Showing posts with label Senate. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Senate. Show all posts

Sunday, November 5, 2023

Institutionalism v Partisanism: Its a Question of And, Not Or

With the privilege of hindsight, we may look back on 2023 as the year that the tensions between the design of our political institutions and how we have operated within those institutions reached a breaking point. The dysfunction with which the Republicans have governed in the House of Representatives after winning a slim, eight seat majority in 2022 has been unprecedented in many ways and is, for many, validation of the general public's disapproval of congress.

So far, the 118th Congress has been paralyzed and unable to perform many of its basic tasks. Not because of partisan gridlock slowing, or even preventing, the passage of legislation, but because of intra-party disagreements. Republicans took four days and fifteen votes to elect Kevin McCarty (R - California), Speaker of the House at the beginning of the congressional session. A speaker who members of their own party could tolerate for no more than nine months before bringing forward a motion to vacate, starting the process over; taking nearly a month to find a Speaker the second time. 

Over the course of that month, the Majority Leader, Steve Scalise, was nominated to be speaker but withdrew his name before a House floor vote could be held due to insufficient support from his own party. Similarly, Majority Whip, Tom Emmer, would be nominated but ultimately withdraw his name before a floor vote could be cast. Republican Conference Chairperson, Elise Stefanik (R - New York), and Republican Policy Committee Chairman, Gary Palmer (R - Alabama), were both in consideration, but neither were nominated. 

These are the leadership positions within the House Republican's own party and would normally be considered as a natural line of succession. Instead, none of these individuals were able to gain enough support from within their party to take their nomination to the House floor for a vote, if they were even able to get a nomination in the first place. Instead Republicans would nominate and elect Mike Johnson (R - Louisiana), a relatively unknown representative.

After the ousting of McCarthy, Ben Jacobs wrote for Vox that this saga illustrates, at least under Republican control, that the House of Representatives is functioning like a parliament when it was not structured to accommodate those forces. In his article, Jacobs spoke with Joshua Huder, a senior fellow at the Government Affairs Institute at Georgetown University and Huder had the following to say on the current situation in the house;

"One of the problems we have in the American system is that we don't have elections based on parties at all, so we can never have that kind of parliamentary-style accountability. What happened Tuesday[, October 3, 2023,] was not a no-confidence vote in the way that you would see in a parliamentary election. It didn't start an election. There was no new governing coalition, and we are sort of stuck. And, in some ways, nothing has changed in the House."

Huder's assessment here appears to be correct. McCarthy was ousted by only eight members of the Republican Party. Under a parliamentary system the existing governing coalition would likely shed these members and find another caucus to maintain their governing majority, or perhaps an entirely new governing coalition would be formed with a new leader. Instead, the Republican Party held together.

McCarthy was no moderate conservative, yet he was not sufficiently conservative for certain members of the Republican Party. Now, fourteen Republicans who represent districts that Biden won voted to elect an election denying, abortion and same-sex marriage opposing, Evangelical conservative as Speaker of the house in Mike Johnson. Either members of the Republican's far-right are going to have to answer to their constituents in primary elections why they supported "moderate" McCarthy, or members in swing districts will have to answer to their constituents during the general election why they supported a far-right candidate for Speaker. This is the dissonance that congressional Republicans have to reconcile.

Our winner-take-all, single representative district electoral system is to blame for widely disparate policy positions within a single party. This electoral system pushes parties and candidates to stake out positions that are broadly appealing and the counter point to the opposing party in order to win elections. Consequently, voters are presented with a similar dilemma; forced to determine which of two parties they agree with most (or disagree with least).

This system masks parliamentary tendencies just below the surface of the two major parties. The Democratic Party is made up of three major caucuses; the Congressional Progressive Caucus, the New Democrat Coalition, and the Blue Dog Coalition. Similarly, the Republican Party is made up of the Republican Study Committee and the Freedom Caucus. The problem is, the way these caucuses align themselves is assumed and there is no movement between the coalitions to create a new majority and governing coalition because the representatives that make up these caucuses are Democrats or Republicans first and members of a caucus second. 

But this is not the only time in recent memory that our institutions have buckled under the weight of partisanship. Ezra Klein might disagree that 2023 is the year our institutions broke and may instead trace the cracks back to late 2019 when President Trump was impeached the first time, if not before.  Leading up to the House voting to formally impeach President Trump, Klein argued in favor of impeachment, writing;

In Federalist 65, Alexander Hamilton considers the problem of impeachment. The process, the Constitution framer writes, is meant for offenses “denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself.” 

Political offenses are, by nature, politicized. They “agitate the passions of the whole community” and “divide it into parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused.” The danger, Hamilton says, is that the impeachment process will be decided “more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.” If that proves either the perception or the reality of impeachment, the process loses its legitimacy, and America loses critical protection against tyrants and criminals. 

Everything, then, rests on the independence and authority of the body charged with impeachment. Hamilton admitted that there was no tribunal capable of “the most exact standard of perfection,” but the best possible hope lay with the Senate. He believed that no “other body would be likely to feel CONFIDENCE ENOUGH IN ITS OWN SITUATION, to preserve, unawed and uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality between an INDIVIDUAL accused, and the REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE.”

Hamilton worried over the ill-effects of political parties and partisanship on the institutions he helped to shape. Washington shared in Hamilton's anxiety over political parties, warning that parties could lead to foreign influence and outright corruption in his farewell address. 

Klein continues;

Hamilton wrote in defense of a political system he thought would resist organized political parties. Today, the Senate makes no pretense to impartiality. The modern Senate, like the House, is controlled by a political party — and it is the political party Trump leads...

Impeachment was meant to be a political remedy for political offenses. But over time, it has mutated into something quite different: a partisan remedy for political offenses. And partisan remedies are subject to partisan considerations. If Trump falls before an impeachment trial, the Republican Party will be left in wreckage. The GOP’s leaders can’t permit the destruction of their own party. 

Elsewhere, Klein summarized his modern anxieties with the impeachment process this way;

This isn't how the system the Founders constructed is meant to work. Ambition was supposed to check ambition. Instead, the ambition of congressional Republicans has become an enabler for the ambitions of President Donald Trump.

What Klein is arguing here is that the Founders believed each institution—in the case of impeachment the Presidency, the House of Representatives, and the Senate—would be jealous of the power of other institutions and would, in turn, guard their own power jealously. This incentive would motivate individuals within the system to act as institutionalists instead of partisans. An institutionalist would act to preserve the integrity, independence, and authority of their institution whereas a partisan would act to further the interests of their party. 

Hamilton was not being naive to think that institutional motivations would outweigh partisan motivations. This balance held through much of our nation's history. Though never convicted by the Senate, the impeachment process worked to remove President Nixon when he resigned instead of being  convicted. 

Tip O'Neil, Democratic Speaker of the house from 1977 through 1987, channeled Hamilton's institutionalist spirit when he responded to a staffer referring to the Republican house members as the enemy, saying,

The House Republicans are not the enemy, they're the opposition. The Senate is the enemy.

Hamilton argued that Senators in particular, with their staggered elections and six-year terms, would be able to resist the partisan pressures of an impeachment trial and be able to act as institutionalists. While Hamilton may not have been naive or irrational in this believe, the most glaring omission in his argument, is that for the Senate to be able to exercise its independence articles of impeachment first have to be ratified by the House of Representatives, which is the most likely institution to be captured by populist sentiments. 

The less obvious mistake in Hamilton's reasoning was failing to recognize that the power of a party and the power of an institution are linked; in that the power held by an institution are irrelevant to the party that is out of power. What Republicans in 2020 recognized was that if they were to vote to impeach and convict President Trump, the leader of the Republican Party, they would be endorsing the idea that the Party was corrupt. This could have a few implications; 

(1) Republicans would be robbed an incumbent Presidential candidate who was very popular with the Party's base in the upcoming 2020 Presidential election. Vice President Mike Pence would be the presumptive nominee, but the Republican party would still likely hold a primary and Pence would be saddled with being the Vice President to an impeached President,

(2) It would have certainly meant that any Republicans that did vote to either impeach or convict President Trump would be primaried, and

(3) It may have hurt the party down-ballot with moderate and independent voters who may have felt uneasy voting for a party who's leader was found guilty in an impeachment trial.

On these last two points; while all of the members of the House of Representatives would be up for reelection in 2020, only a third of the Senate would be up for reelection. However, then Senate Majority Leader, Mitch McConnell, recognized that if Republicans lose control of the Senate, the institutional power of the Senate would be irrelevant to Republicans. McConnell's calculation was that Republican's best chance to hold on to the Senate was to be in lockstep with the President through the impeachment process; diminished Senatorial power for Republicans is better than Republicans not holding power in the Senate. 

The ultimate mistake Hamilton made was believing that the political systems and institutions the Founders created could prevent the creation of parties or, in the end, withstand partisan pressures. For all the care put into designing a system of checks and balances to guard against consolidation of power by any one institution, the Founders failed to recognize the benefit of creating a system that would encourage and empower parties. Importantly, though, not a system that would incentivize and create a two party, bipartisan system. Men who welcomed debate and believed in the benefit of the competition of ideas surely would see the benefit of a multitude of parties reflecting nuanced positions, competing for popular support.

If the power of the Republican and Democratic parties was disaggregated between the five existing major caucuses in the House it would be less likely that partisan incentives would outweigh institutional incentives. Ideologically the majorities in the Senate and House might align with the ideology of the President, but it would be less likely that the President's party would have an outright majority in the Senate and House. As such, the partisan incentives of impeachment outlined earlier would still exist for some members of the House and Senate, but not a majority. And while votes for or against an impeachment may fall along party lines, the votes would not necessarily fall along ideological lines. Furthermore, because there would not be a bifurcation of Senate and House between two parties, impeachment would not be seen as a "partisan remedy for a political offense", as Klein put it.  

A multipolar House would also relieve that institution of its operation-design tension identified by Jacobs. Holding the makeup of the 118th Congress constant, if the five individual caucuses were instead independent political parties the context for the events this year look very different. Presumably the conservative leaning parties caucus together and create a "Republican governing coalition". Kevin McCarthy is still elected Speaker of the House after fifteen votes over four day. However, this would not be characterized as unusual as this is how coalition building goes. It takes time and concessions. Similarly, it would also not be unusual when the motion to vacate was brought forward and McCarthy was removed. 

What would be unusual is that the Republican governing coalition would remain intact and simply search for a new leader of the exact same constituency after the removal of the coalition's leader. Since the assumed existing coalition consists of conservatives from the furthest right of the ideological spectrum to moderates, the coalition could only drop the far-right party in favor of bringing in a moderate liberal party to create a new governing coalition with a new leader. 

Ironically, perhaps, the solution then is not to reject parties or parliamentary tendencies, but embrace them more fully.

Thursday, December 24, 2020

Ranking the Senate: A Race to the Majority

In an earlier post, A Proportional Response, I discuss some of the issues affecting our electoral process. However, in that post I focused on the Electoral College and elections of Representatives, avoiding addressing the Senate at the time. The focus then was the adoption of a proportional system, which could not be overlaid Senate elections. With only two Senators from each state, and only one Senator elected to a seat in each election cycle, there is no opportunity for apportioning votes. However, as I think many of those same issues apply to the Senate, that is where I would like to now turn my attention. 

Even before that original post there was discussion on the adoption of ranked choice voting in our elections. Since Alaska has joined Maine as the second state to conduct their elections using a ranked choice model when Alaskans voted in favor of a ballot initiative on Tuesday, November 3, 2020. The concept behind ranked choice voting is fairly simple. The candidate with the broadest popular appeal is elected to office by passing the 50% vote threshold after voters’ candidate rankings are allocated and reallocated. The hope being that this would increase party representation and decrease partisanship.

First, it may be helpful to take a step back and more fully explain how ranked choice voting works. When a voter enters the polling booth to cast their ballot for their Senator, they will be presented with the candidates running for that Senate seat, as expected. Hypothetically, a voter may see a member of the Republican, Democratic, Green, and Libertarian parties on their ballot. However, instead of selecting a single candidate to cast their ballot for, the voter ranks all candidates from their most desired to least desired. For example:

(1) Green

(2) Democrat

(3) Libertarian

(4) Republican

 

As the votes are tabulated, under a ranked choice system, it is no longer the candidate with the most votes who wins (a plurality), but the first candidate to receive more than 50% of the vote (a majority). This is achieved by dropping the candidate who has received the fewest number of votes, and reallocating those votes to the other candidates. For any voters who had this candidate ranked first, their votes will be reallocated to their second choice. In the example provided above, if the Green party received the fewest votes, then this voter’s ballot would be cast for the Democrat candidate. This continues until a candidate is allocated more than 50% of the votes.

It is through this reallocation process that a ranked choice system will result in the candidate with the broadest popular appeal winning office. It is very likely that the candidate will not be everyone’s first choice, but it will at least be a majority of people’s second or third choices. It also means that voters continue to have a say in who is elected instead of being shut out of the process if their preferred candidate does not win outright, as in our standard electoral process.

Also, by being able to rank candidates, the incentives for strategic voting are reduced. By this I mean; under our current system of voting we get to cast one ballot for one candidate and the candidate with the most votes win. This framing forces voters to weigh whether they would rather vote for their preferred candidate and risk seeing the candidate they have the most disagreements with win, or vote for a candidate they mostly align with that has a better chance of winning. Said another way, voters are asked to consider whether they would rather vote for a candidate or against one.

Under a ranked choice model, third-party candidates would no longer be seen as spoilers to one of the two major parties; a characterization used by the two major parties to disparage third-parties, and their candidates, and dissuade voters from casting their ballots for a third-party candidate. The result being, voting for a third-party candidate would no longer be seen by voters as a protest vote, or worse, a throw-away vote. As I have mentioned before, raising the profile of third-parties increases ideological representation within our government. By increasing ideological representation, voters will feel like they have someone in government who has their interests in mind. It seems intuitive that increasing ideological responsiveness would increase voter engagement.

Lastly, candidates will need to adjust their campaign strategies; campaigning to not only be voters first choice, but their second and third choices as well, shifting away from base activation and toward appealing to a broader coalition of voters. Unless a candidate is able to win outright based on voters’ first preference, the only path to victory is through also being a second or third choice. The hope is that due to the change in incentives, campaigns would be more civil, and that civility would ideally carry over to governing. Examples of this have been seen in Maine where candidates running against one another have appeared in the same campaign ads.

It is worth pointing out that a few states currently have instant runoff elections—Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi—meaning that if no single candidate passes the 50% threshold another election is held between the two leading candidates. One might think that this would have the same intended effects as a ranked choice voter model, however, that does not seem to be the case. This does address the concern that voters of a losing candidate lose their ability to have a say in who the winner should be. However, because a separate, special election is held voter turnout is usually substantially lower than the general election—23% lower on average, as shown in Figure A, below.

Figure A:

 

Change in Turnout

Percent of GE Turnout

2002 LA

-1%

99%

2008 GA

-43%

57%

2014 LA

-13%

87%

2016 LA

-54%

46%

2018 MS

-4%

96%

AVERAGE

-23%

77%

 

Further, as we saw in the 2020 Senate election in Georgia between Doug Collins (R), Kelly Loeffler (R), and Ralph Warnock (D) the potential for an instant runoff election was not a sufficient incentive for candidates to not run a negative campaign nor run a base activation campaign. Collins and Loeffler, both Republicans, ran incendiary campaigns against one another, trying to run to the right of the other. These are members of the same party running attack ads against one another. As a result, this Senate campaign is headed to a runoff between Loeffler and Warnock.

So, it would seem that instant runoff elections do not produce the intended benefits of a ranked choice election method.

With the understanding of a ranked choice model and the intended benefits we should now look at the arguments against the current Senate election model. Looking at Figure B, which details the percentage of the total popular vote by party and seats won by party from the 2000 election through the 2018 election, we are able to see a few things. First, Democrats in 2000 and Republicans in 2010 won a majority of Senate seats despite not winning a majority of votes. Second, on two different occasions, 2004 and 2016, Democrats won the popular share of the vote but lost in the share of seats.

Figure B:

 

Total Popular Vote

Percent of Popular Vote


Total Seats

Percent of Seats

 

Dem

Rep

Other


Dem

Rep

Other

2000

36,788,222

36,729,792

5,797,467


18

14

1

46.38%

46.13%

7.31%


54.55%

42.42%

3.03%

2002

20,470,371

22,198,747

1,606,029


12

22

0

46.23%

50.14%

3.63%

 

35.29%

64.71%

0.00%

2004

43,605,968

39,920,857

2,678,558

 

14

20

0

50.58%

46.31%

3.11%

 

41.18%

58.82%

0.00%

2006

33,623,140

26,498,040

2,837,821

 

23

9

1

53.40%

42.09%

4.51%

 

69.70%

27.27%

3.03%

2008

35,473,711

30,913,256

3,485,123

 

20

14

1

50.77%

44.24%

4.99%

 

57.14%

40.00%

2.86%

2010

33,225,487

35,958,608

5,481,075

 

13

25

0

44.50%

48.16%

7.34%

 

34.21%

65.79%

0.00%

2012

49,998,769

39,131,016

3,930,193

 

23

8

2

53.73%

42.05%

4.22%

 

69.70%

24.24%

6.06%

2014

20,865,858

24,613,889

2,013,372

 

12

24

0

43.93%

51.83%

4.24%

 

33.33%

66.67%

0.00%

2016

51,653,808

41,324,322

4,283,315

 

12

22

0

53.11%

42.49%

4.40%

 

35.29%

64.71%

0.00%

2018

46,712,691

39,333,695

4,426,836

 

22

11

2

51.63%

43.48%

4.89%

 

62.86%

31.43%

5.71%

 

Practically this translates to is Republicans having a two-seat majority in the Senate in 2016 despite winning 17.45 million fewer votes in Senate elections from 2012 to 2016 and a three-seat majority in 2018 though winning 13.96 million fewer votes. This Senate also confirmed three Supreme Court Justices nominated by a President who won 2.8 million fewer votes than his opponent.

Some observers have seen these outcomes of our elections and argued that this is undemocratic. Others have gone farther to argue that this is a dangerous pattern. A party that is not only able to win without needing to appeal or respond to a majority of the public, but actively seeks a minoritarian path to victory will seek to protect that path to power; namely through voter restrictions like ballot ID laws, purges of the voter rolls, closing polling locations, restricting absentee and early voting options, and gerrymandering districts, to name a few.

I do not necessarily disagree with this assessment, in fact it’s one of the reasons I advocate for a proportional system for electing the President and Representatives. Certainly, when taking the Electoral College, gerrymandering of House Districts, and malapportionment of the Senate together I think the argument is quite strong. However, if we look at the Senate in isolation, I think the argument weakens a bit. Looking at Senate election results in the aggregate, as we did above, could be a bit misleading. Senators are elected by the voters in individual states, not in nation wide elections. It’s for this reason I think the argument that Senators are not responsive to a majority of voters could be disingenuous.

So instead, if we look at Senate races from 2000 through 2018, we can see how responsive to voters Senators truly needed to be. Looking to Figure C, below we can see that on average over the 10 election cycles from 2000 to 2018 3 elections per cycle, or 10%, are won by Senators who win fewer than 50% of the vote.

Figure C:

 

Number Races

Winners <50%

Percent of Races <50%

2000

33

3

9%

2002

34

3

9%

2004

34

2

6%

2006

33

4

12%

2008

35

3

9%

2010

37

4

13%

2012

33

3

9%

2014

36

4

11%

2016

34

6

18%

2018

35

2

6%

 

Of these 34 elections with candidates winning fewer than 50% of votes, the candidates are from 19 states. Alaska contributes the most elections with five candidates winning without a majority of the votes. As pointed out earlier Alaska has adopted a ranked choice model. After Alaska; Colorado (3), Minnesota (3), Missouri (3) would be the states which might most benefit from a ranked choice system.  

Though Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi have runoff elections I think it is reasonable to included them within the analysis of Figure C, for the reasons outlined above. If we do, then the average number of elections increases from 3 to 4 per cycle, or from 10% to 11%. Furthermore, Louisiana would join Colorado, Minnesota, and Missouri as it has had three Senate runoff elections over the 10 Senate election cycles.

Now, it is worth considering that there is nothing systematic about Senate elections which would allow for Senators to win and hold their seats despite consistently failing to win with a majority of votes, as the Electoral College allows Presidential candidates to win without wining even the plurality of votes. Further, there is no strategic advantage that one party has over the other; Democrats and Republicans benefit from wining with only a plurality. In fact, it is a fairly even split between the two parties with Democrats winning 19 elections and Republicans winning 14 elections with fewer than 50% of the popular vote.

However, we should consider whether the current system is really producing the best results. As I argued in my earlier post, our system is currently structured in a way that incentivizes a two-party system, and this bipartisan structure forces a false choice which creates apathy within the voting population. Voter preferences are more complex than two parties are able to reflect, and if voters do not see themselves reflected in the available candidates (or available viable candidates) then they are less likely to vote. As shown in Figure D.1, below, turnout for Senate elections are already low when compared to Presidential election turnout, 68% on average. And, as discussed in A Proportional Response, Presidential election turnout in the US is not particularly high to begin with, with an average 15% of registered voters not voting in Presidential elections.

Figure D.1:

 

Presidential Turnout

Senate Turnout


2000

105,405,100

79,315,481

75%

2004

122,295,345

86,205,383

70%

2008

131,313,820

69,872,090

53%

2012

129,085,410

93,059,978

72%

2016

136,669,276

97,261,445

71%

 

 

 

68%

 

Figure D.2 shows that Senate voter turnout falls further during non-Presidential election years, decreasing on average by 25%. 

Figure D.2:

 

Senate Turnout

2000

79,315,481

2002

44,275,147

2004

86,205,383

2006

62,959,001

2008

69,872,090

2010

74,665,170

2012

93,059,978

2014

47,493,119

2016

97,261,445

2018

90,473,222

Presidential Year Average

85,142,875

Off Cycle Average

63,973,132

 

It is easy to imagine how allowing voters the ability to express their preference without it being thought of as a protest vote and, what’s more, allowing them to continue to be involved in the process even after their preferred candidate has not won would increase voter engagement in the process and confidence in the system. If voter engagement is truly activated and more voters do turn out and they vote their true preference they we would also begin to see that diversity reflected in our elected officials as more parties begin to receive more traction.

Lastly, I would like to return to the concerns raised in response to Senate results not reflecting the majority of the electorate. Concerns over the malapportionment of the Senate are valid as the rural-urban divide between Republicans and Democrats continues to grow and as the Senate has a rural bias—Wyoming and California have the same representation within the Senate despite Wyoming having 1.5% of California’s population. I am not convinced that this is the problem, however. One of this country’s founding principles was “majority rules, minority rights” and the Senate seems instrumental to the preservation of minority rights. The issue, as I see it, is that our parties are straining our system in ways it was not designed to withstand. The system of checks and balances was designed to create competition between the branches of government, each protecting its own power. But in a two-party system, where ambitions of the party supersede ambitions of the institution, parties cooperate across branches and those checks and balances break down. Therefore, the solution would not seem to be correcting the apportionment of the Senate, but breaking our bipolar system to create a multipolar system. By disaggregating the power of the parties and increasing competition, it will be difficult to wield across institutions. Maybe then the ambitions of the institution will again supersede the ambitions of the party.

The Moral Value in a Lie

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