based. The interest of each of these groups is going to vary depending on their geographic and demographic needs. Any congressional district is going to include some mix of these geographic and demographic groupings, but if one of the benefits of Congressional Districts is regional representation, then it would seem that this benefit is being nullified by the current system of gerrymandering.

Ohio’s 9^th and 11^th Districts, provided by Census Bureau. Refer to Appendix D, below for the full 116^th Ohio Congressional District map. All state and district maps are available at census.gov.

 

Returning again to the House elections more broadly, in Appendices C.2 & D.2 we can see what the House election results may have looked like in 2016 and 2018 had we apportioned seats based on the popular vote. In 2016, the percentages called out above translated into Republicans winning 28 seats more than they would have if apportioned; Democrats won 17 fewer and Independents won 11 fewer. In 2018, Democrats won 9 more, Republicans 1 fewer, and Independents 8 fewer.

 

One could imagine that after a few cycles under this system the number of third-party Representatives might increase. Members currently identifying with one of the two dominant parties might leave as they would longer be constrained by the confines of the existing party structure. Ultimately it would recognize a reality that currently exists within Democratic and Republican parties; these are already coalitions of diverse ideological groupings, but given the power dynamics they do not necessarily need to be as responsive to all members of the coalition. Or, more insidiously, these parties are captured by highly vocal and politically active members of the party who tend to be more partisan and extreme. The centralized nature of the two parties also allows large money donors, PACs, and “dark money” contributions to focus their efforts to the greatest effect. If you break up these parties, the money is diluted, the power weakened. Similar to the discussion of voter engagement I am under no illusions that this is nearly sufficient to address the issues of campaign finance, but it may be a back-door start.

 

I had mentioned earlier that it is relatively strange that the winner of our elections come to power without a majority of support, but govern as though they had. No work is done to build a coalition to represent a majority of Americans because no work needs to be done. Under the system proposed above, even if there is not substantial movement in the proportion of votes cast for the two major parties in Presidential contests, if the House of Representatives is disaggregated among multiple parties then coalition building will be necessary to govern. Consequently, policies will be amended to reflect that popular majority created. Cross party cooperation will be a necessity to effectively govern, and Representatives will be able to more freely switch between traditional Republican and Democratic groupings on a policy-by-policy basis.  In short, the hope is that there would be increased cooperation within the House of Representatives. 

 

At this point one may be wondering what my proposed solution for the Senate is, and unsatisfactorily perhaps, I do not have one here. Similar to the concern described above when discussing the weight of EC votes, the senate is much more weighted toward lower population states as every state has an equal 2% representation, despite 0.17% - 12% of voting aged population gap between Wyoming and California. However, this has historically been a workable system and disenfranchising low population states is a concern. The hope would be that by introducing proportionality to the EC in Presidential elections and the House of Representative elections, third-parties would be legitimized and the two parties’ hold on the Senate would be similarly weakened. Interestingly we see more Independent affiliated Congress-people in the Senate than in the House of Representatives; Bernie Sanders from Vermont and Angus King from Maine. It is possible that with a more diverse Senate, coalitions of greater than 60 members could be created to overcome the filibuster, enabling effective legislating and governance. However, it is equally likely that this 60 member threshold would be forever out of reach and the Senate would be in perpetual deadlock. This may be romanticizing the legislative process, but I think it is important for a legislative body to be afforded the time to deliberate legislation, and fully consider the effects; reading ‘Green Eggs and Ham’ on the Senate floor is not that. At the very least, some reform of the filibuster is needed, but I am not sure outright abolition is the solution.

 

With redistricting on the horizon as we complete the 2020 Census, now seems to be an ideal time to adopt the proportional system laid out above to avoid potential for gerrymandering by either party. As stated at several points above, this is not a holistic remedy for the issues ailing American democracy, we still need specific approaches to address voter enfranchisement and participation, campaign finance, and Senatorial procedures. And those are just the issues mentioned herein. I do, however, believe that this would help to address voter participation and would increase the political and ideological perspectives represented within our government, and would give us a better chance to identify those issues and work to amend them.

  

See the Electoral College Proportional Analysis spreadsheet for Appendices A & B

See the House of Representatives Proportional Analysis spreadsheet for Appendices C & D

Figure D – Ohio 116^th Congressional District Map from Census.gov

---