The Korean War: A Distorted Expansionary Application of Containment

 

    George F. Kennan, a member of the State Department stationed in Moscow, sent in 1946 the “Long Telegram”, which proposed a policy approach for US-Soviet relations—containment. By 1950 Kennan’s ideas, as presented in his “Long Telegram”, had been expanded beyond their original intent by the National Security Council in their report—NSC-68. The expansion of the containment policy directly led to events like the Korean War; the manner in which the war was conducted was a result of military objectives and Generals dictating the direction of the war instead of policies and policy makers. George Kennan believed that for the containment theory to be most effective US commitments would have to be limited and focused on areas of strategic importance relative to US interest vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Furthermore, US actions around the world—especially military action—would have to be directed by an enlightened, constrained policy and not military objectives.

     When George Kennan drafted the “Long Telegram” in 1946 the geopolitical balance of power was drastically different by the time the Korean War began in 1950; but, in Kennan’s mind, this shift in power was not a sufficient reason to expand containment policy. Kennan first formulated his policy to contain Communism in the Soviet Union when the US had a nuclear monopoly. This provided the United States, and her allies, with a sense of security. The Soviet Union had a larger conventional military force, but America’s nuclear capabilities would act as an effective deterrent to any Soviet military aggression. In 1949, the Soviet Union detonated their own nuclear weapon limiting the effect of America’s nuclear deterrence and made the potential risk of a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union too costly.

    In 1946 it was also the case that the Soviet Union was the only communist nation in the world, with the exception of its satellite countries in Eastern Europe. The same year the Soviet Union detonated their first atomic bomb, the Chinese Communists fighting against the Chinese Nationalists won the civil war making China a Communist nation.

    These two shifts in the geopolitical structure of the world were reason enough for the National Security Council to expand the policies of containment, as stated in NSC-68.

    Kennan disagreed. He did not believe that NSC-68 was a logical or reasonable extension of the policy he proposed in his “Long Telegram” and the expansion of containment risked overextending US power in the world. Ten years after NSC-68 was drafted Kennan said, “[w]ith the preparation of NSC-68 I had nothing to do. I was disgusted about the assumptions concerning Soviet intentions.”[1]

    Kennan’s disgust is derived from the National Security Council drawing incorrect conclusions from their understanding of Russian history, culture, and politics. The discrepancy in the conclusions drawn from Kennan’s understanding of Russian history, culture, and politics and the National Security Council’s was the main point of contention between Kennan’s idea of containment and the policy as it was presented in NSC-68; the US was going to attempt to contain Communism around the globe instead of key, strategic locations as Kennan proposed.[2] By attempting to contain Communism in all areas of the world the US would have weakened its position in these strategic locations which Kennan spoke of; for example Western Europe. This unfocused pressure placed on the Soviet Union, Kennan believed, would not be as effective in containing the expansion of Communist power throughout the world as well as Soviet power in Western Europe.

    It was true that there was some commonality between Kennan’s “Long Telegram” and NSC-68; however, Kennan framed his argument in the “Long Telegram” with a deep understanding of Russian history and culture. According to Kennan, the assumptions which the Kremlin’s policies were based on were drawn from Russia’s sense of insecurity due to contact with the more “economically advanced West.”[3] From Kennan’s understanding of the Russian peoples and their culture, he is better able predict Soviet responses to US policy and therefore can formulate an appropriate policy. The Means by which the Russian people worked towards security were through a “patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.”[4] The Soviet Union would not take unnecessary risks to achieve its goals and if faced with sufficient force would back down and would shift tactics.[5] It was for this reason that Kennan proposed placing pressure on the Soviet Union in strategic locations.

    In addition to the insecurity caused by external threats, the Soviet Union suffered from internal instability. Kennan argues that the first transfer of power, from V. I. Lenin to Joseph Stalin, disrupted the Soviet system for fifteen years, and the second would come after power was passed from Stalin to his successor.[6] The second transfer of power would not be the final test of the legitimacy of Bolshevik rule in the Soviet Union.[7] The internal instability and insecurity of the leaders in the Kremlin would not only result in strongly centralized power within the Soviet Union but a projection of outward power as well. The National Security Council used these same points to frame their proposed policy for dealing with the Soviet Union.[8] The conclusions which George Kennan and the National Security Council drew from the same assumptions of Russian culture and history were not necessarily different in kind, but were different in degree.

    George Kennan saw the expansion of containment policy as a risk, not only because it would over extend America’s commitments abroad but because it could lead to a protracted conflict. Kennan believed that the Soviet Union would formulate official policy toward third-world countries which would “weaken power and influence and contacts of advanced Western nations” to create a vacuum in which they hoped to fill with their influence.[9] To serve the same ends in the same regions, the Kremlin would unofficially sponsor violence.[10] This Soviet policy would bog down the US, distracting her leader’s attention and diverting resources away from strategically important resources. After Western influence had been sufficiently weakened and independence was attained then “Soviet dominated puppet political machines [would] be undergoing preparations to take over domestic power.”[11] According to Kennan, these policies of the Soviet Union, official and unofficial, worked toward a larger objective. The Kremlin was working to “undermine general political and strategic potential of major Western powers” in other countries to “disrupt national self-confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity.”[12] With the self-confidence of Western nations in doubt, unrest within their own nations, and an overburdened national defense it will be easy for the Soviet Union to exert her influence throughout the world without much interference from Western nations. Furthermore, with the aforementioned conditions present, the Communist party may be able to gain influence in Western nations.

    What Kennan was describing was a proxy war in a country in which the US had interests or influence. The Soviet Union would not commit her own troops and only a limited amount of resources, but instead sponsor the local population to entangle American troops, resources, and attention to weaken America’s geopolitical position within the world relative to that of the Soviet Unions. The Korean War appeared to be a perfect example of the Soviet Union enacting the policies which Kennan described. It would also be for this reason that Kennan did not believe that the US should, or even could, halt the spread of Communism everywhere in the world. Therefore, to prevent American resources from being spread too thin, she must commit to stopping the spread of Communism only in areas of strategic importance.

    In expanding US commitments to contain Communism around the world the National Security Council dictated more clearly what the policy of containment would entail than did George Kennan. NSC-68 described containment as a policy which would attempt to use all available options short of war to achieve its goals.[13] There were four goals of NSC-68, which are: to prevent expansion of Soviet power, to reveal the lies of Soviet propaganda, begin to cause a withdraw of Soviet power, and hope to enact policies which would lead to the destruction of the Soviet State or at least cause it to behave internationally in conventional manners.[14]

    Included in the means to the end of achieving these policy goals included military pressure, as well as economic and diplomatic pressure, meaning that policy should drive military action, not military necessity dictating policy. In enacting containment to achieve these goals, pressure should be placed on the Soviet Union without directly provoking them.[15] Avoiding direct conflict with the Soviet Union was a higher priority for American leaders than achieving the policy goals of NSC-68. The National Security Council makes the assumption that the Kremlin came to the conclusion that the US would not engage in a preventative war or use nuclear weapons unless they were directly attacked, but NSC-68 does not place such restrictions on American policy.[16]

    The report also addressed the recent fall of China to Communism, an issue which Kennan was unable to factor for when originally designing his containment policy. NSC-68 says that Communism would have a base from which to spread throughout Asia from the newly Communist China.[17] Fear that Communism was on the march in Asia appeared to be a reality with the fall of China and so any advancement of Communism in the region would necessarily need to be halted.

    Containment as outlined in NSC-68 not only justified President Truman’s decision to intervene on the Korean Peninsula in defense of the South Koreans, NSC-68 necessitated action. On June 27, 1950 President Truman invited congressional leaders to the White House to brief them on the Korean situation and how America was to respond.[18] Minutes recorded from the meeting between Truman, his advisors, and congressional members allow some insight into the geopolitical considerations of the Truman administration which were factored into the decision to intervene in Korea. At this meeting, Truman said that the United States “should adopt a very firm stand in the Far East” to stop this aggressive spread of communism.[19]

    By June 27 it was clear that the South Korean Army was unable to defend itself against the North Korean Army. Truman believed that North Korean aggression against its southern neighbor was “very obviously inspired by the Soviet Union.”[20] Allowing North Korean aggression, and by extension Soviet aggression, against an ally of the United States to stand without a response would embolden the Soviet Union to take action in other areas of the world.

    The Domino Theory—the idea that if one country fell to Communism the surrounding countries would soon fall as well—was an accepted theory throughout the Cold War and Truman believed the strongest effects of the Domino Theory would be seen throughout South East Asia. Truman also said that it was “equally necessary for us to draw the line at Indo-China, the Philippines, and Formosa” as well as Korea.[21] Truman listed all of the other countries in South East Asia which America had commitments to but he failed to mention one essential country; Japan. At the beginning of 1950, U.S. News & World Report published a story which said that Japan would cede military bases to the United States in return for a permanent joint military agreement.[22] Japan was an important US ally which would hopefully be used to project American power throughout the region.

    Truman’s geopolitical concerns also spanned as far as America’s allies in Europe. Truman told US Congressional leaders that “the governments of many Western European nations appear to be in a state of near-panic.”[23] Truman knew that America’s European allies were watching the situation on the Korean peninsula, waiting to see how America would react. The concern of the Domino Theory was not confined to South East Asia. If the United States did not fulfill its commitments in Asia, then the Soviet Union might believe that the US was either unwilling or unable to fulfill their commitments in other areas of the world, namely Europe, and might make aggressive moves in these regions of the world. The same conclusion might be drawn by allies of the US who would then lose faith in America’s ability to defend them. The belief that America would not uphold its commitments could lead these nations to determine that it was in their best interest to come to some amicable terms with the Soviet Union. Truman did not know what the repercussions in Europe would be, but he suggested that there would be consequences, “if we let Asia go, the Near East would collapse and no telling what would happen in Europe.”[24] It is clear that Truman believes in the validity of the Domino Theory and in a global struggle with the Soviet Union no conflict is geographically confined.

    In addition to geopolitical considerations Truman viewed US foreign policy through a lens shaped by the events of the early twentieth century. Less than a decade before the Korean War began, the Second World War had come to a close and Truman would not repeat the same mistakes that he believed coalesced into that global conflict. When addressing the American people on July 19, 1950, Truman said, “appeasement leads only to further aggression and ultimately to war.”[25] Truman believed that if British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had not allowed German aggression against Czechoslovakia to reclaim the Sudetenland in the Munich Agreement, then perhaps Adolf Hitler would have abandoned his ambitions in Europe. Truman feared that appeasement of another European dictator in Joseph Stalin would lead to another global war, just as a direct conflict with the Soviet Union could.

    History also gives reason for Truman to be concerned for the integrity of the international organization, the United Nations. In Truman’s meeting with Congressional leaders he said of the Korean conflict; it was “the clearest test case that the United Nations had ever faced.”[26] Truman then goes on to say, “If the United Nations is ever going to do anything, this is the time, and if the United Nations cannot bring the crisis in Korea to an end, then we might just as well wash up the United Nations and forget it.”[27] Truman’s fear was that if the United Nations failed to act when the case for intervention was, in his mind, clear would make the United Nations impotent. In 1935, when Italy attacked Ethiopia, the League of Nations—precursor to the United Nations—failed to act. It became clear that the League of Nations would be ineffective in its purpose of preserving peace. The United Nations could go the same way as the League of Nations if it failed to meet this early test and curb aggression on the Korean Peninsula.

    George Kennan stated in his memoir that he initially supported Truman’s decision to enter into the Korean Conflict on the side of South Korea.[28] He agreed with Truman that America could not afford to let Communist aggression stand in Korea because it “would have been wholly disruptive of our prestige in Asia.”[29] Asia was a region of instability; France was trying to reestablish her colonies in Indo-China, China had fallen to Communism, and Japan, who America had hoped would be a strong ally in Asia, was still rebuilding after the war. If American prestige was undermined by Communist forces in Asia, then the prospects of containing Communism in the region were bleak. Although, according to author Nicholas Thompson, he did not support America’s entering under the banner of the United Nations, because Kennan believed the UN would inhibit America’s ability to accomplish its objectives.[30]

    Despite his initial support, Kennan did have some reservations about America’s involvement. He believed that America should play a limited role; only to reestablish the status quo of a Korea divided at the 38th parallel.[31] To try and achieve more than returning to prewar boundaries would be to involve the US in a larger scale conflict which would overextend her resources. Even if the United States was successful in limiting its engagement in Korea, its involvement in the conflict could provoke the Soviet Union or the People’s Republic of China, leading to a larger war which the US might not be prepared to fight. Furthermore, Kennan says the Korean Peninsula is not the spot where the US would want to engage in a large-scale conflict.[32] The very reason that the Korean Peninsula would not be an ideal location to begin a major conflict necessitates careful, informed action driven by policy objectives and not military objectives.

    As early as August 1950, George Kennan began to have misgivings about how the war was being conducted. In a memo sent to Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, on August 23, 1950, Kennan recommends that the US should seek to end their involvement in the Korean War as quickly as possible.[33] Early in the war Kennan was able to foresee the pitfalls of America’s involvement in the Korean War.

    At the time Kennan had sent the memo to Secretary of State Acheson the tide of the Korean conflict had shifted in favor of the United Nations forces under the command of American General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur wanted total victory and saw the Korean War as an opportunity to roll Communism back, at least out of the Korean Peninsula, and not just contain it. Kennan argues that it was not overly important to American interests to see a Korea united under an anti-Communist regime.[34] Kennan goes on to say that America does not have the resources to ensure that Korea remains sovereign, and Korea will not be able to maintain her independence herself when faced with pressure from both the Soviet Union and Japan.[35]

    Kennan believed that ultimately the Korean Peninsula would fall under the purview of either the Soviet Union or Japan, and as a result America should seek a policy towards Korea which would allow Japanese influence to become dominant in that region.[36] To achieve this goal “it is important that nominal independence of Korea be preserved” so that once Japan reestablished its prewar strength, Korea could fall into its sphere of influence in Asia.[37] Kennan believed that American national interests in Asia were tied to the success of Japan’s ability to rebuild her strength, and for Japan to regain her prewar strength friendly powers in the region are necessary, making the defense of South Korea a necessity for American interests in Asia.

    George Kennan did not appreciate the freedom from direct control of Washington that General Douglas MacArthur enjoyed, nor the fact that no one in Washington knew exactly what he was doing.[38] Kennan was also uncomfortable with the fact that as a result of this freedom, MacArthur was able to “determin[e] [American] policy in the north Asian and western Pacific areas” and in doing so make “statements that are being made—and the actions taken—in [America’s] name.”[39] Kennan believed that the latitude given to MacArthur was dangerous because it gave MacArthur the ability to dictate policy in Korea when the political and diplomatic policies should have been driving American action, and these actions had the potential to not only hurt America’s prestige in Asia but around the world as well.

    MacArthur, for his part, said that despite what America did in Korea, the Soviet Union would not respond. Kennan believed otherwise, due to the proximity of the Korean border to the Soviet Union and an understanding of Soviet insecurity.[40]

    Truman accepted MacArthur’s advice because MacArthur had spent his career in the Pacific and presumably understood the dynamics of the relationships in the region. But it was Kennan who was able to accurately predict the response of the Soviet Union.

    Kennan believed one of the greatest lessons of the Korean War involved the situation surrounding MacArthur. MacArthur’s military considerations alone placed the US in a dangerous position because leaders in Washington were either unwilling or unable to temper MacArthur’s decisions with political considerations.[41] Kennan supported Truman’s decision to relieve MacArthur of his position because for the first time during the Korean War control over policy of the war was under Washington’s control.[42] Regaining control over the policy of the Korean War allowed politicians to bring the war to an end.

    When George F. Kennan first formulated the containment policy in 1946, he carefully constructed a limited policy which would place a focused pressure on the Soviet Union in strategic locations around the world without provoking war. Although war was not taken off the table—if communism tried to aggressively expand in a region of strategic importance to the US then Kennan believed the use of force was an acceptable means to halting that progression. The National Security Council used Kennan’s ideas as the foundation of the policy they proposed in NSC-68, but in the four years since Kennan’s “Long Telegram” China had fallen to Communism and the Soviet Union had developed their own nuclear bomb. For the National Security Council this justified an expansion of the containment policy which Kennan had proposed. Because the Soviet Union had its own nuclear weapons America’s nuclear shield defending Western Europe was neutralized limiting the deterrent effect of the presence of American forces and nuclear weapons in Western Europe. After China became a Communist nation there was a new base in a new region of the world from which Communism could spread, this one in Asia. Kennan did not believe the development of the Soviet Union’s nuclear capabilities or China falling to Communism necessitated a change in his containment policy. Even with the disagreement on the scope of the containment policy Kennan and the Truman administration agreed that it was necessary to defend South Korea against North Korean aggression. But Kennan lobbied for a much more limited war and quickly became an advocate for extraction from Korea. This time in application of policy, the original objectives were expanded beyond their intent—a war to defend South Korean sovereignty became a war to roll back Communism. The objectives of the war expanded beyond their original intent because Truman allowed General Douglas MacArthur to direct policy with military objectives in mind instead of political objectives. The failure of the Korean War was the expansion of the containment policy beyond its original intent, then putting policy aside to allow a military leader to guide American foreign policy.

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Works Cited

Primary:

Kennan, George F. Memoirs, 1950-1963. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972. Print.

U.S. National Security Council, A Report to the National Security Council 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (April 1950), by The Executive Secretary. Washington D.C., 1950.

Harry S. Truman. Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Situation in Korea, July 19, 1950

U.S. Department of State, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State (February 1946), by George F. Kennan. Moscow, 1946.

U.S. Department of State, Memorandum, George F. Kennan to Dean Acheson (August 1950), by George F. Kennan. 1950.

U.S. President. 1950. Notes Regarding Meeting with Congressional Leaders. Harry S. Truman Administration File, Elsey Papers.

Secondary:

Thompson, Nicholas. The Hawk and the Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and the History of the Cold War. New York: Henry Holt, 2009. Print. 

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Footnotes:
[1] Nicolas Thompson, The Hawk and The Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and The History of The Cold War (New York: Henry Hold and Company, 2009), 113
[2] Ibid.
[3] U.S. Department of State. 1946. The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State (February 1946), by George F. Kennan. Part 2
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., Part 5.1
[6] Ibid., Part 5.3
[7] Ibid.
[8] U.S. National Security Council. 1950. A Report to the National Security Council 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (April 1950), by The Executive Secretary. 13-14, 16
[9] U.S. Department of State, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State. Part 3d
[10] Ibid., Part 4.7b
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid., Part 4.7a
[13] U.S. National Security Council. 21
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid., 22
[16] Ibid., 35
[17] U.S. National Security Council. 1950. 30
[18] U.S. President. 1950. Notes Regarding Meeting with Congressional Leaders. Harry S. Truman Administration File, Elsey Papers. 1
[19] Ibid., 3
[20] Ibid., 4
[21] U.S. President. 1950. 4
[22] George Kennan, Memoirs: 1950-1963 Volume II (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press 1972), 43
[23] U.S. President. 1950. 3
[24] Ibid., 4
[25] Harry S. Truman. Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Situation in Korea, July 19, 1950
[26] U.S. President. 1950. 7
[27] Ibid.
[28] Kennan, 24
[29] U.S. Department of State. 1950. Memorandum, George F. Kennan to Dean Acheson (August10), by George F. Kennan. p. 3
[30] Thompson, 116
[31] Kennan, 24
[32] Ibid.
[33] U.S. Department of State, Memorandum, George F. Kennan to Dean Acheson. p. 2
[34] Ibid., 3
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid., 4
[37] Ibid.
[38] Kennan, 24
[39] Ibid., 25
[40] Ibid., 35
[41] Ibid., 38
[42] Kennan, 35

Soviet-Japanese Relations during the Second World War

    In discussions of the Second World War interactions between the Soviet Union and Japan are generally over looked. This is despite the fact that from 1932 until the end of the war in 1945 Japanese and Soviet troops shared a long border. Because the Japanese and Soviet Union were in a kind of cold war throughout most of the 1930s and 1940s—the military presence of each on boarder influenced the military planning of the other. However, this cold war was broken up by a few minor flare ups in the form of border disputes between the two countries until the Soviet Union formally declared war against Japan in 1945. Both nations sought to extend their influence over the same region, China, and as a result had a history of conflict and tensions throughout the early 20^th century. Treaties and agreements were signed by both nations, but these only served to postpone direct conflict.

Tensions and Treaties:

            Between the Soviet Union and Japan there existed a history of treaties which were not preferable to either side, causing tensions between the two nations. One such agreement dated back to 1905 between Japan and the Soviet Union’s predecessor, the Russian Empire. The Russo-Japanese Treaty of Portsmouth gave Japanese fishermen the “right to pursue their calling in Russian Far Eastern waters”—i.e. Siberian fisheries (Jones, pg.178). In 1907 the Russo-Japanese Fishery Convention allowed Japanese fisherman to rent canneries on the Russian coast (Jones, pg. 178). However, after the Russian revolution Japan did not pay the rent of the canneries as the government Japan had an agreement with no longer existed and relations with the Soviet Union had not yet been established (Jones, pg. 178). The general Treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union signed in 1925, established relations between the two nations, honored the Japan’s right to fish in Russian waters as established in the Treaty of Portsmouth (Jones, pg. 178).

Three years later a second convention was held, The Soviet-Japanese Fishery Convention of 1928, as a result of the general Treaty signed in 1925 (Jones, pg. 178).  It was decided at this convention that the rights to fishing grounds and to build canneries were to be auctioned off to private companies, including Japanese companies (Jones, pg. 178).

            Despite agreeing to auction off fishing grounds and canneries, the Soviet Union did not like that a capitalist nation like Japan was exploiting Soviet resources, making the issue ideological as well as nationalistic (Jones, pg. 178).  Moscow’s nationalist concerns specifically centered on the fear that allowing Japanese companies to build canneries and fish in Soviet waters would not only compete with Soviet fishing interests, which the Soviet Union was attempting to expand, but give the Japanese opportunities for espionage (Jones, pg. 178).

Japan wanted rights to the fishing grounds for more practical reasons. Fish was a main staple of the Japanese diet and their exportation of tinned fish was also increasing, thus they required access to more fisheries and canneries (Jones, pg. 178).

To protect their interests the Soviet government began to systematically reduce Japanese rights to fishing grounds (Jones, pg. 178). In 1928 Japanese companies had rented 80 percent of the fishing grounds, that number fell to about 50 percent in 1931 (Jones, pg. 179). By 1932, in response to Japanese complaints, an agreement was reached that the claim to fishing grounds would be frozen (Jones, pg. 179). Talks between Japan and the Soviet Union over the rights to fishing grounds were not making progress and by 1935 were suspended, only to be resumed in 1936 to extend the 1928 Convention until the end of the year (Jones, pg. 179). A new Fishery Convention was held later in 1936, but when Moscow heard of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact refused to sign the Convention and instead agreed to prolong the 1928 Convention another year (Jones, pg. 179). The extension of 1928 Convention in 1937 left the Japanese in an uncertain position with the Soviet Union refusing to sign the 1936 Convention or enter into new negotiations on the matter (Jones, pg. 179).

            By the end of 1938 the Soviet Union announced that she would not extend the 1928 Convention a third year unless Japanese companies surrendered 40 fishing grounds (Jones, pg. 182). Shigenori Tōgō, Japanese Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Diplomat, were unable to come to an understanding on the matter, and so Moscow stated that on March 13, 1939 an auction of fishing grounds—including grounds held by Japanese companies—would be held at Vladivostok (Jones, pg. 182-183). In response, the Japanese Foreign Ministry said that Japan would not accept the outcome of the auction and she “might be constrained to act in self-defense should the Soviet Union resort to such unilateral action” (Jones, pg. 183). Japan even threatened to give Japanese fishermen naval escorts to their fishing grounds (Jones, pg. 183).

Due either to this threat by Japan or increased hostilities in Europe, the Soviet State Fishery Organization bought only four lots at the auction (Jones, pg. 183). A lack of buyers at the first auction resulted in a second auction to be held on April 3, 1939 (Jones, pg. 183). At this auction it was announced that Japanese companies would give up 37 of their old fishing grounds but would get 10 new ones and that the 1928 Convention would be extended until the end of the year (Jones, pg. 183).

The Treaty of 1925, which normalized relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, created its own set of issues between the two states. One such conflict arising from the treaty included an agreement which stated that Japan would remove its troops from the northern half of the island Sakhalin. In return Japan was allowed access to the oil fields and coal mines by paying a yearly rent (Jones, pg. 179). This was especially important to the Japanese because they lacked their own oil reserves needed to fuel their military machine (Jones, pg. 179). To mine these resources the Japanese established two companies, North Sakhalin Petroleum Company and the North Sakhalin Mining Company, in December 1925 (Jones, pg. 179). Although the Japanese companies were responsible for harvesting the resources, Soviet authorities were responsible for providing a work force of Soviet laborers or allowing the Japanese bring in their own workers (Jones, pg. 179). As relations worsened in the 1930s between the two powers, the Japanese found it increasingly difficult to hire enough men to mine due to the Soviet Union limiting the available man power (Jones, pg. 179-180).

            In the summer of 1939 a new conflict over labor in Sakhalin broke out. The Russian Worker’s Union claimed that the Japanese North Sakhalin Petroleum Company had not fulfilled its labor contract and sued the company (Jones, pg. 183). The local Soviet courts imposed heavy fines and threatened to confiscate the property from the company if the Russian workers were not paid. The Japanese company, for their part, complained that Soviet officials had limited oil production by limiting the work force (Jones, pg. 183). The issue was finally resolved after an agreement between the Soviet workers and the Japanese company was reached which resulted in higher wages and other benefits to the workers (Jones, pg. 183).  

Japanese Aggression:

            Japan invaded Manchuria on September 18, 1931 taking control of the area which the Chinese Eastern Railway ran through; importantly Harbin, a major juncture on the Chinese Eastern Railway (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 362). The Japanese claimed that their military presence was necessary to protect Japanese citizens in Harbin after a “mutiny of Chinese troops” (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 362).

Japan assured the Soviets that their interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway would not be infringed, and while the Japanese would use the railway to transport troops, they would pay the cost of transportation (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 362-363).  This would require both the approval of the Soviet and the Chinese governments as they both held claims to the Chinese Eastern Railway (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 363).

The Soviet Union wished to stay out of the conflict in Manchuria and so they sought a way to mitigate the threat of Japanese troops approaching the Soviet border (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 363). In an attempt to resolve the issue through diplomacy Soviet leaders proposed a nonaggression pact with the Japanese on December 31, 1931 (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 363). The Japanese ignored this proposition until the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected the pact on December 13, 1932 (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 364). Also, in 1932 the Manchukuo government, the government presiding over Japanese controlled Manchuria, was declared independent and established as a puppet government of Japan (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 385).

            The failure of the Japanese and the Soviet Union to come to a nonaggression agreement did not end diplomatic talks, however. As an attempt to eliminate a source of tension the Soviet Union offered to sell the Chinese Eastern Railway to the Manchukuo government, though for all practical purposes this sale would be to Japan (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 364, 385). The Soviet government estimated the cost of the railway from initial construction until 1932 at about 411,700,000 rubles and another 178,530,000 rubles loaned to “cover deficit and running costs in the early years of the railway” (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 364). Japan mediated the talks between the Soviet Union and Manchukuo beginning on June 26, 1933 (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 365). The initial asking price from the Soviet government for the railway was 250 million rubles, to be paid in four semiannual installments; Manchukuo made a counter offer of 20 million rubles (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 365). The Manchukuo government refused to budge on their proposal after Moscow lowered their original proposal of 250 million rubles to 200 million rubles (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 365). After a six-month hiatus negotiations resumed; each side made concessions—though Moscow conceded more—until September 19, 1934 when the railway was sold for 67.5 million rubles (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 365).

While the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway was intended to ease tensions it actually, through the process of negotiating the sale, increased difficulties between the Soviet Union and Japan. It also led to later disputes over the railway as well. The Manchukuo government refused to pay the pensions of former employees as promised and refused to pay the final installment for the purchase of the railway (Jones, pg. 180). This only added to the animosity between the Soviet Union and Japan. 

Soviet Interference:

In 1919, the Soviet Union had established the Comintern, whose purpose was to help spur Communist revolutions throughout the world. The Comintern was making an effort in Japan to overthrow the Japanese Emperor in the years 1932 and 1933, through the Communist Party of Japan (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 385-386). With a Japanese military presence in Manchukuo and the ongoing dispute over the Chinese Eastern Railway, Moscow feared a Japanese push into Siberia (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 385). The purpose of the Communist Party of Japan was meant to cause civil unrest within Japan so that the Japanese would be preoccupied quelling a domestic revolution and unable able to expand northward, into the Soviet Union (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 385).

The Communist Party of Japan planned to begin this revolution as a “bourgeois-democratic revolution” against the Emperor and the old regime to “do away with the ‘remnants of feudalism’” (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 385). This revolution was not initially expected to be a proletariat revolution, but after the Emperor was deposed the transition from a bourgeois-democratic revolution to a socialist revolution would be begin (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 386). However, this tactic by the Soviet Comintern was unsuccessful, because Japan was effectively able to identify and arrest members of the Communist Party of Japan and its leaders, almost wiping out the party by the end of 1932 (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 386). The Soviet Union sent another Japanese communist in 1933 who was initially successful at reorganizing the remaining fragments of the party until another wave of arrests again reduced the size of the party’s members, scattering those that remained (Eudin and Slusser, pg. 386). This direct and material support of multiple coup attempts in a sovereign nation could have been viewed as overt hostility by the Japanese and responded to in kind.

            In addition to the Soviet Union’s support of domestic revolution within Japan itself, the Soviet Union provided direct aid and assistance to China in her defense against Japanese aggression. Before a formal lending agreement was signed between the USSR and China in 1938, the Soviet Union “sent arms and ammunition to China to the value of 100 million Chinese dollars” (Jones, pg. 173). In May, 1938 two loans were formally agreed upon at the rate of 50 million US dollars each to be given to the Chinese from the USSR (Jones, pg. 174). The Chinese asked for additional aid which Stalin denied until the first two loans were fully spent. In June, 1939 the third loan of 150 million US dollars was given to China (Jones, pg. 174). Also in June, 1939 the Soviet Union and China signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Commerce which made gave China the status of “most-favored-nation” and diplomatic privileges and immunities (Jones, pg. 174). With these three loans the Chinese were able to purchase arms and ammunition from the Soviet Union to be employed against the Japanese military (Jones, pg. 174).

            To supply China with Soviet aid Soviet ships traveled into the port of Canton from 1937 until 1938, when it was captured by the Japanese (Jones, 174). After the fall of Canton, the supplies were transported over land from Alma Ata, in present day Kazakhstan, and on the Turkestan-Siberian Railway, from Sinkiang to Lanchow in China (Jones, pg. 174-175). The Soviet Union also sent airmen to China to fly missions and train Chinese pilots beginning in 1937. This also benefited the Soviet pilots, as they received combat experience.  (Jones, pg. 176-177). Four fighter and two bomber squadrons were sent in total, but by 1938 the Soviet pilots returned to the Soviet Union due to the increasing threat of war in Europe (Jones, pg. 177).

Japan protested the Soviet Union selling arms and supplies to the Chinese, but these complaints were ignored by Moscow (Jones, 177). By supplying the Chinese and sending airmen to China to fly missions the Soviet Union made itself susceptible to being drawn into war with Japan. The Japanese had an incentive to cut off trading routs, which could include bombing rail lines, and the presence of Soviet airmen made it possible for Soviet and Japanese pilots to engage in direct combat. If these actions were to have occurred it would have likely been considered an act of war against the Soviet Union drawing her fully into the conflict. This forced Japan to decide which was more costly, allowing the Soviet Union to continue to supply China or drawing the Soviet Union into the conflict.

Defensive Pacts:

            The Soviet Union’s concern of Japanese aggression to the south of her borders continued to grow. In response to Japanese claiming of land on the border of Manchukuo and Manchuria the Soviet Union and Mongolia entered into a “gentlemen’s agreement” in November 1934 (March, pg. 214). This agreement stated that the Soviet Union would defend the Mongolian People’s Republic and so Soviet troops entered into Outer Mongolia in the same year (March, pg. 214-215).

Within two years Japan’s interest in Outer Mongolia became strong enough to attack the Buir Nor area in Outer Mongolia, in February 1936 (March, pg. 215). The attack was able to be repelled but consequently Stalin formally announced that the Soviet Union would come to the aid of Mongolia in her defense (March, pg. 215). On March 12, 1936 the USSR and Mongolia entered into the Protocol of Mutual Assistance, which stated that if either state was attacked the other would provide any assistance (March, pg. 215).

            Japan was concerned of the presence of the Soviet Union north of Manchukuo and also did not appreciate the support of revolution in Japan by Moscow. As a result Japan formally entered into the Anti-Comintern pact with Germany in 1936 (March, pg. 219-222). The pact stated that each state would “exchange information on the activities of the Comintern and collaborate in preventive measures” (Jones, pg. 25). Second they agreed that a third state threatened by Comintern activities would join the pact, this would be Italy (Jones, pg. 25). The pact secretly stated that if either state was to be attacked, unprovoked, by the Soviet Union the other would not aid the Soviet Union in any way (Jones, pg. 25). Further, neither state was to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union without the consent of the other (Jones, pg. 25). There was a third stipulation for both public and private sections of the pact; it would only last five years, then it could be renewed (Jones, pg. 25). Although this was not a formal military or defensive alliance it did set the tone for one to follow (Jones, pg. 26). When the Soviet Union found out about the contents of the secret pact they broke off negotiations over fisheries with Japan (Jones, pg. 26).

            Japan entered into a second pact with Germany and Italy, this one being considerably more defensive in nature. Japan hoped that by entering into a military pact with Italy and Germany it would force the Soviet Union into either a two-front war or cutting aid to China (Jones, pg. 182). In Berlin on September 27, 1940 Japan, Germany, and Italy entered into the Tripartite Pact (Jones, pg. 199). Article 3 of this pact says that if a nation not involved in either the European or the Asian-Pacific war “commits and act of aggression against one of the contracting parties, Japan, Germany, and Italy undertake to declare war on such Power and to assist one another with all political, economic and military means” (Jones, pg. 197). The purpose of this article was to deter the United States from entering into either war with the threat of facing three regional powers instead of just one or two (Jones, pg. 197). The pact was also meant to deter the Soviet Union from acting in either theater as well.

Article 5 of the pact said that this pact would not change any of the signatories’ current political relations with the Soviet Union (Jones, pg. 197). In fact, Italy and Germany intended to use their good standing with the USSR to try to improve the Soviet- Japanese relationship (Jones, pg. 198). Despite this the Soviet Union saw this as a restructuring of the Anti-Comintern Pact but with a more aggressive posture toward the Soviet Union (Jones, pg. 202). A secret protocol of the pact was to establish “joint military, naval, and economic commissions” between the three nations (Jones, pg. 197). In addition, each nation should “furnish each other with all new inventions and weapons of war, with industrial equipment, technical assistance, and raw materials for war purposes” (Jones, pg. 198).

            Despite neither side wanting to engage the other in hostilities a border skirmish broke out between Soviet and Manchukuo forces at Changkufeng on the Manchukuo-Soviet border in July 1938 (Jones, pg. 180). Although it was initially a minor engagement between patrols it quickly escalated with both sides sending reinforcements of heavy artillery and tanks (Jones, pg. 181). In the battle between Soviet and Japanese forces that ensued the Soviet forces were able to inflict significant damage on the Japanese forces (Jones, pg. 181). This pressured the Japanese to pursue a diplomatic resolution to the border dispute with the Soviet Union and on August 2 the Japanese government reached out to the Soviet Union (Jones, pg. 181). The Japanese originally claimed that the disputed territory belonged to Manchukuo but Soviet authorities argued that according to the protocol of 1886, which was added to the Russo-Chinese Treaty of Huchun of 1869, the territory belonged to them (Jones, pg. 181). Unable to come to an agreement the two nations agreed to a truce on August 11, ending the engagement. (Jones, pg. 181). According to the agreement the border would be left undefined until a later date Soviet troops could maintain their current position but Japanese troops would fall back a kilometer, leaving the disputed border a no-man’s-land (Jones, pg. 181).

            A year later hostilities again broke out between the Soviet Union and Japan, this time in Mongolia. On May 11, 1939 Japanese troops attacked a region to the east of Buir Nor and a joint Soviet-Mongol force defended against the Japanese invasion (March, pg. 216). The Soviet Union, fulfilling its obligations of the Protocol of Mutual Assistance, sent aid to Mongolia in its defense (March, pg. 216). On July 1 General Georgi Zhukov was sent to Mongolia to take command of military operations (March, 216). The Soviet military amassed a large force of “three rifle divisions and ample reinforcements of tank, aircraft, and heavy artillery units” and supplies in secret (March, pg. 216). The Japanese also reinforced their troops, creating the Sixth Army command (March, pg. 216). On August 20 General Zhukov launched his attack, “crushing his advisory through the careful coordination of the total firepower of his armor, aircraft, and heavy artillery” (March, pg. 217). Both sides took considerable damage in the battle, although the Soviet Union did emerge victorious, dissuading Japan from further provoking the Soviets (March, pg. 217).

            Japan was shocked when, on August 23, 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany signed the Russo-German Non-aggression Pact (March, pg. 222). In Hitler’s preparations for Operation Barbarossa he chose not to tell the Japanese his plans for fear of the Moscow finding out (March, pg. 222). The recent defeats of the Japanese army by Soviet troops and the Russo-German Non-aggression pact likely caused the Japanese to seek their own peace treaty with the Soviet Union. Had Japan been made aware of Germany’s aims to invade the Soviet Union she may have not pursued it further. But as a result, on April 13, 1941, the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Treaty was signed by Japan and the Soviet Union, stating that if either nation was to enter into hostilities with a third party the other would remain neutral (March, pg. 222).

This treaty would be extremely beneficial for both parties. Later in this same year the Soviet Union would be invaded by German and Japan would attack Pearl Harbor drawing America into the Second World War. The Neutrality Treaty gave both the Soviet Union and Japan the assurance that the other did not pose a threat.

The Second World War

            As Japan was beginning to expand through China in the 1930s, Stalin was focusing on internal development with the Five Year Plans. And as the Japanese began to probe the Soviet Union’s border, testing the Soviet army in 1937, the purges within the Red Army were taking place (March, pg. 215). By the time the Neutrality Treaty was signed in 1941 war had begun in Europe and Soviet forces were engaged in the west against German troops; the Soviet Union wanted to avoid fighting a war on two fronts. Japan was already engaged in conflicts with China and was not prepared to fight a united Sino-Soviet force. The 1936 program expanded Japanese armaments and war industries and “planned to place the Japanese Army in a position of full readiness for war with the USSR by about 1940” (Jones, pg.172). In 1938 Japanese troops were suffering a shortage in ammunition (Jones, pg. 172). Furthermore, the defeats the Japanese troops suffered by the Soviet forces in 1938 and 1939 convinced the Japanese military leadership that it was not in their best interest to pursue an aggressive policy with the Soviet Union.

            On June 22, 1941 Germany launched Operation Barbarossa and invaded the Soviet Union, taking Soviet forces by surprise. German forces made quick progress at first and were able to push to the outskirts of Moscow by October 1941. Although Soviet forces were in retreat, because of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Treaty the Soviet army was able to bring 175,000 troops up from the east to reinforce their western flank against German advances (March, pg. 222). These troops were trained to fight in the winter and were instrumental in the defense of Moscow (March, pg. 222). Although the tide of the war began to turn against Germany, the victory at Moscow was more of a symbolic victory than a strategic one. Had the Soviet Union and Japan not come to a formal neutrality agreement then the Soviet army may not have felt secure in transferring troops from the east to the west, shifting the balance of power in the European theater. Further, had the Soviet Union and Japan still been engaged in border skirmishes then important resources would have also been diverted from the western front to supply the Soviet eastern front. If this was the case the war in Europe would have unfolded very differently.

            Despite the neutrality pact with the Soviet Union there was a debate in Tokyo on July 2, 1941 whether they should attack the Soviet Union in the north or press south (March, pg. 222-223). The Kwantung Army in Manchuria was at its peak of 600,000 troops, with the support of 50,000 troops from the Army of Korea (March, pg. 223). Those in Tokyo who wanted to go south won the debate due, in part, to past loses to Soviet forces and the presence of Soviet bombers in Vladivostok capable of bombing the Japanese home islands (March, pg. 223). It was also believed that the oil production from Sakhalin was not sufficient for the Japanese Imperial Navy, who preferred oil fields in the East Indies (March, pg. 223). Japanese military leadership also believed, as Hitler did, that Germany would be able to easily defeat the Soviet Union (March, pg. 223).

This decision by the Japanese military leadership to go south resulted in the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941 (March, pg. 223). The next day America declared war on Japan, and by December 11 Germany invoked Article 3 of the Tripartite Pact and declared war on America (Jones, pg. 323 & 329). This resulted in an “anti-Axis alliance” between the Soviet Union and the United States (March, pg. 223).

            As a direct result of the “anti-Axis alliance” Joseph Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill met several times during the war to discuss the progress of the war and postwar plans. One such meeting was the meeting in Yalta in February 1945 (March, pg. 224). The leaders discussed what postwar Europe would look like (March, pg. 224). It was also decided that the Soviet Union would enter into the War in the Pacific two to three months after Germany’s surrender to help bring an end to the war with Japan (March, pg. 224). In return for the Soviet Union’s aid in the Pacific Theater, the Soviet Union would have Southern Sakhalin, the Chinese Eastern Railway, the South Manchurian Railroad, the Use of Port Arthur and Talien in the Liao-tung Peninsula, and the Kuril Islands returned to them (March, pg. 224).

            On April 9, 1945 the Soviet Union announced that it would no longer honor the Neutrality Pact with Japan (March, pg. 225). Japan thought that this meant that the Soviet Union was choosing to not renew the pact when it expired April 12, 1945 (March, pg. 225). On May 7, 1945 Germany unconditionally surrendered to the Allied forces in Europe. Three months later, on August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan (March, pg. 225). A Soviet force of 1.6 million men, 5,000 tanks, 4,000 aircraft, and the Soviet Pacific Fleet was under the command of Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky in Khabarovsk (March, pg. 225). By this time the Kwantung Army, stationed in Manchuria had been hollowed out as troops were repositioned to stop the American advance in the Philippines and attacks on the home islands (March, pg. 225).

The Soviet attack came on August 9 from three directions (March, pg. 225). The first and largest, the Transbaikal Front, attacked eastward from Outer Mongolia toward Mukden and Changchun and southeast across Inner Mongolia (March, pg. 225). The First Far Eastern Front crossed the Ussuri River and invaded westward, also toward Mukden, and aided amphibious landings pushing southward into Korea (March, pg. 225-226). The Second Far Eastern Front attacked southward from Blagoveshchensk across the Amur River to attack northern Manchuria (March, pg. 225-226). Within two weeks of the initial invasion by Soviet forces, Manchukuo and Sakhalin had fallen and on August 17 Soviet forces invaded the Kurils islands (March, pg. 226). The Soviet success was quick, decisive, and shocked both the American’s and Japanese (March, pg. 226).

            On August 11 Japan announced that she would accept the terms of the Potsdam Declarations (March, pg. 226). Four days later the emperor made an announcement to his people that the military would cease hostilities (March, pg. 226). The official surrender of the Japanese Empire was signed in Tokyo Bay aboard the USS Missouri on September 2 (March, pg. 226). Occupation of Japan began very quickly after her surrender (March, pg. 226). Only three months before, occupation of Germany was established and Germany was divided into four zones of occupation; the Soviet Union proposed handling Japan’s occupation in a similar manner (March, pg. 226). America rejected this idea and the occupying force was mostly an America force, under the command of American General Douglas MacArthur (March, pg. 226).

Conclusion:

            Despite the limited military contact between the Japan and the Soviet Union leading up to and the Second World War their interactions shaped both European and Pacific theaters of the war. The support of China in personnel, training, loans, and supplies gave the Chinese army the means to resist the Japanese invasion. This served a second function as well; it gave the Chinese hope that the Soviet Union might itself become involved in the conflict in Asia. As a result of Japan’s probing of the Soviet strength along the border of Manchukuo Japan dropped its ambitions for northern expansion. Instead Japan opted for southern expansion, a policy which led to the Pearl Harbor attack and the involvement of the United States into both theaters of World War II. Also as a result of the border skirmishes Japan entered into a neutrality treaty with the Soviet Union allowing the Soviet military to focus its full attention on the European Theater without any threats from the east. Just as the Soviet troops were able to leave the border between the Soviet Union and Manchukuo, the Kwantung Army troops were taken to defend against the American advance. However, the Soviet Union’s eventual involvement in the Pacific Theater would have lasting repercussions—a divided Korean Peninsula, the rise of Communist China, and the spread of Communism through Southeast Asia.