In discussions of the Second World War interactions between the Soviet Union and Japan are generally over looked. This is despite the fact that from 1932 until the end of the war in 1945 Japanese and Soviet troops shared a long border. Because the Japanese and Soviet Union were in a kind of cold war throughout most of the 1930s and 1940s—the military presence of each on boarder influenced the military planning of the other. However, this cold war was broken up by a few minor flare ups in the form of border disputes between the two countries until the Soviet Union formally declared war against Japan in 1945. Both nations sought to extend their influence over the same region, China, and as a result had a history of conflict and tensions throughout the early 20th century. Treaties and agreements were signed by both nations, but these only served to postpone direct conflict.
Tensions and Treaties:
Between the Soviet Union and Japan there existed a history of treaties which were not preferable to either side, causing tensions between the two nations. One such agreement dated back to 1905 between Japan and the Soviet Union’s predecessor, the Russian Empire. The Russo-Japanese Treaty of Portsmouth gave Japanese fishermen the “right to pursue their calling in Russian Far Eastern waters”—i.e. Siberian fisheries (Jones, pg.178). In 1907 the Russo-Japanese Fishery Convention allowed Japanese fisherman to rent canneries on the Russian coast (Jones, pg. 178). However, after the Russian revolution Japan did not pay the rent of the canneries as the government Japan had an agreement with no longer existed and relations with the Soviet Union had not yet been established (Jones, pg. 178). The general Treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union signed in 1925, established relations between the two nations, honored the Japan’s right to fish in Russian waters as established in the Treaty of Portsmouth (Jones, pg. 178).
Three years later a second convention was held, The Soviet-Japanese Fishery Convention of 1928, as a result of the general Treaty signed in 1925 (Jones, pg. 178). It was decided at this convention that the rights to fishing grounds and to build canneries were to be auctioned off to private companies, including Japanese companies (Jones, pg. 178).
Despite agreeing to auction off fishing grounds and canneries, the Soviet Union did not like that a capitalist nation like Japan was exploiting Soviet resources, making the issue ideological as well as nationalistic (Jones, pg. 178). Moscow’s nationalist concerns specifically centered on the fear that allowing Japanese companies to build canneries and fish in Soviet waters would not only compete with Soviet fishing interests, which the Soviet Union was attempting to expand, but give the Japanese opportunities for espionage (Jones, pg. 178).
Japan wanted rights to the fishing grounds for more practical reasons. Fish was a main staple of the Japanese diet and their exportation of tinned fish was also increasing, thus they required access to more fisheries and canneries (Jones, pg. 178).
To protect their interests the Soviet government began to systematically reduce Japanese rights to fishing grounds (Jones, pg. 178). In 1928 Japanese companies had rented 80 percent of the fishing grounds, that number fell to about 50 percent in 1931 (Jones, pg. 179). By 1932, in response to Japanese complaints, an agreement was reached that the claim to fishing grounds would be frozen (Jones, pg. 179). Talks between Japan and the Soviet Union over the rights to fishing grounds were not making progress and by 1935 were suspended, only to be resumed in 1936 to extend the 1928 Convention until the end of the year (Jones, pg. 179). A new Fishery Convention was held later in 1936, but when Moscow heard of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact refused to sign the Convention and instead agreed to prolong the 1928 Convention another year (Jones, pg. 179). The extension of 1928 Convention in 1937 left the Japanese in an uncertain position with the Soviet Union refusing to sign the 1936 Convention or enter into new negotiations on the matter (Jones, pg. 179).
By the end of 1938 the Soviet Union announced that she would not extend the 1928 Convention a third year unless Japanese companies surrendered 40 fishing grounds (Jones, pg. 182). Shigenori Tōgō, Japanese Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Diplomat, were unable to come to an understanding on the matter, and so Moscow stated that on March 13, 1939 an auction of fishing grounds—including grounds held by Japanese companies—would be held at Vladivostok (Jones, pg. 182-183). In response, the Japanese Foreign Ministry said that Japan would not accept the outcome of the auction and she “might be constrained to act in self-defense should the Soviet Union resort to such unilateral action” (Jones, pg. 183). Japan even threatened to give Japanese fishermen naval escorts to their fishing grounds (Jones, pg. 183).
Due either to this threat by Japan or increased hostilities in Europe, the Soviet State Fishery Organization bought only four lots at the auction (Jones, pg. 183). A lack of buyers at the first auction resulted in a second auction to be held on April 3, 1939 (Jones, pg. 183). At this auction it was announced that Japanese companies would give up 37 of their old fishing grounds but would get 10 new ones and that the 1928 Convention would be extended until the end of the year (Jones, pg. 183).
The Treaty of 1925, which normalized relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, created its own set of issues between the two states. One such conflict arising from the treaty included an agreement which stated that Japan would remove its troops from the northern half of the island Sakhalin. In return Japan was allowed access to the oil fields and coal mines by paying a yearly rent (Jones, pg. 179). This was especially important to the Japanese because they lacked their own oil reserves needed to fuel their military machine (Jones, pg. 179). To mine these resources the Japanese established two companies, North Sakhalin Petroleum Company and the North Sakhalin Mining Company, in December 1925 (Jones, pg. 179). Although the Japanese companies were responsible for harvesting the resources, Soviet authorities were responsible for providing a work force of Soviet laborers or allowing the Japanese bring in their own workers (Jones, pg. 179). As relations worsened in the 1930s between the two powers, the Japanese found it increasingly difficult to hire enough men to mine due to the Soviet Union limiting the available man power (Jones, pg. 179-180).
In the
summer of 1939 a new conflict over labor in Sakhalin broke out. The Russian
Worker’s Union claimed that the Japanese North Sakhalin Petroleum Company had
not fulfilled its labor contract and sued the company (Jones, pg. 183). The
local Soviet courts imposed heavy fines and threatened to confiscate the
property from the company if the Russian workers were not paid. The Japanese
company, for their part, complained that Soviet officials had limited oil
production by limiting the work force (Jones, pg. 183). The issue was finally
resolved after an agreement between the Soviet workers and the Japanese company
was reached which resulted in higher wages and other benefits to the workers
(Jones, pg. 183).
Japanese Aggression:
Japan invaded Manchuria on September 18, 1931 taking control of the area which the Chinese Eastern Railway ran through; importantly Harbin, a major juncture on the Chinese Eastern Railway (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 362). The Japanese claimed that their military presence was necessary to protect Japanese citizens in Harbin after a “mutiny of Chinese troops” (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 362).
Japan assured the Soviets that their interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway would not be infringed, and while the Japanese would use the railway to transport troops, they would pay the cost of transportation (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 362-363). This would require both the approval of the Soviet and the Chinese governments as they both held claims to the Chinese Eastern Railway (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 363).
The Soviet Union wished to stay out of the conflict in Manchuria and so they sought a way to mitigate the threat of Japanese troops approaching the Soviet border (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 363). In an attempt to resolve the issue through diplomacy Soviet leaders proposed a nonaggression pact with the Japanese on December 31, 1931 (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 363). The Japanese ignored this proposition until the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected the pact on December 13, 1932 (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 364). Also, in 1932 the Manchukuo government, the government presiding over Japanese controlled Manchuria, was declared independent and established as a puppet government of Japan (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 385).
The failure of the Japanese and the Soviet Union to come to a nonaggression agreement did not end diplomatic talks, however. As an attempt to eliminate a source of tension the Soviet Union offered to sell the Chinese Eastern Railway to the Manchukuo government, though for all practical purposes this sale would be to Japan (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 364, 385). The Soviet government estimated the cost of the railway from initial construction until 1932 at about 411,700,000 rubles and another 178,530,000 rubles loaned to “cover deficit and running costs in the early years of the railway” (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 364). Japan mediated the talks between the Soviet Union and Manchukuo beginning on June 26, 1933 (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 365). The initial asking price from the Soviet government for the railway was 250 million rubles, to be paid in four semiannual installments; Manchukuo made a counter offer of 20 million rubles (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 365). The Manchukuo government refused to budge on their proposal after Moscow lowered their original proposal of 250 million rubles to 200 million rubles (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 365). After a six-month hiatus negotiations resumed; each side made concessions—though Moscow conceded more—until September 19, 1934 when the railway was sold for 67.5 million rubles (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 365).
While the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway was intended to ease tensions it actually, through the process of negotiating the sale, increased difficulties between the Soviet Union and Japan. It also led to later disputes over the railway as well. The Manchukuo government refused to pay the pensions of former employees as promised and refused to pay the final installment for the purchase of the railway (Jones, pg. 180). This only added to the animosity between the Soviet Union and Japan.
Soviet Interference:
In 1919, the Soviet Union had established the Comintern, whose purpose was to help spur Communist revolutions throughout the world. The Comintern was making an effort in Japan to overthrow the Japanese Emperor in the years 1932 and 1933, through the Communist Party of Japan (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 385-386). With a Japanese military presence in Manchukuo and the ongoing dispute over the Chinese Eastern Railway, Moscow feared a Japanese push into Siberia (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 385). The purpose of the Communist Party of Japan was meant to cause civil unrest within Japan so that the Japanese would be preoccupied quelling a domestic revolution and unable able to expand northward, into the Soviet Union (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 385).
The Communist Party of Japan planned to begin this revolution as a “bourgeois-democratic revolution” against the Emperor and the old regime to “do away with the ‘remnants of feudalism’” (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 385). This revolution was not initially expected to be a proletariat revolution, but after the Emperor was deposed the transition from a bourgeois-democratic revolution to a socialist revolution would be begin (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 386). However, this tactic by the Soviet Comintern was unsuccessful, because Japan was effectively able to identify and arrest members of the Communist Party of Japan and its leaders, almost wiping out the party by the end of 1932 (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 386). The Soviet Union sent another Japanese communist in 1933 who was initially successful at reorganizing the remaining fragments of the party until another wave of arrests again reduced the size of the party’s members, scattering those that remained (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 386). This direct and material support of multiple coup attempts in a sovereign nation could have been viewed as overt hostility by the Japanese and responded to in kind.
In addition to the Soviet Union’s support of domestic revolution within Japan itself, the Soviet Union provided direct aid and assistance to China in her defense against Japanese aggression. Before a formal lending agreement was signed between the USSR and China in 1938, the Soviet Union “sent arms and ammunition to China to the value of 100 million Chinese dollars” (Jones, pg. 173). In May, 1938 two loans were formally agreed upon at the rate of 50 million US dollars each to be given to the Chinese from the USSR (Jones, pg. 174). The Chinese asked for additional aid which Stalin denied until the first two loans were fully spent. In June, 1939 the third loan of 150 million US dollars was given to China (Jones, pg. 174). Also in June, 1939 the Soviet Union and China signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Commerce which made gave China the status of “most-favored-nation” and diplomatic privileges and immunities (Jones, pg. 174). With these three loans the Chinese were able to purchase arms and ammunition from the Soviet Union to be employed against the Japanese military (Jones, pg. 174).
To supply China with Soviet aid Soviet ships traveled into the port of Canton from 1937 until 1938, when it was captured by the Japanese (Jones, 174). After the fall of Canton, the supplies were transported over land from Alma Ata, in present day Kazakhstan, and on the Turkestan-Siberian Railway, from Sinkiang to Lanchow in China (Jones, pg. 174-175). The Soviet Union also sent airmen to China to fly missions and train Chinese pilots beginning in 1937. This also benefited the Soviet pilots, as they received combat experience. (Jones, pg. 176-177). Four fighter and two bomber squadrons were sent in total, but by 1938 the Soviet pilots returned to the Soviet Union due to the increasing threat of war in Europe (Jones, pg. 177).
Japan protested the Soviet Union selling arms and supplies to the Chinese, but these complaints were ignored by Moscow (Jones, 177). By supplying the Chinese and sending airmen to China to fly missions the Soviet Union made itself susceptible to being drawn into war with Japan. The Japanese had an incentive to cut off trading routs, which could include bombing rail lines, and the presence of Soviet airmen made it possible for Soviet and Japanese pilots to engage in direct combat. If these actions were to have occurred it would have likely been considered an act of war against the Soviet Union drawing her fully into the conflict. This forced Japan to decide which was more costly, allowing the Soviet Union to continue to supply China or drawing the Soviet Union into the conflict.
Defensive Pacts:
The Soviet Union’s concern of Japanese aggression to the south of her borders continued to grow. In response to Japanese claiming of land on the border of Manchukuo and Manchuria the Soviet Union and Mongolia entered into a “gentlemen’s agreement” in November 1934 (March, pg. 214). This agreement stated that the Soviet Union would defend the Mongolian People’s Republic and so Soviet troops entered into Outer Mongolia in the same year (March, pg. 214-215).
Within two years Japan’s interest in Outer Mongolia became strong enough to attack the Buir Nor area in Outer Mongolia, in February 1936 (March, pg. 215). The attack was able to be repelled but consequently Stalin formally announced that the Soviet Union would come to the aid of Mongolia in her defense (March, pg. 215). On March 12, 1936 the USSR and Mongolia entered into the Protocol of Mutual Assistance, which stated that if either state was attacked the other would provide any assistance (March, pg. 215).
Japan was concerned of the presence of the Soviet Union north of Manchukuo and also did not appreciate the support of revolution in Japan by Moscow. As a result Japan formally entered into the Anti-Comintern pact with Germany in 1936 (March, pg. 219-222). The pact stated that each state would “exchange information on the activities of the Comintern and collaborate in preventive measures” (Jones, pg. 25). Second they agreed that a third state threatened by Comintern activities would join the pact, this would be Italy (Jones, pg. 25). The pact secretly stated that if either state was to be attacked, unprovoked, by the Soviet Union the other would not aid the Soviet Union in any way (Jones, pg. 25). Further, neither state was to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union without the consent of the other (Jones, pg. 25). There was a third stipulation for both public and private sections of the pact; it would only last five years, then it could be renewed (Jones, pg. 25). Although this was not a formal military or defensive alliance it did set the tone for one to follow (Jones, pg. 26). When the Soviet Union found out about the contents of the secret pact they broke off negotiations over fisheries with Japan (Jones, pg. 26).
Japan entered into a second pact with Germany and Italy, this one being considerably more defensive in nature. Japan hoped that by entering into a military pact with Italy and Germany it would force the Soviet Union into either a two-front war or cutting aid to China (Jones, pg. 182). In Berlin on September 27, 1940 Japan, Germany, and Italy entered into the Tripartite Pact (Jones, pg. 199). Article 3 of this pact says that if a nation not involved in either the European or the Asian-Pacific war “commits and act of aggression against one of the contracting parties, Japan, Germany, and Italy undertake to declare war on such Power and to assist one another with all political, economic and military means” (Jones, pg. 197). The purpose of this article was to deter the United States from entering into either war with the threat of facing three regional powers instead of just one or two (Jones, pg. 197). The pact was also meant to deter the Soviet Union from acting in either theater as well.
Article 5 of the pact said that this pact would not change any of the signatories’ current political relations with the Soviet Union (Jones, pg. 197). In fact, Italy and Germany intended to use their good standing with the USSR to try to improve the Soviet- Japanese relationship (Jones, pg. 198). Despite this the Soviet Union saw this as a restructuring of the Anti-Comintern Pact but with a more aggressive posture toward the Soviet Union (Jones, pg. 202). A secret protocol of the pact was to establish “joint military, naval, and economic commissions” between the three nations (Jones, pg. 197). In addition, each nation should “furnish each other with all new inventions and weapons of war, with industrial equipment, technical assistance, and raw materials for war purposes” (Jones, pg. 198).
Despite neither side wanting to engage the other in hostilities a border skirmish broke out between Soviet and Manchukuo forces at Changkufeng on the Manchukuo-Soviet border in July 1938 (Jones, pg. 180). Although it was initially a minor engagement between patrols it quickly escalated with both sides sending reinforcements of heavy artillery and tanks (Jones, pg. 181). In the battle between Soviet and Japanese forces that ensued the Soviet forces were able to inflict significant damage on the Japanese forces (Jones, pg. 181). This pressured the Japanese to pursue a diplomatic resolution to the border dispute with the Soviet Union and on August 2 the Japanese government reached out to the Soviet Union (Jones, pg. 181). The Japanese originally claimed that the disputed territory belonged to Manchukuo but Soviet authorities argued that according to the protocol of 1886, which was added to the Russo-Chinese Treaty of Huchun of 1869, the territory belonged to them (Jones, pg. 181). Unable to come to an agreement the two nations agreed to a truce on August 11, ending the engagement. (Jones, pg. 181). According to the agreement the border would be left undefined until a later date Soviet troops could maintain their current position but Japanese troops would fall back a kilometer, leaving the disputed border a no-man’s-land (Jones, pg. 181).
A year later hostilities again broke out between the Soviet Union and Japan, this time in Mongolia. On May 11, 1939 Japanese troops attacked a region to the east of Buir Nor and a joint Soviet-Mongol force defended against the Japanese invasion (March, pg. 216). The Soviet Union, fulfilling its obligations of the Protocol of Mutual Assistance, sent aid to Mongolia in its defense (March, pg. 216). On July 1 General Georgi Zhukov was sent to Mongolia to take command of military operations (March, 216). The Soviet military amassed a large force of “three rifle divisions and ample reinforcements of tank, aircraft, and heavy artillery units” and supplies in secret (March, pg. 216). The Japanese also reinforced their troops, creating the Sixth Army command (March, pg. 216). On August 20 General Zhukov launched his attack, “crushing his advisory through the careful coordination of the total firepower of his armor, aircraft, and heavy artillery” (March, pg. 217). Both sides took considerable damage in the battle, although the Soviet Union did emerge victorious, dissuading Japan from further provoking the Soviets (March, pg. 217).
Japan was shocked when, on August 23, 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany signed the Russo-German Non-aggression Pact (March, pg. 222). In Hitler’s preparations for Operation Barbarossa he chose not to tell the Japanese his plans for fear of the Moscow finding out (March, pg. 222). The recent defeats of the Japanese army by Soviet troops and the Russo-German Non-aggression pact likely caused the Japanese to seek their own peace treaty with the Soviet Union. Had Japan been made aware of Germany’s aims to invade the Soviet Union she may have not pursued it further. But as a result, on April 13, 1941, the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Treaty was signed by Japan and the Soviet Union, stating that if either nation was to enter into hostilities with a third party the other would remain neutral (March, pg. 222).
This treaty would be extremely beneficial for both parties. Later in this same year the Soviet Union would be invaded by German and Japan would attack Pearl Harbor drawing America into the Second World War. The Neutrality Treaty gave both the Soviet Union and Japan the assurance that the other did not pose a threat.
The Second World War
As Japan was beginning to expand through China in the 1930s, Stalin was focusing on internal development with the Five Year Plans. And as the Japanese began to probe the Soviet Union’s border, testing the Soviet army in 1937, the purges within the Red Army were taking place (March, pg. 215). By the time the Neutrality Treaty was signed in 1941 war had begun in Europe and Soviet forces were engaged in the west against German troops; the Soviet Union wanted to avoid fighting a war on two fronts. Japan was already engaged in conflicts with China and was not prepared to fight a united Sino-Soviet force. The 1936 program expanded Japanese armaments and war industries and “planned to place the Japanese Army in a position of full readiness for war with the USSR by about 1940” (Jones, pg.172). In 1938 Japanese troops were suffering a shortage in ammunition (Jones, pg. 172). Furthermore, the defeats the Japanese troops suffered by the Soviet forces in 1938 and 1939 convinced the Japanese military leadership that it was not in their best interest to pursue an aggressive policy with the Soviet Union.
On June 22, 1941 Germany launched Operation Barbarossa and invaded the Soviet Union, taking Soviet forces by surprise. German forces made quick progress at first and were able to push to the outskirts of Moscow by October 1941. Although Soviet forces were in retreat, because of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Treaty the Soviet army was able to bring 175,000 troops up from the east to reinforce their western flank against German advances (March, pg. 222). These troops were trained to fight in the winter and were instrumental in the defense of Moscow (March, pg. 222). Although the tide of the war began to turn against Germany, the victory at Moscow was more of a symbolic victory than a strategic one. Had the Soviet Union and Japan not come to a formal neutrality agreement then the Soviet army may not have felt secure in transferring troops from the east to the west, shifting the balance of power in the European theater. Further, had the Soviet Union and Japan still been engaged in border skirmishes then important resources would have also been diverted from the western front to supply the Soviet eastern front. If this was the case the war in Europe would have unfolded very differently.
Despite the neutrality pact with the Soviet Union there was a debate in Tokyo on July 2, 1941 whether they should attack the Soviet Union in the north or press south (March, pg. 222-223). The Kwantung Army in Manchuria was at its peak of 600,000 troops, with the support of 50,000 troops from the Army of Korea (March, pg. 223). Those in Tokyo who wanted to go south won the debate due, in part, to past loses to Soviet forces and the presence of Soviet bombers in Vladivostok capable of bombing the Japanese home islands (March, pg. 223). It was also believed that the oil production from Sakhalin was not sufficient for the Japanese Imperial Navy, who preferred oil fields in the East Indies (March, pg. 223). Japanese military leadership also believed, as Hitler did, that Germany would be able to easily defeat the Soviet Union (March, pg. 223).
This decision by the Japanese military leadership to go south resulted in the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941 (March, pg. 223). The next day America declared war on Japan, and by December 11 Germany invoked Article 3 of the Tripartite Pact and declared war on America (Jones, pg. 323 & 329). This resulted in an “anti-Axis alliance” between the Soviet Union and the United States (March, pg. 223).
As a direct result of the “anti-Axis alliance” Joseph Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill met several times during the war to discuss the progress of the war and postwar plans. One such meeting was the meeting in Yalta in February 1945 (March, pg. 224). The leaders discussed what postwar Europe would look like (March, pg. 224). It was also decided that the Soviet Union would enter into the War in the Pacific two to three months after Germany’s surrender to help bring an end to the war with Japan (March, pg. 224). In return for the Soviet Union’s aid in the Pacific Theater, the Soviet Union would have Southern Sakhalin, the Chinese Eastern Railway, the South Manchurian Railroad, the Use of Port Arthur and Talien in the Liao-tung Peninsula, and the Kuril Islands returned to them (March, pg. 224).
On April 9, 1945 the Soviet Union announced that it would no longer honor the Neutrality Pact with Japan (March, pg. 225). Japan thought that this meant that the Soviet Union was choosing to not renew the pact when it expired April 12, 1945 (March, pg. 225). On May 7, 1945 Germany unconditionally surrendered to the Allied forces in Europe. Three months later, on August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan (March, pg. 225). A Soviet force of 1.6 million men, 5,000 tanks, 4,000 aircraft, and the Soviet Pacific Fleet was under the command of Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky in Khabarovsk (March, pg. 225). By this time the Kwantung Army, stationed in Manchuria had been hollowed out as troops were repositioned to stop the American advance in the Philippines and attacks on the home islands (March, pg. 225).
The Soviet attack came on August 9 from three directions (March, pg. 225). The first and largest, the Transbaikal Front, attacked eastward from Outer Mongolia toward Mukden and Changchun and southeast across Inner Mongolia (March, pg. 225). The First Far Eastern Front crossed the Ussuri River and invaded westward, also toward Mukden, and aided amphibious landings pushing southward into Korea (March, pg. 225-226). The Second Far Eastern Front attacked southward from Blagoveshchensk across the Amur River to attack northern Manchuria (March, pg. 225-226). Within two weeks of the initial invasion by Soviet forces, Manchukuo and Sakhalin had fallen and on August 17 Soviet forces invaded the Kurils islands (March, pg. 226). The Soviet success was quick, decisive, and shocked both the American’s and Japanese (March, pg. 226).
On August 11 Japan announced that she would accept the terms of the Potsdam Declarations (March, pg. 226). Four days later the emperor made an announcement to his people that the military would cease hostilities (March, pg. 226). The official surrender of the Japanese Empire was signed in Tokyo Bay aboard the USS Missouri on September 2 (March, pg. 226). Occupation of Japan began very quickly after her surrender (March, pg. 226). Only three months before, occupation of Germany was established and Germany was divided into four zones of occupation; the Soviet Union proposed handling Japan’s occupation in a similar manner (March, pg. 226). America rejected this idea and the occupying force was mostly an America force, under the command of American General Douglas MacArthur (March, pg. 226).
Conclusion:
Despite the limited military contact between the Japan and the Soviet Union leading up to and the Second World War their interactions shaped both European and Pacific theaters of the war. The support of China in personnel, training, loans, and supplies gave the Chinese army the means to resist the Japanese invasion. This served a second function as well; it gave the Chinese hope that the Soviet Union might itself become involved in the conflict in Asia. As a result of Japan’s probing of the Soviet strength along the border of Manchukuo Japan dropped its ambitions for northern expansion. Instead Japan opted for southern expansion, a policy which led to the Pearl Harbor attack and the involvement of the United States into both theaters of World War II. Also as a result of the border skirmishes Japan entered into a neutrality treaty with the Soviet Union allowing the Soviet military to focus its full attention on the European Theater without any threats from the east. Just as the Soviet troops were able to leave the border between the Soviet Union and Manchukuo, the Kwantung Army troops were taken to defend against the American advance. However, the Soviet Union’s eventual involvement in the Pacific Theater would have lasting repercussions—a divided Korean Peninsula, the rise of Communist China, and the spread of Communism through Southeast Asia.
Works Cited:
Eudin, Xenia Joukoff., and Robert M. Slusser. Soviet
Foreign Policy, 1928-1934; Documents and Materials,. Vol. II. University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1967. Print.
Jones, F. C. Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall 1937-45. London: Oxford UP, 1954. Print.
March, G. Patrick. Eastern Destiny: Russia in Asia and the North Pacific. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996. Print.
No comments:
Post a Comment