George F. Kennan, a member of the State Department stationed in Moscow, sent in 1946 the “Long Telegram”, which proposed a policy approach for US-Soviet relations—containment. By 1950 Kennan’s ideas, as presented in his “Long Telegram”, had been expanded beyond their original intent by the National Security Council in their report—NSC-68. The expansion of the containment policy directly led to events like the Korean War; the manner in which the war was conducted was a result of military objectives and Generals dictating the direction of the war instead of policies and policy makers. George Kennan believed that for the containment theory to be most effective US commitments would have to be limited and focused on areas of strategic importance relative to US interest vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Furthermore, US actions around the world—especially military action—would have to be directed by an enlightened, constrained policy and not military objectives.
When George Kennan drafted the “Long Telegram” in 1946 the geopolitical balance of power was drastically different by the time the Korean War began in 1950; but, in Kennan’s mind, this shift in power was not a sufficient reason to expand containment policy. Kennan first formulated his policy to contain Communism in the Soviet Union when the US had a nuclear monopoly. This provided the United States, and her allies, with a sense of security. The Soviet Union had a larger conventional military force, but America’s nuclear capabilities would act as an effective deterrent to any Soviet military aggression. In 1949, the Soviet Union detonated their own nuclear weapon limiting the effect of America’s nuclear deterrence and made the potential risk of a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union too costly.
In 1946 it was also the case that the Soviet Union was the only communist nation in the world, with the exception of its satellite countries in Eastern Europe. The same year the Soviet Union detonated their first atomic bomb, the Chinese Communists fighting against the Chinese Nationalists won the civil war making China a Communist nation.
These two shifts in the geopolitical structure of the world were reason enough for the National Security Council to expand the policies of containment, as stated in NSC-68.
Kennan disagreed. He did not believe that NSC-68 was a logical or reasonable extension of the policy he proposed in his “Long Telegram” and the expansion of containment risked overextending US power in the world. Ten years after NSC-68 was drafted Kennan said, “[w]ith the preparation of NSC-68 I had nothing to do. I was disgusted about the assumptions concerning Soviet intentions.”[1]
Kennan’s disgust is derived from the National Security Council drawing incorrect conclusions from their understanding of Russian history, culture, and politics. The discrepancy in the conclusions drawn from Kennan’s understanding of Russian history, culture, and politics and the National Security Council’s was the main point of contention between Kennan’s idea of containment and the policy as it was presented in NSC-68; the US was going to attempt to contain Communism around the globe instead of key, strategic locations as Kennan proposed.[2] By attempting to contain Communism in all areas of the world the US would have weakened its position in these strategic locations which Kennan spoke of; for example Western Europe. This unfocused pressure placed on the Soviet Union, Kennan believed, would not be as effective in containing the expansion of Communist power throughout the world as well as Soviet power in Western Europe.
It was true that there was some commonality between Kennan’s “Long Telegram” and NSC-68; however, Kennan framed his argument in the “Long Telegram” with a deep understanding of Russian history and culture. According to Kennan, the assumptions which the Kremlin’s policies were based on were drawn from Russia’s sense of insecurity due to contact with the more “economically advanced West.”[3] From Kennan’s understanding of the Russian peoples and their culture, he is better able predict Soviet responses to US policy and therefore can formulate an appropriate policy. The Means by which the Russian people worked towards security were through a “patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.”[4] The Soviet Union would not take unnecessary risks to achieve its goals and if faced with sufficient force would back down and would shift tactics.[5] It was for this reason that Kennan proposed placing pressure on the Soviet Union in strategic locations.
In addition to the insecurity caused by external threats, the Soviet Union suffered from internal instability. Kennan argues that the first transfer of power, from V. I. Lenin to Joseph Stalin, disrupted the Soviet system for fifteen years, and the second would come after power was passed from Stalin to his successor.[6] The second transfer of power would not be the final test of the legitimacy of Bolshevik rule in the Soviet Union.[7] The internal instability and insecurity of the leaders in the Kremlin would not only result in strongly centralized power within the Soviet Union but a projection of outward power as well. The National Security Council used these same points to frame their proposed policy for dealing with the Soviet Union.[8] The conclusions which George Kennan and the National Security Council drew from the same assumptions of Russian culture and history were not necessarily different in kind, but were different in degree.
George Kennan saw the expansion of containment policy as a risk, not only because it would over extend America’s commitments abroad but because it could lead to a protracted conflict. Kennan believed that the Soviet Union would formulate official policy toward third-world countries which would “weaken power and influence and contacts of advanced Western nations” to create a vacuum in which they hoped to fill with their influence.[9] To serve the same ends in the same regions, the Kremlin would unofficially sponsor violence.[10] This Soviet policy would bog down the US, distracting her leader’s attention and diverting resources away from strategically important resources. After Western influence had been sufficiently weakened and independence was attained then “Soviet dominated puppet political machines [would] be undergoing preparations to take over domestic power.”[11] According to Kennan, these policies of the Soviet Union, official and unofficial, worked toward a larger objective. The Kremlin was working to “undermine general political and strategic potential of major Western powers” in other countries to “disrupt national self-confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity.”[12] With the self-confidence of Western nations in doubt, unrest within their own nations, and an overburdened national defense it will be easy for the Soviet Union to exert her influence throughout the world without much interference from Western nations. Furthermore, with the aforementioned conditions present, the Communist party may be able to gain influence in Western nations.
What Kennan was describing was a proxy war in a country in which the US had interests or influence. The Soviet Union would not commit her own troops and only a limited amount of resources, but instead sponsor the local population to entangle American troops, resources, and attention to weaken America’s geopolitical position within the world relative to that of the Soviet Unions. The Korean War appeared to be a perfect example of the Soviet Union enacting the policies which Kennan described. It would also be for this reason that Kennan did not believe that the US should, or even could, halt the spread of Communism everywhere in the world. Therefore, to prevent American resources from being spread too thin, she must commit to stopping the spread of Communism only in areas of strategic importance.
In expanding US commitments to contain Communism around the world the National Security Council dictated more clearly what the policy of containment would entail than did George Kennan. NSC-68 described containment as a policy which would attempt to use all available options short of war to achieve its goals.[13] There were four goals of NSC-68, which are: to prevent expansion of Soviet power, to reveal the lies of Soviet propaganda, begin to cause a withdraw of Soviet power, and hope to enact policies which would lead to the destruction of the Soviet State or at least cause it to behave internationally in conventional manners.[14]
Included in the means to the end of achieving these policy goals included military pressure, as well as economic and diplomatic pressure, meaning that policy should drive military action, not military necessity dictating policy. In enacting containment to achieve these goals, pressure should be placed on the Soviet Union without directly provoking them.[15] Avoiding direct conflict with the Soviet Union was a higher priority for American leaders than achieving the policy goals of NSC-68. The National Security Council makes the assumption that the Kremlin came to the conclusion that the US would not engage in a preventative war or use nuclear weapons unless they were directly attacked, but NSC-68 does not place such restrictions on American policy.[16]
The report also addressed the recent fall of China to Communism, an issue which Kennan was unable to factor for when originally designing his containment policy. NSC-68 says that Communism would have a base from which to spread throughout Asia from the newly Communist China.[17] Fear that Communism was on the march in Asia appeared to be a reality with the fall of China and so any advancement of Communism in the region would necessarily need to be halted.
Containment as outlined in NSC-68 not only justified President Truman’s decision to intervene on the Korean Peninsula in defense of the South Koreans, NSC-68 necessitated action. On June 27, 1950 President Truman invited congressional leaders to the White House to brief them on the Korean situation and how America was to respond.[18] Minutes recorded from the meeting between Truman, his advisors, and congressional members allow some insight into the geopolitical considerations of the Truman administration which were factored into the decision to intervene in Korea. At this meeting, Truman said that the United States “should adopt a very firm stand in the Far East” to stop this aggressive spread of communism.[19]
By June 27 it was clear that the South Korean Army was unable to defend itself against the North Korean Army. Truman believed that North Korean aggression against its southern neighbor was “very obviously inspired by the Soviet Union.”[20] Allowing North Korean aggression, and by extension Soviet aggression, against an ally of the United States to stand without a response would embolden the Soviet Union to take action in other areas of the world.
The Domino Theory—the idea that if one country fell to Communism the surrounding countries would soon fall as well—was an accepted theory throughout the Cold War and Truman believed the strongest effects of the Domino Theory would be seen throughout South East Asia. Truman also said that it was “equally necessary for us to draw the line at Indo-China, the Philippines, and Formosa” as well as Korea.[21] Truman listed all of the other countries in South East Asia which America had commitments to but he failed to mention one essential country; Japan. At the beginning of 1950, U.S. News & World Report published a story which said that Japan would cede military bases to the United States in return for a permanent joint military agreement.[22] Japan was an important US ally which would hopefully be used to project American power throughout the region.
Truman’s geopolitical concerns also spanned as far as America’s allies in Europe. Truman told US Congressional leaders that “the governments of many Western European nations appear to be in a state of near-panic.”[23] Truman knew that America’s European allies were watching the situation on the Korean peninsula, waiting to see how America would react. The concern of the Domino Theory was not confined to South East Asia. If the United States did not fulfill its commitments in Asia, then the Soviet Union might believe that the US was either unwilling or unable to fulfill their commitments in other areas of the world, namely Europe, and might make aggressive moves in these regions of the world. The same conclusion might be drawn by allies of the US who would then lose faith in America’s ability to defend them. The belief that America would not uphold its commitments could lead these nations to determine that it was in their best interest to come to some amicable terms with the Soviet Union. Truman did not know what the repercussions in Europe would be, but he suggested that there would be consequences, “if we let Asia go, the Near East would collapse and no telling what would happen in Europe.”[24] It is clear that Truman believes in the validity of the Domino Theory and in a global struggle with the Soviet Union no conflict is geographically confined.
In addition to geopolitical considerations Truman viewed US foreign policy through a lens shaped by the events of the early twentieth century. Less than a decade before the Korean War began, the Second World War had come to a close and Truman would not repeat the same mistakes that he believed coalesced into that global conflict. When addressing the American people on July 19, 1950, Truman said, “appeasement leads only to further aggression and ultimately to war.”[25] Truman believed that if British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had not allowed German aggression against Czechoslovakia to reclaim the Sudetenland in the Munich Agreement, then perhaps Adolf Hitler would have abandoned his ambitions in Europe. Truman feared that appeasement of another European dictator in Joseph Stalin would lead to another global war, just as a direct conflict with the Soviet Union could.
History also gives reason for Truman to be concerned for the integrity of the international organization, the United Nations. In Truman’s meeting with Congressional leaders he said of the Korean conflict; it was “the clearest test case that the United Nations had ever faced.”[26] Truman then goes on to say, “If the United Nations is ever going to do anything, this is the time, and if the United Nations cannot bring the crisis in Korea to an end, then we might just as well wash up the United Nations and forget it.”[27] Truman’s fear was that if the United Nations failed to act when the case for intervention was, in his mind, clear would make the United Nations impotent. In 1935, when Italy attacked Ethiopia, the League of Nations—precursor to the United Nations—failed to act. It became clear that the League of Nations would be ineffective in its purpose of preserving peace. The United Nations could go the same way as the League of Nations if it failed to meet this early test and curb aggression on the Korean Peninsula.
George Kennan stated in his memoir that he initially supported Truman’s decision to enter into the Korean Conflict on the side of South Korea.[28] He agreed with Truman that America could not afford to let Communist aggression stand in Korea because it “would have been wholly disruptive of our prestige in Asia.”[29] Asia was a region of instability; France was trying to reestablish her colonies in Indo-China, China had fallen to Communism, and Japan, who America had hoped would be a strong ally in Asia, was still rebuilding after the war. If American prestige was undermined by Communist forces in Asia, then the prospects of containing Communism in the region were bleak. Although, according to author Nicholas Thompson, he did not support America’s entering under the banner of the United Nations, because Kennan believed the UN would inhibit America’s ability to accomplish its objectives.[30]
Despite his initial support, Kennan did have some reservations about America’s involvement. He believed that America should play a limited role; only to reestablish the status quo of a Korea divided at the 38th parallel.[31] To try and achieve more than returning to prewar boundaries would be to involve the US in a larger scale conflict which would overextend her resources. Even if the United States was successful in limiting its engagement in Korea, its involvement in the conflict could provoke the Soviet Union or the People’s Republic of China, leading to a larger war which the US might not be prepared to fight. Furthermore, Kennan says the Korean Peninsula is not the spot where the US would want to engage in a large-scale conflict.[32] The very reason that the Korean Peninsula would not be an ideal location to begin a major conflict necessitates careful, informed action driven by policy objectives and not military objectives.
As early as August 1950, George Kennan began to have misgivings about how the war was being conducted. In a memo sent to Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, on August 23, 1950, Kennan recommends that the US should seek to end their involvement in the Korean War as quickly as possible.[33] Early in the war Kennan was able to foresee the pitfalls of America’s involvement in the Korean War.
At the time Kennan had sent the memo to Secretary of State Acheson the tide of the Korean conflict had shifted in favor of the United Nations forces under the command of American General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur wanted total victory and saw the Korean War as an opportunity to roll Communism back, at least out of the Korean Peninsula, and not just contain it. Kennan argues that it was not overly important to American interests to see a Korea united under an anti-Communist regime.[34] Kennan goes on to say that America does not have the resources to ensure that Korea remains sovereign, and Korea will not be able to maintain her independence herself when faced with pressure from both the Soviet Union and Japan.[35]
Kennan believed that ultimately the Korean Peninsula would fall under the purview of either the Soviet Union or Japan, and as a result America should seek a policy towards Korea which would allow Japanese influence to become dominant in that region.[36] To achieve this goal “it is important that nominal independence of Korea be preserved” so that once Japan reestablished its prewar strength, Korea could fall into its sphere of influence in Asia.[37] Kennan believed that American national interests in Asia were tied to the success of Japan’s ability to rebuild her strength, and for Japan to regain her prewar strength friendly powers in the region are necessary, making the defense of South Korea a necessity for American interests in Asia.
George Kennan did not appreciate the freedom from direct control of Washington that General Douglas MacArthur enjoyed, nor the fact that no one in Washington knew exactly what he was doing.[38] Kennan was also uncomfortable with the fact that as a result of this freedom, MacArthur was able to “determin[e] [American] policy in the north Asian and western Pacific areas” and in doing so make “statements that are being made—and the actions taken—in [America’s] name.”[39] Kennan believed that the latitude given to MacArthur was dangerous because it gave MacArthur the ability to dictate policy in Korea when the political and diplomatic policies should have been driving American action, and these actions had the potential to not only hurt America’s prestige in Asia but around the world as well.
MacArthur, for his part, said that despite what America did in Korea, the Soviet Union would not respond. Kennan believed otherwise, due to the proximity of the Korean border to the Soviet Union and an understanding of Soviet insecurity.[40]
Truman accepted MacArthur’s advice because MacArthur had spent his career in the Pacific and presumably understood the dynamics of the relationships in the region. But it was Kennan who was able to accurately predict the response of the Soviet Union.
Kennan believed one of the greatest lessons of the Korean War involved the situation surrounding MacArthur. MacArthur’s military considerations alone placed the US in a dangerous position because leaders in Washington were either unwilling or unable to temper MacArthur’s decisions with political considerations.[41] Kennan supported Truman’s decision to relieve MacArthur of his position because for the first time during the Korean War control over policy of the war was under Washington’s control.[42] Regaining control over the policy of the Korean War allowed politicians to bring the war to an end.
When George F. Kennan first formulated the containment policy in 1946, he carefully constructed a limited policy which would place a focused pressure on the Soviet Union in strategic locations around the world without provoking war. Although war was not taken off the table—if communism tried to aggressively expand in a region of strategic importance to the US then Kennan believed the use of force was an acceptable means to halting that progression. The National Security Council used Kennan’s ideas as the foundation of the policy they proposed in NSC-68, but in the four years since Kennan’s “Long Telegram” China had fallen to Communism and the Soviet Union had developed their own nuclear bomb. For the National Security Council this justified an expansion of the containment policy which Kennan had proposed. Because the Soviet Union had its own nuclear weapons America’s nuclear shield defending Western Europe was neutralized limiting the deterrent effect of the presence of American forces and nuclear weapons in Western Europe. After China became a Communist nation there was a new base in a new region of the world from which Communism could spread, this one in Asia. Kennan did not believe the development of the Soviet Union’s nuclear capabilities or China falling to Communism necessitated a change in his containment policy. Even with the disagreement on the scope of the containment policy Kennan and the Truman administration agreed that it was necessary to defend South Korea against North Korean aggression. But Kennan lobbied for a much more limited war and quickly became an advocate for extraction from Korea. This time in application of policy, the original objectives were expanded beyond their intent—a war to defend South Korean sovereignty became a war to roll back Communism. The objectives of the war expanded beyond their original intent because Truman allowed General Douglas MacArthur to direct policy with military objectives in mind instead of political objectives. The failure of the Korean War was the expansion of the containment policy beyond its original intent, then putting policy aside to allow a military leader to guide American foreign policy.
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Works Cited
Primary:
Kennan, George F. Memoirs, 1950-1963. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972. Print.
U.S. National Security Council, A Report to the National Security Council 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (April 1950), by The Executive Secretary. Washington D.C., 1950.
Harry S. Truman. Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Situation in Korea, July 19, 1950
U.S. Department of State, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State (February 1946), by George F. Kennan. Moscow, 1946.
U.S. Department of State, Memorandum, George F. Kennan to Dean Acheson (August 1950), by George F. Kennan. 1950.
U.S. President. 1950. Notes Regarding Meeting with Congressional Leaders. Harry S. Truman Administration File, Elsey Papers.
Secondary:
Thompson, Nicholas. The Hawk and the Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and the History of the Cold War. New York: Henry Holt, 2009. Print.
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Footnotes:
[1] Nicolas Thompson, The Hawk and The Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and The History of The Cold War (New York: Henry Hold and Company, 2009), 113
[2] Ibid.
[3] U.S. Department of State. 1946. The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State (February 1946), by George F. Kennan. Part 2
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., Part 5.1
[6] Ibid., Part 5.3
[7] Ibid.
[8] U.S. National Security Council. 1950. A Report to the National Security Council 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (April 1950), by The Executive Secretary. 13-14, 16
[9] U.S. Department of State, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State. Part 3d
[10] Ibid., Part 4.7b
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid., Part 4.7a
[13] U.S. National Security Council. 21
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid., 22
[16] Ibid., 35
[17] U.S. National Security Council. 1950. 30
[18] U.S. President. 1950. Notes Regarding Meeting with Congressional Leaders. Harry S. Truman Administration File, Elsey Papers. 1
[19] Ibid., 3
[20] Ibid., 4
[21] U.S. President. 1950. 4
[22] George Kennan, Memoirs: 1950-1963 Volume II (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press 1972), 43
[23] U.S. President. 1950. 3
[24] Ibid., 4
[25] Harry S. Truman. Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Situation in Korea, July 19, 1950
[26] U.S. President. 1950. 7
[27] Ibid.
[28] Kennan, 24
[29] U.S. Department of State. 1950. Memorandum, George F. Kennan to Dean Acheson (August10), by George F. Kennan. p. 3
[30] Thompson, 116
[31] Kennan, 24
[32] Ibid.
[33] U.S. Department of State, Memorandum, George F. Kennan to Dean Acheson. p. 2
[34] Ibid., 3
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid., 4
[37] Ibid.
[38] Kennan, 24
[39] Ibid., 25
[40] Ibid., 35
[41] Ibid., 38
[42] Kennan, 35
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